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Abstract 
This thesis explores the development and implementation of a performance measurement 
system in Indonesian regional governments. A field study approach is employed in which 
publicly available and internal documents, together with semi-structured interviews, are used 
as a comprehensive source of evidence. In 1999, the Indonesian Government, like many other 
countries in the Western world, decentralized their control to autonomous regional 
government units. Public sector reforms were introduced with significant changes to the way 
performance was measured and managed in areas such as education, health, government 
planning and infrastructure, as well as financial management of budgets. As part of the 
decentralisation process, the central government put mechanisms in place to ensure their 
overarching vision and strategies effected transparency in performance and resource 
allocation.  
Drawing on the performance measurement literature and taking a New Institutional 
Sociology (NIS) approach, an analysis of the discharge of accountability, public sector 
governance and performance measurement system (PMS) change over 15 years (1999-2015) 
was conducted to provide insights into: a) regional governments’ underlying motivation for 
adapting to change; b) performance measurement system (PMS) introduction, development 
and implementation over time; c) whether there were any major impediments to the 
implementation of the national framework on performance measurement at a regional level; 
and d) the extent to which accountability has been impacted. Different stages of change were 
identified, as follows; a) the introduction of PMS for accountability (1998-2003); b) revision 
in performance planning and budgeting, and the introduction of Key Performance Indicators 
(2004-2009); and c) improvement in PMS regulations (2010-2015). 
The findings of this study support NIS research, in that the main motivation of regional 
governments towards adopting the national framework was for meeting legitimacy needs as 
well as there being strong evidence of coercive isomorphism that results in compliance. In 
particular, a number of impediments were noted during these evolutionary stages. These 
include: low levels of top management commitment; passive attitude/apathetic behavior 
towards PMS among staff in accountability units; low institutional capacity; lack of 
coordination among policy setters in the central government; communication problems 
between policy setters in the central government and implementers at regional governments; 
conflicts of interest among stakeholders at regional level; and a high level of informality (in 
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relation to PMS and administrative control), which influence decision making processes at 
both higher and lower levels management. Each of these has provided obstacles to the 
development and implementation of PMS. Furthermore, in response to the discharge of 
accountability, PMS has been largely implemented and used for accountability purposes; in 
particular, towards the central government, the major regional governments’ stakeholder. 
Regional governments’ response in meeting the need to fulfil accountability requirements to 
other stakeholders remains limited. 
The research contributes to the literature in several ways. While reforms in industrial 
countries have been comprehensively studied, there has been less attention paid to public 
sector performance measurement reforms in developing countries such as Indonesia. The 
present research is intended to fill this gap by providing evidence of the evolution of 
performance measurement and the discharge of accountability in the Indonesian public 
sector. In addition, the present research contributes not only to management accounting 
literature by providing evidence from a developing country perspective, but also provides 
valuable insights into practical applications for policy makers and public sector accountants, 
for future policies and further designs and application of reliable PMS. It also offers an 
opportunity for other countries with similar socio-economic conditions to those of Indonesia 
to learn from the practices identified.  
Keywords: Performance Measurement System, New Institutional Sociology, Legitimacy, 
Isomorphism, Indonesian regional governments 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Research in the area of public sector performance measurement has recently became popular 
in both accounting (Abernethy et al. 2005; Brignall & Modell 2000; Cavalluzzo & Ittner 
2004; Speklé & Verbeeten 2014) and non-accounting literature (Anderson 2001; Bernstein 
2001; Heinrich 2002; Propper & Wilson 2003). The emergence of New Public Management 
(NPM), and subsequently New Public Financial Management (NPFM), have triggered the 
change in public sector management practice from a traditional model to a business-like 
mechanism. This follows a belief that the business model may deliver better performance and 
accountability (Guthrie, Olson & Humphrey 1999; Hood 1991, 1995). Another mechanism 
that has been introduced into the public sector is the principle of good governance in which 
transparency and accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of public services are taken into 
consideration (UNESCAP 2009). In addition, the philosophy of corporate governance, 
initially used in the private sector, has now been applied in public sector management reform 
(Ryan & Ng 2000). 
Since the emergence of these approaches to improving public sector management 
performance, the issue of public sector performance measurement and accountability has 
arisen as the community expectation of better public services is increasing. Constituents or 
stakeholders have become more aware of public sector expenditure. They increasingly 
scrutinise and question how public money is being utilized (Allmendinger, Tewdwr-Jones & 
Morphet 2003). In order to be accountable, the public sector has to be able to produce reliable 
measures for their performance and accurate data to be measured. Thus, there is a very strong 
relationship between performance measurement and accountability. For the purpose of the 
present research, particular focus is put on the discharge of such responsibilities between 
regional and central government, and how the relationship with other constituents is 
managed. 
The increase in public interest into public accountability has directed the need for research in 
the area of public sector management accounting and the utilisation of performance 
management and measurement innovations (Broadbent & Guthrie 1992, 2008). Since then, a 
considerable amount of management accounting research on the topic of performance 
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measurement has been conducted in industrialised countries, which has provided a significant 
contribution to the literature. Nonetheless, the practice in developing countries remains 
largely uncovered in the literature. Hence, the present study aims to provide evidence of 
performance measurement system (PMS) change for the better discharge of accountability, 
from a developing country perspective.  
The setting for the study is the Indonesian public sector. As many countries in Asia, 
Indonesia had to deal with currency depreciation in the mid-1990s in which resulted the loss 
of trust for government administration. As a consequence, remarkable demonstration from 
various community elements made the 32 year old-New Order regime collapse. The new 
government administration then researched for alternative solutions for a better management 
practices. One of the reforms initiated has been the measurement of government performance 
at all levels. Since 1999, The Indonesian Government has begun to recognise the value of 
performance measurement and accountability. Since then, as part of public bureaucracy 
reform, a number of regulatory requirements have been published by the central government 
and imposed on all government level agencies to comply with latest performance 
management initiatives. Nevertheless, a recent central government assessments of 
performance accountability indicate that a large number of local and provincial governments 
are not making satisfactory achievements (MSAEBR 2014a, 2014b).  
The Indonesian jurisdiction consists of three layers of governments i.e., local governments, 
provincial governments and the central government. In terms of PMS, both local and 
provincial governments are subject of the same central government regulations and both are 
accountable to the central government at similar extent. For simplicity, hereafter, local and 
provincial governments will be referred to as regional governments.  
1.2 Objective of the study and research questions 
The objective of the present research is to better understand the impact of the central 
government mandate on Indonesian regional governments’ PMS and accountability, 
following the last 15 years of public sector reforms. Following this objective, the present 
study seeks to document the development and implementation of PMS reform since the 
introduction of Presidential Instruction Number 7/1999.
1
 This thesis also examines views on 
the notion of accountability, which have been gathered from a number of qualitative data 
                                                 
1
 This is the first regulation on PMS in response to public bureaucracy reform. 
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sources. By exploring the evolution of PMS development over time, along with its 
implementation, the study reveals a rational explanation for the current practice of PMS 
implementation, provides an understanding of how public sector management administers the 
changes, and also exposes consequences of government accountability requirements. 
To meet the objectives of this study, and to better understand the discharge of accountability 
through performance measurement in the Indonesian public sector, the proposed research 
questions are:  
RQ1. To what extent are regional governments motivated to adapt their PMS to the central 
government initiative? 
RQ2. How has PMS been introduced, developed and implemented at regional level of 
government over the last 15 years? 
RQ3. To what extent has the development and implementation of the national framework on 
performance measurement been impeded at a regional level?  
RQ4. Have there been any significant impacts on accountability following the performance 
measurement change initiative? 
1.3 Contribution of the study 
The study contributes in multiple ways. Theoretically, this study is designed to enrich the 
management accounting literature on performance measurement and accountability within 
public sector organisations, in particular through the provision of evidence from a developing 
country practice. It provides a better perspective to view the topic in a balanced way as it 
increases the proportion of developing country studies in this area.  
In contributing to the institutional literature the study reveals that isomorphic processes do 
occur and operate simultaneously to gain momentum. For instance, the central government 
powerful regulations act as coercive force which is enhanced through assistance from 
government representatives in each region. This finding provides empirical evidence of 
institutionalisation. It is worthy to note also that the coercive pressures result in unintended 
consequences. For example, the central government’s imposed requirements are in conflict 
with the demands from the House of Representatives. As a result, the regional governments 
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act as if they comply, but in fact are disguising some aspects of the requirements to balance 
the interests of all. This empirical finding provides support for the new thoughts on NIS.  
That is, the proponents believe that internal management do not necessarily comply with the 
institutional environment, instead managers have available different strategic choices that 
they can call upon in response to the pressures. 
Practically, the findings of this study provide insights for the Indonesian central government 
policy makers in their attempts to produce robust performance measurement policies and a 
framework for performance measurement systems in the future. The study is also useful for 
professionals, e.g. public sector accountants in regional government administrations, in 
developing a reliable system of performance measurement and discharge of accountability 
requirement.  
Finally, this research provides other developing nations, particularly countries with similar 
socio-economics conditions to those of Indonesia, with the opportunity to learn from the 
practices identified. 
1.4 Key findings  
Performance measurement practice in the Indonesian government post 1999 was heavily 
influenced by USA and UK practices. The imitation of the United State Government 
Performance and Result Act (GPRA) elements and later the implementation of a performance 
agreements mechanism show this influence. Efforts to produce a framework of performance 
measures that is applicable to both central and regional governments were important in 
bureaucracy reforms initiated in 1999 in Indonesia. This framework has since been made 
compulsory, including at regional government level, and has been diffused down to agency 
level. With a number of practice-based shortcomings, regional government has to a certain 
extent implemented this framework in their PMS in order to secure legitimacy. Since 
performance reporting has been made compulsory, regional governments cannot deny their 
obligation to develop and implement the performance measurement system, regardless of its 
perceived benefit and usefulness. 
Since its introduction, the central government-imposed PMS has gone through some 
revisions, which can be categorised into three major stages of evolutionary change. The first 
stage (1999-2003) was marked by the introduction of Presidential Instruction number 7/1999 
on government institution performance reporting. At this initial stage, PMS was not well 
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translated into practices at regional governments, due to insufficient knowledge and skill 
amongst regional government staff on the one hand, and on the other hand inadequate 
guidelines. For instance, performance planning as a basis for performance measurement has 
not been adequately addressed in regulations, which has resulted in difficulties in fully 
implementing PMS.  
The second stage in the PMS evolution (2004-2009) is taken to begin with initiatives to 
strengthen performance planning and performance budgeting carried out by different leading 
agencies of the central government. Performance planning incorporates long term (i.e. twenty 
year planning), medium term (i.e. five year planning) and annual planning. Annual planning 
is presumably designed to set the base for resource allocation, including budget 
appropriation. Meanwhile, key performance indicators (KPIs) were introduced as means of 
measuring the achievement of governments’ goals and strategic objectives. Due to lack of 
coordination among policy setters (i.e. leading agencies in the central government setting the 
performance-related guidelines), the level of integration among planning, performance and 
budgeting remains low in the field. 
The last stage in PMS evolution (2010-present) is marked by the release of a revision in 
performance agreements and performance reporting regulation. Eventually, at the latest 
period in the PMS evolution, presidential regulation number 29/2014 was released to 
supersede presidential instruction number 7/1999, after 15 years of its enforcement. This 
latest regulation and its subsequent guidelines focus on strengthening the integration between 
performance-related system, and the empowering internal review of performance reporting.  
During these evolutionary stages, the PMS framework has been revised a number of times. 
Nonetheless, the usefulness of its application at the regional level of government remains 
limited due to a number of obstacles that impede the development and implementation 
process. At the regional level, these obstacles are associated with managerial commitment, 
attitude, institutional capacity, conflict of interest, and informality; while at the central level 
they present as a lack of coordination and of communication. 
In terms of accountability, regional governments tend to fulfill external, vertical 
accountability to satisfy the central government legislative requirements, through on-time 
compliance in producing performance reporting. The central government tends to be the 
major stakeholder, and accountability towards the other stakeholders such as the House of 
Representative and the general public remains limited. The utilisation of PMS and its 
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reporting have been mostly ceremonial, with no evidence of their utilisation for internal 
policy decision making.  
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The organisation of the remainder of the thesis is outlined as follows: 
Chapter 2 elaborates the relevant prior literature and reviews public sector performance 
measurement system and accountability in general, and specific literature in relation to the 
Indonesian context of management accounting reform and the practices of its neighboring 
countries. 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical foundation for this study, where a description of the 
theoretical lens used and its contribution to the research question development are discussed. 
This chapter then elaborates on the research process, wherein research questions were 
operationalised through the construction of semi-structured interview questions. 
Chapter 4 presents a detailed description of methodological aspects of the research, where 
philosophical assumptions underlying qualitative research and justification for the method 
selection, as well as attempts to increase methodological rigor of the research, are depicted.  
Chapter 5 presents the research setting: where the field study takes place, and a brief 
description of PMS in practice in Indonesia. 
Chapter 6 details the findings of the research in the field where all relevant evidence was 
collected and analysed, from data sources within the Indonesian public sector setting.  
Chapter 7 offers a discussion of the findings presented in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 8 also presents concluding remarks, limitations of the research and potential future 
extensions that might be expected from the present study.    
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of literature on public sector performance measurement and 
accountability. This area of research has interested academia since the emergence of the NPM 
paradigm, which has contributed to a significant change in public sector practices in OECD
2
 
countries and eventually the entire world. There is a rich literature in public sector 
performance measurement not only in the management domain but also from an accounting 
perspective. As the literature covers a wide area, the present discussion focuses on previous 
studies that share perspectives on the motivations for adopting a PMS and associated issues in 
the process of adoption, development and implementation.  
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of public sector PMS in general, which is followed 
by a description of NPM, NPFM, and good governance agendas, as well as corporate 
governance philosophy that switch public management practices. The next section provides a 
thorough discussion of PMS adoption and impediments to this, before a deliberation on 
accountability is presented. A number of accountability dimensions that suit the public sector 
mechanisms are elaborated to enrich understanding of the role of such dimensions and how 
they are discharged in the public sector. 
2.2 Public sector PMS 
The public sector, by definition, may be referred to as a sector in which products or services 
are aimed at serving the public interest (Lane 2000). In this sense, the orientation is different 
from the private sector (e.g. not towards the maximization of profit) (Wal, Graaf & 
Lasthuizen 2008). Instead of profit optimisation, the utmost aim of public sector activities is 
that of achieving appropriate outcomes in serving the community in the most efficient and 
effective manner (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000). Hence, products or services with little 
economic margins, for example basic education, are in general not considered appropriate to 
be run by the private sector. In addition, there are areas which are considered the exclusive 
domain of government, such as legal enforcement and defense. These kinds of products or 
services are retained in the public sector and should be managed by the government for the 
                                                 
2
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Currently there are 34 developed countries - 
mostly European countries – included as members of the OECD. 
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sake of community interests. The governments run the public sector through departments and 
other means. The scope of this sector is quite large. It may contain a central government with 
its departments and units, states or provincial governments, local authorities, and state-owned 
enterprises.  
Nonetheless, due to the complex factors arising from the global fiscal crisis and the increased 
in size of bureaucratic organisations, which have contributed to the call for better 
performance in such organisations (Broadbent & Guthrie 1992), attempts to provide 
substantial changes to public management have been initiated globally to accelerate 
performance and improve accountability. One of these initiatives is that public sector 
practices borrow some of the practices of the private sector (Hood 1991). This initiative has 
been supported by a large number of proponents, and has resulted in the change of certain 
public sector features such as the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (Milne, 
Roy & Angeles 2012; Parker1990) and the adoption of accrual basis accounting (Christensen 
2002; Guthrie 1998; Paulsson 2006). This practice of adopting private sector practices in 
public management has reduced the differences between the nature of both sectors to some 
extent (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012).  
Similarly to the private sector, public sector performance measurement now encompasses a 
variety of measures to better assess performance results. It consists of not only financial 
measures but may also incorporate a number of other qualitative measures, such as measures 
of the effectiveness and efficiency of core business, measures from the customer perspective, 
as well as capacity-enhancing measures (Kaplan & Norton 1995). Performance measurement 
‘is a basic management tool, it is an activity that must be placed firmly between sound policy 
decisions about the objectives of the service, programme, organisation, to be measured and 
judgmental process leading to rational decision making’ (Redfern 1986, p. 5). Thus, the 
public sector PMS is not a stand-alone unit; rather, it lies upon the policy decisions on 
planning (where goals and objectives are set) and budgeting (where funding is allocated 
based on pre-determined programs to achieve planning outcomes) (Redfern 1986). The PMS 
serves the purpose of boosting managerial performance and enhancing accountability (Kloot 
1999). However, many studies show that an externally imposed PMS does not necessarily 
translate into improved performance and internal evaluation (internal accountability), but 
may have a positive impact upon external accountability (Cavalluzzo & Ittner 2004; 
Halachmi 2002).  
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2.2.1 NPM and NPFM as impetuses for change 
The focus on change in public sector management practices came about as a result of the 
1970s recession, whereby governments around the world were impacted by the consequences 
of previous excesses associated with loose monetary policies, by soaring oil prices and post-
Vietnam war investment spending led by the US Government (see, for example, Gruening 
2001). This recession resulted in public service retrenchment and budget cuts (Dunshire 
1995). The blame for this cut was placed on government bureaucracy, which was argued to 
be incapable of managing the necessary change (Peters & Savoie 1994). This was a difficult 
time for the government sector, where on one hand administrations had to deal with 
deficiencies in financial resources that could lead to the sacrifice of social policies; while on 
the other hand this sector saw a rise in community expectations of the quality of services 
(Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). Furthermore, imbalanced living conditions in the era of 
unregulated industrialisation had also driven governments to intervene, in order to ensure 
sufficient supply of social needs to avoid worsening living conditions of their citizens 
(Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). The public administration modernisation initiative that was in 
place at the time had not been able to address those issues, and did not generate government 
management improvements to an acceptable extent (Baimyrzaeva 2012a). These 
shortcomings in the reform agenda provided leverage for the emergence of subsequent 
initiatives in managing the public sector. 
From the early 1980’s, the public witnessed a shift in government management practices as a 
result of initiatives commenced in advanced economies such as the United Kingdom, with its 
‘Financial Management Initiative’ project, and the United States of America with its 
‘Reinventing Government’ agenda (Jones & McCaffery 1997; Jowet & Rothwell 1988). 
Similar agendas also started to be visible soon after in other countries, through various 
initiatives. All initiatives developed were aimed at improving public sector effectiveness and 
efficiency in delivering products and services to the community, so as to make this sector 
more accountable to its stakeholders. During that time, academics then started introducing 
NPM as a generic universal terminology replacing various individual terms for initiatives in 
different jurisdictions (Gruening 2001).  
One theme that emerged for public sector management change that was unanimously agreed 
to by policy makers and academics was that the private sector management form could be 
used in the public sector as a model to imitate, since the former has clearer goals and 
objectives, and a relevant measurement system of goal achievement (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 
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2012; Guthrie et al. 2005). Subsequently, government management practices imitated what 
had been practiced primarily in the private sector; and over time the differences between 
public sector and private sector have, as a result, lessened (Guthrie et al. 2005).  
In order for the public sector to imitate the practices of the private sector, a number of NPM 
components are essentially needed to be adhered to. According to Hood (1995), these 
components consist of: 
- unbundling of the public sector into corporatized units; 
- developing contract-based competitive provision; 
- stress on private sector style of management practice; 
- stress on discipline and frugality in resource use; 
- emphasis on visible, hands-on top management; 
- development of explicit formal measurement standards and measures of performance; and 
- greater emphasis on output control. 
To start the reform process, Hood (1991, 1995) advocated these components/areas be 
addressed by public sector organisations for an NPM change; and one of the requirements 
was to possess explicit standards and measures of performance. The justification for this 
change came, firstly, from the awareness that a clear statement of government goals is 
essential in order to hold the government accountable for actions taken upon resources 
allocated by taxpayers; and secondly, from the acknowledgement that, to evaluate the 
achievement of those pre-determined goals a set of reliable indicators of measurement is a 
necessity (Hood 1991). 
Within the public sector management accounting research agenda, the term NPFM (Guthrie 
et al. 2005; Guthrie, Olson & Humphrey 1999) subsequently tended to be  used instead of 
NPM to place emphasis on the financial and accounting purposes. Management change under 
NPFM reform can be categorised under five different themes: change to financial reporting 
systems; the development of commercially-minded and market-oriented management systems 
and structures; development of a performance measurement approach; decentralization or 
delegation of budgets; and change to internal and external public sector auditing (Christensen 
2002; Guthrie et al. 2005; Guthrie, Olson & Humphrey 1999). Similarly to NPM, NPFM 
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indicates a strong requirement for performance measurement improvement, as explicitly 
described as an element for change. Hence, a reliable PMS is vital in government 
management for improved performance and accountability purposes. 
While the adoption of an NPM/NPFM reform agenda in OECD countries has been 
reasonably advanced, the application of such initiatives in developing countries is somewhat 
less comprehensive. Due to distinct characteristics of developing countries, they have tried to 
implement selective elements of NPM/NPFM to suit their needs, context and capabilities 
(Samaratunge, Alam & Teicher 2008; Samaratunge & Benningtoon 2002). Indeed, the 
application of such an agenda requires full consideration. Developing countries have to pay 
attention to prerequisite conditions such as building managerial capacity and diminishing the 
scope for informality (Schick 1998). The results of NPM application in developing countries 
are mixed, between leading countries and those lagging behind in their application 
(Samaratunge, Alam & Teicher 2008). 
2.2.2 Corporate governance and good governance as more recent public sector reform 
frameworks 
Besides NPM, another philosophy introduced into public sector management reform is 
corporate governance. This philosophy also came from an initiative introduced in the 
corporate sector. Corporate governance, in simple terms, is defined as ‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury 1992, p. 14). Corporate governance was 
initially applied in the private sector as guide for the conduct of practice. In 1991, a 
committee on financial aspects of good governance was set up in the UK, chaired by Adrian 
Cadbury (Cadbury 1992). The objective of this committee was to set a code of conduct as 
standard or framework for business, to be continually reviewed and controlled. The code 
works on three principles: openness (i.e., open/transparent in disclosing performance 
information), integrity (i.e., straightforward dealing and completeness in presenting the full 
picture of company’s affairs), and accountability (i.e., board of directors are accountable to 
stakeholders, whilst both play equal roles in making accountability effective) (Cadbury 
1992).  
In the public sector, the adoption of corporate governance principles started to be commenced 
in the UK when the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) released 
their corporate governance framework (Ryan & Ng 2000). However, due to the distinctive 
characteristics of the public sector, the principles of corporate governance have been 
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broadened. For instance, CIPFA incorporate the principles that acknowledge the diversity of 
stakeholders in the public sector as well as include performance information in the 
framework (Ryan & Ng 2000). Nonetheless, the most important consideration in determining 
these principles is that they should meet performance expectations. Carpenter (1998) argues 
that public sector corporate governance is about organisational performance. This 
performance dimension, then, is considered more appropriate in public sector corporate 
governance (Ryan & Ng 2000).  
In promoting change in the public sector, first the US, and then globally recognised 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, developed initiatives to 
be adopted by developing countries; most of which seem not to have translated well into 
practice (Baimyrzaeva 2012a). The promoters of such initiatives were over-confident of the 
proposed model’s capabilities, without considering the imbalance between the environmental 
aspects and political condition of the recipient countries (Baimyrzaeva 2012b). Examining 
this phenomenon, these donors (i.e., the World Bank and International Monetary Bank) 
eventually designed an agenda which is often referred to as ‘good governance’.  
Good governance emerged in the mid-1990s at about the same time as the introduction of 
corporate governance; and the emphasis thereafter changed to improving the capacity and 
quality of government institutions, rather than merely focusing on market-like mechanisms as 
suggested in NPM (Baimyrzaeva 2012c). However, there is no single explicit definition of 
good governance supplied in literature. UNESCAP (2009, p. 1) describes governance as ‘the 
process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not 
implemented).’ Thus, it is implied that good governance is the process of the implementation 
of good decisions through good process. The process of good implementation involves eight 
major elements that may be used to describe governance as good or not good. UNESCAP 
(2009) lists these characteristics of good governance as:  
- equal participation between genders,  
- the empowerment of rule of law, 
- enhanced transparency, 
- responsiveness to stakeholders, 
- consensus orientation towards serving the best interests of the whole community, 
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- maintenance of equity and inclusiveness of all groups in the society,  
- effectiveness and efficiency taken into consideration in producing the results that meet 
society needs, and  
- enhanced accountability to all stakeholders.  
In relation to performance measurement, the transparency characteristic of good governance 
is reflected in the performance reporting mechanism; while effectiveness and efficiency 
measures exhibit the outcomes and results of PMS implementation. Some believe that the 
shift from traditional structures of governance have not been fully replaced, and that some 
practices are overlapping or coexist to suit the capability of reform (Wiesel & Model 2014): 
for example, while promoting good governance, the reform at the same time implements 
NPM elements under public administrative bureaucracy.  
From all the above perspectives, it is clear that performance measurement is at the centre of 
discussions in public sector management reform. The present research extends the literature 
by providing evidence of the evolution of a PMS, associated issues surrounding its 
application and the extent of accountability following the implementation. 
2.2.3 PMS adoption and impediments 
In the past only few countries have learnt the NPM-assisted market mechanism PMS and 
New Zealand saw a good practice (Schick 1998). Further to the New Zealand experience, 
more countries then adopting the model and the rest developing their own techniques (Schick 
1998). In general, a variety of performance measurement tools have been introduced in the 
public sector as part of management accounting change: for example, Balanced Scorecards 
(Kloot & Martin 2000; Northcott & Taulapapa 2012), KPIs, and Activity Based-Costing 
(ABC) (Jackson & Lapsley 2003). However, the level of adoption and implementation varies 
depending on the strength of the influence of top management commitment (Cavalluzzo & 
Ittner 2004), parliamentary support (Jones & McCaffery 1997) and adequate training as 
contributed factors (Shields 1995). Others also believe that institutional capacity and level of 
informality contribute to the design and implementation of PMS (Mimba, Helden & Tillema 
2007). These shortcomings have to be addressed in the outset in order for PMS adoption and 
implementation to be useful.  
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The important value of top management commitment to the success of managerial 
innovations has been much studied in the literature. Fernandez and Rainey (2006) propose the 
need to ensure top management support and commitment, as one critical factor in managing a 
successful change in the public sector. Similarly, Berman and Wang (2000) contend that, for 
success in performance measurement reform implementation, the role of political support 
from elected officials is critical. In a survey to determine the factors that lead to successful 
ABC implementation, Shields (1995) found management commitment to be an important 
explanatory variable. In attempting to identify the incidence of ABC adoption among Scottish 
local authorities, Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2003) found that implementation was abandoned 
and sometimes rejected due to inadequate senior management commitment. This lack of 
commitment has been linked to management skepticism about the system’s usefulness and 
benefit compared to its cost (Arnaboldi & Lapsley 2003). Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004), in 
their study on Performance of US Government federal agencies, found a similar trend, where 
the level of top management commitment has a significant influence over PMS 
implementation and use. Managers are often reluctant to develop measures directly related to 
explicit objectives, because they wish to avoid the bad news that may be associated with less 
than desired performance (Anderson 2001).  
In terms of parliamentary support, conflicts of interest among legislative members and their 
potentially divergent interests from that of elected officials, also play significant roles in PMS 
development and implementation. Since public sector management deals with multiple 
stakeholders of different interests, public sector agencies often exercise ‘juggling behavior’, 
and come to a political agreements to balance the diverging stakeholders’ interests (Mimba, 
Helden & Tillema 2013, p. 24). Public sector agencies are keen to accommodate, or at least to 
compromise with stakeholders’ interests, in the fear that stakeholders’ resistance may result 
in delays in decision making (Mimba, Helden & Tillema 2007). In the budget process, a 
delay in budget approval may incur huge consequences in meeting annual government 
performance targets. Jones and McCaffery (1997) argue that the US Congress has neither 
sufficient interest in using performance information for resource decision making nor 
adequate capability to utilise it. Nonetheless, central government (Congress) directives on 
performance-related legislation have been used to reform State performance (Jones & 
McCaffery 1997). However, in practice, Jones (1993, p. 89) believes that performance 
information (for example, financial statements) cannot replace the annual budget process as a 
methodology for decision making, since budgets ‘provide the grease that keeps the wheels of 
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politics rolling.’ Jones and McCaffery (1997, p. 40) even state that ‘what members of 
Congress and their staffs care most about in budgeting is winning and losing battles over 
programs and money to operate them.’ Moreover, there is a tendency for elected legislators to 
be more concerned about re-election, and thus reluctant to impose a central government 
mandate as it may limit their decision-making ability (Jones 1993; Jones & McCaffery 1997). 
Institutional capacity is another factor to be considered by governments in adopting a PMS. 
In particular, for government organisations in developing countries, this factor is believed to 
contribute to the likely success of a PMS design and implementation (Mimba, Helden & 
Tillema 2007, 2013; Tillema, Mimba & Helden 2010). Institutional capacity has been defined 
as ‘the ability of an institution to decide on and pursue its goals, to perform tasks, and to 
improve performance constantly’ (Mimba, Helden & Tillema 2007, p. 196). In the context of 
PMS development and implementation, Berman and Wang (2000) distinguish capacity into 
technical/infrastructure capacity and stakeholder (or political) capacity. They conceptualise 
technical/infrastructure capacity as ‘the ability to develop performance goals and measures 
and to overcome such conceptual barriers as distinguishing outcomes from outputs’; while 
stakeholder (or political) capacity is believed to be related mostly to the nature of support 
from stakeholders or political interests (Berman & Wang 2000, p. 410). Therefore, low 
institutional capability is determined by a wide range of factors, including a high level of 
politicisation in the process of policy decision making, and by lacking of internal 
management resources to improve competencies (Mimba, Helden & Tillema 2013). Since 
institutional performance is a basis for a government’s capacity to fully function and to be 
able to fulfill its obligation to the community, low capacity is not a sufficient condition to 
build resilience (UNDP 2011).  
In regard to resource competencies, there have been issues in PMS implementation 
difficulties as a result of the lack of requisite competencies among public sector managers, as 
they ‘are traditionally accustomed to dealing with financial measures, but are less familiar 
with non-financial indicators and concepts such as output and outcome’ (Arnaboldi & 
Azzone 2010, p. 267). This obstacle may hinder both the system’s adoption and measures 
development process (Arnaboldi & Azzone 2010). To a certain extent, incompetence of 
human resources is related to the small amount of training provided to staff in order to 
increase their capability for developing meaningful performance measures, as is suggested by 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004). For instance, local authorities in Scotland complained of 
lacking human resources, requiring the assistance of consultants in setting up the ABC 
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system and making it useful (Fernandez & Rainey 2006). Indeed, adequate training has an 
association with employee satisfaction within innovation implementation (McGowan & 
Klammer 1997), as they are less pressured and much more confident (Shields 1995).  
Recently, level of informality has been considered to impede the process of designing and 
implementing a PMS. In particular, public sector performance measurement studies (Mimba, 
Helden & Tillema 2007, p. 198) define informality ‘as the mechanism through which 
individuals or groups influence organisational decisions and activities without having a 
formal authority to exert that influence, and/or without aligning the content of their influence 
with the goals and policies that are laid down in official documents.’ In practice such a 
definition can be simply viewed as the activity of not following formal rules in day to day 
management practices. This condition is believed to potentially occur in any country, but is 
mostly evidenced in developing countries, since they have ‘relatively weak specification of 
property rights and other formal process to regulate economic activity’ (Schick 1998, p. 127). 
A clear example of informality can be seen through subordination of formal rule-based 
practices into an informal order dictated by the practice of clientelism (Sarker 2006). 
Clientelism is defined by Scott (1972, p. 92) thus:  
…the patron-client relationship - an exchange relationship between roles - 
may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a 
largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher 
socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide 
protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his 
part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including 
personal services, to the patron. 
In the political arena, both the patron (groups or individuals) and client (politicians) share 
reciprocal benefits, and one side is contingent to the other. Politicians supply benefit to 
groups or individuals, who in turn promise support in electoral voting; and in return the 
patron will influence political decision making (Hicken 2011). The presence of clientelism, 
informally, in the government structure, such as is evidenced in some developing countries, 
has undermined the reform spirit (Sarker 2006).  
Table 2.1 (p. 30) presents a summary of literature used in this study in regard to impediments 
to PMS adoption, development and implementation within the public sector. 
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2.3 Defining accountability in the public sector  
Since the interest of the general public and other constituents to government accountability 
increased significantly due to the unfavorable past experience, governments all around the 
world had been trying to develop innovation for better practices and enhance their services 
through more legitimate and rational practices in order to survive (Meyer & Rowan 1977). As 
the importance of accountability was taken into consideration, the diffusion of various 
management accounting practices into the public sector had mounted (Carnegie & West 
2005). Performance measurement techniques are considered as one of management 
accounting’s innovations (Jackson & Lapsley 2003; Lapsley & Wright 2004). Hence, it can 
be argued that performance measurement is an accountability tools as it delivers performance 
information to stakeholders. However, unlike the for-profit organizations where good 
financial positions and financial statements constitute the level of accountability, multiple 
public sector stakeholders would consider a variety of measures in assessing the value gained 
form spending public money and the achievement of public service delivery based on their 
diverging expectation (Romzek 2000). Thus the meaning of accountability in the public 
sector context is arguably broader and it may be categorized into multiple dimensions based 
different purpose and to whom it serve. 
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Table 2.1: Main literature on public sector performance measurement used in the study 
No 
Author(s) and year 
of publication 
Journals Findings 
Link to current research topic 
development 
1 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner 
(2004) 
Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 
 
- Organisational and technical factors have influenced PMS 
and development. 
- PMS and accountability are associated with the use of 
Performance Information. 
- Little evidence of mandated PMS initiatives increasing 
with greater measurement and accountability. 
 
- Impediments to PMS development 
and implementation. 
- Results issues. 
2 
Berman and Wang 
(2000) 
Public Administration 
Review 
 
- The success of performance measurement is greatly 
affected by underlying organisational capacities, namely 
technical infrastructure and stakeholders support 
 
- Impediments to PMS development 
and implementation. 
3 
Mimba, Helden and 
Tillema (2007) 
Journal of Accounting & 
Organizational Change 
 
- This conceptual paper argues that public sector 
organisations in developing countries are facing an 
increasing demand for but insufficient supply of 
performance information. 
- The increase in demand for performance information is 
stipulated by the increased stakeholders’ involvement in 
the design of PMS. 
- Insufficient supply of information is a result of low 
institutional capacity and high level of corruption.  
 
 
- Impediment to PMS development 
and implementation. 
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4 
Jones and McCaffery 
(1997) 
Public Budgeting and 
Finance 
 
- Chief Financial Officers Act and GPRA might have not 
achieved their objectives due to barriers in their 
implementation. Among the barriers identified are that 
Congress passed the Act for wrong reasons (where they 
were not really supporting the Act) and the inability of 
Congress to use financial statement data for decision 
making.  
 
- Impediment to PMS development 
and implementation. 
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Sinclair (1995, p. 221) underlines that accountability ‘has discipline-specific meanings’ and 
that these meanings continuously develop and change. While there is no single absolute 
definition of accountability, and research largely emphasises various themes (Mutiganda 
2013), in general accountability may be defined as the acts of persons or organizations in 
reporting responsibly any conduct delegated to them by their constituents or stakeholders 
(Mulgan 2000a). Thus, people or management are held accountable for their conduct (Glynn 
& Murphy 1996). In the government or the public sectors, the notion of accountability may 
involve the obligation to responsibly answer constituents’ questions on their capability to 
provide services needed, so decisions can be made accordingly. A detailed definition of 
accountability can be found  in Gray, Adams & Owens (2014, pp. 7-8): 
At its simplest, accountability is a duty to provide information to those who 
have a right to it. It is linked closely with the notions of (social) responsibility 
and is an essential component of democracy. The greater the power an 
individual, or an organization, has over people, resources, communities, etc., 
the greater the responsibility to provide a full account of stewardship of those 
people, resources or communities. If our world is to be democratic, then those 
with the greatest power, large companies and governments, owe the greatest 
accountability. 
 
According to Peters (2007, p. 15), accountability ‘provides government with a means of 
understanding how programs may fail and finding mechanisms that can make programs better 
perform.’ He argues that, for government, accountability has been useful in encouraging 
transparency and eradicating any forms of corruption in a democratic government, since the 
public are able to question the government’s programs. Therefore, Funnel, Cooper and Lee 
(2012) believe, accountability will be a reality and not just rhetoric in a democratic society, as 
the citizens should be able to hold government accountable for value for money that has been 
spent in their best interests.  
The term accountability in the public sector, however, is very complex, and the concept has 
been developed in various dimensions as it serves different purposes (Hodges 2012; Mulgan 
2000b). Sinclair (1995, p. 231) describes accountability in the public sector as ‘chameleon-
like’, since managers have to deal with competing constituencies and thus they are held 
accountable for different things. This has resulted in multiple meanings of accountability, and 
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to some extent provides a basis for the variety of accountability dimensions identified in the 
literature. 
In performing their tasks and responsibilities, most governments today manage their 
organisations by adopting the most advanced and state of art common practices, and do not 
restrict their management system under a single regime. For instance, while adopting NPM, 
public sector organisations are also infused by New Public Governance
3
 where working 
collaboration among agencies are encouraged. Consequently, different accountability 
dimensions are taking place at the same time, and they serve different purposes. For instance, 
while NPM deals with vertical accountability, the proponents of the NPG regime are more 
concerned with horizontal accountability (Almquist et al. 2013).  
In order to be meaningful, accountability should be reported and published to external 
stakeholders for the purpose of evaluation of programs and activities achievements. The 
achievements of an organisation are assessed through a series of pre-determined indicators of 
measures, developed for performance indication by comparing the targets with actuals. 
Funnel, Cooper and Lee (2012, p. 49) claim relevant performance information is the key 
success of accountability, as they believe,  
…without the means to report on actions, there is no way of ensuring that 
responsibilities are carried out as intended. In other words, accountability 
relies upon the ability to provide an account. In the public sector, this means 
the existence of information systems which allow all aspects of accountability, 
both performance and fiduciary accountability, to be given visibility. 
2.4 Dimensions of accountability in the public sector 
The literature classifies a variety of accountability dimensions to distinguish differences 
based on their purposes, and to some extent from whom, about what and to whom they serve. 
For the purpose of the present research, public sector-related accountability dimensions are 
reviewed and discussed. However, this review does not aim cover every dimension discussed 
in the literature. Instead, is the overall range of dimensions are filtered down to those that are 
believed to be most appropriate for this particular research. One of the accountability 
                                                 
3
 The new public governance paradigm is believed to have started at the beginning of 21
st
 century, adding the 
latest thought on how the public sector should perform. A thorough discussion of this paradigm is elaborated in 
Osborne (2010), among others. 
22 
 
dimensions discussed is based on the classification provided by Bovens (2007), who 
distinguish accountability into four categories. Their classification is based on to whom 
accountability is rendered to (e.g. political and legal accountability), accountability from 
whom (e.g. corporate and hierarchical accountability) when we talk about the actors, about 
what information is to be disclosed (e.g. financial, administrative), and why the actors have to 
provide information on accountability (e.g. vertical and horizontal accountability).  
Administrative accountability, which is concerned with information disclosure on, for 
example, efficiency and effectiveness, does not receive much coverage in Bovens (2007). 
Hence, the work of Funnel, Cooper and Lee (2012) is used in the present work to illustrate 
performance accountability as an example of this administrative accountability. They 
distinguish performance accountability based on what it concerns (i.e., economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness), and put it under a performance continuum of increasing complexity and 
importance. Performance information disclosed may exhibit a government performance 
accountability position in the continuum. 
Another common classification for accountability in the public sector is a dimension that 
distinguishes between internal and external forms of accountability (Boyne et al. 2002; 
Mulgan 2000a). Each of these classifications is discussed in the following sections. 
2.4.1 Political accountability 
Political accountability locates itself at the highest level in the hierarchy of accountability, 
where each level is a derivative of another, and lower levels contribute to the higher level 
accountability (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). Eckardt (2008) asserts that political 
accountability is related to the extent to which the community is able to hold public sector 
people accountable for their conduct. Mulgan (2000a, p. 556) asserts that ‘the key 
accountability relationships in this core sense are those between the citizens and the holders 
of public office and, within the ranks of office holders, between elected politicians and 
bureaucrats.’ Since the public has delegated their power to their representatives in 
parliaments, the central issues are then around the ability of members of parliament to 
address public interests, or the ability of legislators to scrutinize government actions and 
make officials answerable for any misconduct (Mulgan 2000a). The accountability 
mechanism works in the opposite direction to this power delegation, where government is 
held accountable by legislators, and legislators by the public in general (Bovens 2007). 
Political accountability is also often referred to as democratic accountability, and without it 
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other lower levels of accountability are considered to be less useful (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 
2012).   
2.4.2 Legal accountability 
Legal accountability relies upon a principal-agent relationship, where the focus is on the 
ability of an agent to comply with the principal’s formal requirements and expectations 
(Romzek 2000). It derives from laws and regulations, and the drive for compliance with 
principal requirements is reinforced by legal scrutiny and legislative oversight (Bovens 2007; 
Romzek 2000). In reality, a form of legal accountability can be found in governments’ 
compliance with regulatory instructions for any expenditure disbursed from the budget, and it 
is also labeled fiduciary accountability as it concerns the correctness of expenditures against 
regulations (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). In the past this kind of accountability has been the 
form of accountability of the most concern in the public sector, where governments are held 
accountable and are expected to be able to answer to the legality aspect of their conduct 
(Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012).  
2.4.3 Corporate and hierarchical accountability 
On the nature of the actors, where the emphasis is on whom should render accountability, in 
the present research to the importance of two types of accountability are discussed, namely 
corporate accountability and hierarchical accountability. Bovens (2007, p. 13) claims that 
‘many public organisations are corporate bodies with an independent legal status’, and thus 
‘can operate as unitary actors to be held accountable accordingly.’ Organisations take full 
responsibility for collective outcomes and are accountable as a corporate, without too much 
consideration for underperforming individuals/units (Bovens 2007). Meanwhile, in 
hierarchical accountability individuals as actors are responsible for their conduct 
hierarchically: those who are at the top end of an organisational hierarchy take all the blame 
(Bovens 2007). Then, in turn, the conduct of middle-level managers, down to the lowest 
authorities, is addressed internally. 
2.4.4 Financial accountability 
In order for political or democratic accountability to be effective, the role contributed by 
financial accountability is inevitable (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). In line with public sector 
reform, financial reform, which includes the introduction of performance-based budgeting, 
has been diffused through public or government institutions to enhance effectiveness and 
efficiency and to promote transparency, which in turn results in better accountability. In 
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terms of budgeting, financial accountability serves to provide an answer for the appropriate 
allocation and disbursement of the government budget. Governments would not be able to 
perform their duties serving their communities without the support of the budget as a vital 
input. This input (in monetary terms) is mostly raised from citizens through levies or taxation, 
besides other sources. Hence, the government is accountable for any activities and programs 
conducted using taxpayers’ money. The performance-based budgeting system that was 
originally practiced in the private sector has today spread into public activities to optimize the 
effectiveness of programs (Lee & Wang 2009). Financial accountability is very important in 
the public sphere as the public demands answers for the appropriate use of budgets for the 
best public interests, especially in an era of resource constraint.  
2.4.5 Performance accountability 
The interpretation of accountability has changed over time, with an earlier narrow definition 
of accountability, where the government function was assessed using input measures such as 
the legal use of budgets, has been expanded to focus more on output and outcomes measures 
(Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). As with the private sector, the public sector is now managing 
performance by considering both financial and non-financial aspects. This practice is widely 
accepted due to the belief that public management needs to incorporate a set of leading, 
forward-focused indicators or measures with the ability to provide a drive for performance, in 
addition to traditionally lagging financially-focused measures (Chan 2004; Ittner & Larcker 
1998; Kaplan & Norton 1995), in order to allow the immediate remedy for any defect in 
performance during the process. 
In general, stakeholders would like to witness and assess the achievement of government 
programs and strategic objectives in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Unlike 
the private sector, however, the public needs their money spent appropriately without 
sacrificing outcomes (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). Therefore, effectiveness measures of 
performance are the most important aspect in public sector accountability, as compared to 
efficiency and economy aspects (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). This is reasonable since 
governments must accommodate public needs, even for programs that incur a big financial 
expense. 
If we further examine performance accountability, in terms of the degree to which certain 
aspects or elements are more important than others, a performance accountability continuum, 
as suggested by Funnel, Cooper and Lee (2012), may provide the best explanation. Figure 2.1 
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presents a diagram of the performance accountability continuum in the public sector. Funnel, 
Cooper and Lee (2012) divide this continuum into three aspects of concern in performance 
accountability: economy, efficiency and effectiveness.  
Figure 2.1: The public sector accountability and performance continuum 
       
 Increasing 
Sophistication 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Outputs lead to the achievement of 
policy outcomes 
 Policy and program 
effectiveness. The higher 
level of performance 
accountability 
       
  EFFICIENCY 
Inputs are related to outputs 
produced 
  
       
  ECONOMY 
The level of inputs must be 
controlled 
 The lowest performance 
accountability level. Focus is 
on the level of inputs 
       
       
   REGULARITY 
AND LEGALITY 
  The concern is with meeting 
the requirement of processes  
 
 -------- Components of performance and management accountability 
Source: Funnel, Cooper and Lee (2012, p. 52) 
The highest level is accountability, with the emphasis on policy and program effectiveness, 
while traditional accountability with its economy focus comes at the lowest end, since the 
economy is no longer the most concerning aspect in the public sector. In terms of the degree 
of sophistication, accountability with a focus on efficiency falls in the middle of the 
continuum, somewhere between effectiveness focus and economy focus accountabilities. 
Outside the performance accountability boundary, fiduciary/legal accountability exists to 
support the upper level of accountability, and is concerned with meeting legislative 
requirements in the process of managing resources. This is a very basic form of 
accountability with limited impact on performance results, but it is fundamental.  
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2.4.6 Vertical versus horizontal accountability 
Vertical accountability refers to ‘legal structures underlying public sector organisations and 
which conform to the process of authorisation and defined mandates’, where the focus is on 
whether the government has delivered outputs in an acceptable manner (Hodges 2012, p. 30). 
This means that, whenever a unit of an organisation assumes the power to a certain extent in a 
hierarchy or government structure, it retains the capacity to hold its respective subordinate 
units accountable for their conduct. In most democratic governments, accountability can be 
seen through a chain of authority delegation from highest level of authority to the lowest one, 
and individuals or teams are held responsible for resources allocated by their immediate 
superiors (Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012). For instance, employees are accountable to 
immediate superiors; departmental unit managers are accountable to their respective chief 
executive officers, and so forth up to the highest position in the hierarchy.  
In contrast, horizontal accountability is a concept of accountability ‘where the accountee is 
not hierarchically superior to the accountor’ (Schillemans 2011, p. 390). Instead, the term is 
used to describe the external control over the practices of a particular institution by other 
interested parties (Schillemans 2011). For government institutions, the most direct examples 
of horizontal accountability are the relationship between the executive and legislative 
branches of the government, or between public sector agencies and clients and other interest 
groups. It has been suggested that accountability under the NPM regime would fall under the 
vertical dimension (Almquist et al. 2013), since higher level authorities delegate some tasks 
and responsibilities to lower level authorities and they own the rights to receive information 
on tasks performed by their subordinates. Almquist et al. (2013) also indicate that those under 
a NPG regime would promote horizontal accountability practices, where collaboration work 
among agencies or different branches of government in performing tasks requires disclosure 
of each party’s achievement.  
2.4.7 External versus internal accountability 
This dimension of accountability originally comes from the two main schools of thought in 
politics in the 1940s in the US in defining the term ‘responsibility’, where one side 
emphasized the inward responsibility to professional standards and value, while the other side 
highlighted the importance of meeting external political directions (Mulgan 2000a). The 
debate continued half of a century later with the argument over the notion of internal and 
external accountability instead of responsibility (Mulgan 2000a). 
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Internal accountability deals with the internal interaction between a manager and his 
subordinates within an organisation, or between agency managers and politicians (Boyne et 
al. 2002). In this kind of accountability, relationships exist within the government sector to 
provide a good control system that is useful for evaluating performance and minimising 
defects in the management. Internal accountability is believed to be more effective in 
enhancing performance, despite it not being formally regulated in government sectors in most 
cases.  
By comparison, external accountability refers to the responsibility of management to be able 
to provide reasonable answers for its conduct to external stakeholders (Boyne et al. 2002). It 
may take the form the discharge of accountability of local authorities to their associated 
provincial and central governments, or accountability of governments to members of the 
House of Representatives. This type of accountability is usually well-regulated, but has 
minimal impact on real performance improvement, and compliance in producing 
performance accountability reports usually useful in meeting legitimacy demands 
(Cavalluzzo & Ittner 2004).  
2.5 Management accounting reform in the Indonesian Government and the 
practices of neighboring countries 
Management accounting reform in the Indonesian public sector started in 1999, subsequent to 
the fiscal collapse during that period in many Asian countries. The severe impact to the 
Indonesian economy resulted in the collapse of Soeharto
4
 regime (Harun 2007; Harun, H, 
Peursem & Eggleton 2012). The succeeding administration commenced reform of 
governmental systems, law and managerial practices (Akbar 2011). This new government, 
led by B.J. Habibie, was distinctly different from the previous military-style regime, in 
setting the milestone of a more democratic management. Among these reforms was the 
introduction of Law Number 22, Year 1999, on Regional Governments, where more power 
was delegated to regional governments to rule and manage their territories, through a 
decentralised system of government. This law was instituted as the prompt for ‘a major 
reorganization of political accountability chains’, since the public could now directly hold 
regional governments accountable due to their higher authority over resources (Eckardt 2008, 
p. 5). 
                                                 
4
 Soeharto was the President of Indonesia at the time. He served in the presidential position for 32 years and set 
a regime called New Order, a centralised governmental system which collapsed in the middle of 1998. 
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This reform has been in line with the idea of NPFM, where overall practices require attention 
and substantial improvement in several aspects of the managerial system need to be made. In 
fact, the reform has addressed all NPFM aspects or elements for change as described in 
Guthrie et al. (2005) and Guthrie, Olson and Humphrey (1999). For example, the Indonesian 
Government started to adopt an accrual accounting system to replace cash basis accounting, 
with the release of Government Regulation number 71/2010; and revised the financial 
reporting system through the introduction of Government Regulation number 8/2006. In 
regard to developing a commercially-minded and market-oriented structure, a large number 
of state-owned enterprises have emerged, in the areas of telecommunications to mining 
industries and from energy to water corporations, for example. Other reforms involve the 
decentralisation of the budget and improving the auditing system.  
However, the emphasis for the present research is on performance measurement reform, since 
it is a core element for change in the Indonesian public sector and provides a strong link with 
other initiatives for change, particularly the linkage among three aspects, i.e. performance 
measurement, planning, and the budgeting system. Management accounting literature on 
performance measurement systems in the developing world is considerably rare compared to 
that on the developed world. Research on East Asian countries is particularly limited. The 
present research aims to fill this gap by providing evidence of performance measurement 
system evolution and the discharge of accountability with Indonesian regional governments 
as the object of study.  
Of the limited studies within the Indonesian neighborhood, the works of Khalid (2008), 
Sutheewasinnon, Hoque and Nyamori (2015), Tooley, Hooks and Basnan (2010) and Sarker 
(2006) provide insights into the practices of PMS in this region. This body of literature has 
shown that the cause of change to performance measurement systems was the impact of 
economic recession. For example, reform in Thailand was a response to the economic crisis 
and became an entry point for international donors such as the World Bank to exert their 
power for a performance measurement change (Sutheewasinnon, Hoque & Nyamori 2015). 
Since the late 1990s, the Thai Government promoted a Performance Agreement Framework 
(PAF), which was claimed as being based on the Balanced Scorecards model, in which the 
government implemented some of the Balanced Scorecards dimensions and has gradually 
continued implementing further dimensions until they are fully understood and accepted by 
the implementers (Sutheewasinnon, Hoque & Nyamori 2015).  
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In another jurisdiction, Malaysia has unsuccessfully introduced two performance 
measurement applications (i.e., performance planning budgeting, and modified budgeting 
system) and started to introduce KPIs in 2005 to all public agencies (Khalid 2008). However, 
they reported difficulties in performance data collection and the use of KPIs-derived 
information, which are thus expected not to lead to significant changes towards effective and 
efficient service delivery (Khalid 2008). Moreover, in particular with respect to local 
authorities, Malaysia lacks clear performance reporting requirements in terms of disclosure of 
non-financial performance (Tooley, Hooks & Basnan 2010). Hence, the usefulness of KPI 
reporting was minimal and mostly used for internal purposes (Khalid 2008). Among other 
neighbors, Singapore is progressing towards a better implemention of PM and making PMS 
useful for external and internal use. In this respect, Singapore is considered to be relatively 
better than other countries in the region in terms of its ability to maintain economic 
development and good administrative infrastructure, strong political commitment from top 
management, high level of state capacity, and the ability to maintain rule of law as well as 
low level of informality (Sarker 2006).  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on public sector performance measurement and 
accountability in general, and provides a review of reform in the Indonesian public sector. 
Public sector performance measurement changes originated from the need to have an 
improved government performance and better accountability, and for this purpose, NPM and 
NPFM, including new governance and corporate governance paradigms, have much to offer. 
However, the literature has to a certain extent suggested that a mandated PMS and reporting 
has not necessarily resulted in better performance, but instead is used as a form of compliance 
that serves an external accountability purpose. Furthermore, efforts to improve performance 
are not straightforward since a number of impediments in the adoption, development and 
implementation process have been listed in the literature. In terms of accountability, the 
definition of public sector accountability is multifaceted as it has to serve multiple 
stakeholders interests which often diverge and are in conflict. This has resulted in the 
identification of a number of accountability dimensions worthy of further examination. The 
framework for Indonesian regional government performance measurement started to change 
in the late 90s. This framework provided by the central government for the purpose of better 
evaluating the government achievement and better enhancing accountability. The application 
of this framework along last 15 years of implementation requires a thorough examination. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework  
3.1 Introduction 
A theoretical framework is vital in a research process as it provides the foundation upon 
which the study is based and positioned with respect to the existing literature. The theoretical 
framework is used as a lens in developing the research questions, designing the work process, 
and analysis. A researcher should refer to the theory he/she applies throughout the research, 
as the selection of a theoretical lens may determine research directions and has implications 
for the process of the research. It also useful to increase the level of confidence in the 
findings as it provides links between the theoretical aspects and the results of a study. 
This chapter elaborates on the theoretical lens used in the study as a framework to support the 
argument is discussed, as well as the foundation to develop research questions. The present 
study employs a branch of new institutional theory rooted in the field of sociology, namely 
New Institutional Sociology (NIS). The use of this theory in examining public sector 
performance measurement research is not new, and it has been proved reliable in answering 
questions relating to the underlying motivations toward the re-organisation of systems of 
performance (see for example Carpenter & Feroz 2001, Modell 2001 and Chang 2006). In the 
present research context, this theory is also considered to be able to provide explanations for 
the processes of change in public sector performance measurement, through the evaluation of 
isomorphic processes. Evidence from previous research in a similar context is drawn upon for 
a clearer picture of the association between NIS and performance measurement research. 
Finally, in section 3.5 the chapter provides an explanation of the research process employed 
to assist the study in achieving its objective. 
3.2 New Institutional Sociology (NIS) as a lens 
Many studies on management accounting for the public sector have used institutional theory 
as a theoretical framework or lens and sometimes triangulated with other perspectives such as 
resource dependence theory Abernethy & Chua 1996; Capenter & Feroz 2001). Some have 
used a traditional perspective of old institutional economic theory in their research, such as 
Burns and Scapens (2000) while others have applied New Institutional Theory (NIT) 
sociological approaches (Carpenter, VL & Feroz 1992, 2001; Chang 2006; Modell 2001). In 
general, NIT has two branches, namely New Institutional Economics (NIE) and New 
Institutional Sociology (NIS). NIE concerns with economic rationale to explain a number of 
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different types of organisational structure and system, while NIS put emphasis on social 
aspect in which an organisation needs to embrace rules, social norms and expectation of its 
institutional environment (Scapens 2006).  For this particular research, NIS is used as a lens 
in an effort to uncover the underlying motivation of PMS change under socially 
institutionalised government organisations and to assess the evidence of influencing factors 
(in terms of isomorphic processes) on the PMS development and implementation stages. NIS 
was popularised by among others Meyer and Rowan (1977), Dimaggio and Powell (1983), 
Scott (1987) and Zucker (1987).   
NIS advocates that the rationale for bureaucratisation or formal structure of a management 
organisation lies on institutional rules exerted by powerful institutional environment 
(Dimaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977). Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 343) argue 
that formal organization structures and practices are the results of powerful institutional rules 
since its “… enforced by public opinion, by the view of important constituents, by knowledge 
legitimated through the educational system, by social prestige, by the laws, and the 
definitions of negligence and prudence used by the courts.” The state and professional bodies 
are believed have strong roles in shaping institutional environment (Dimaggio & Powell 
1983).  
While NIS discusses institutionalisation as the rationale for the formal structure of 
organisations as exerted by institutionalised environment, an understanding of two terms (i.e. 
institutionalisation and institutional environment) is important. Zucker (1977, p. 728) defines 
institutionalisasion as a ‘process by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined 
as real and, at the same time, at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined 
as more or less a taken-for-granted part of this social reality.’ From this definition, Zucker 
(1977) contends that institutionalisation has two elements: objective and exterior. Acts can be 
perceived objective if they are repeatable by other institutional actors without altering the 
understandings and they are embedded in formal structures of similar organisations (Zucker 
1977, 1987). Acts are perceived exterior once ‘subjective understanding of acts is 
reconstructed as intersubjective understanding so that the acts are seen as part of the external 
world’ (Zucker 1977, p. 728). Thus, institutionalised structure is rule-like resulting from 
social belief of rationality.  
The literature does not reveal an explicit definition of the institutional environment. However, 
rationally thinking, any influencing factor that has the ability to shape an organisation 
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structure to be similar with its counterparts (under the same line of business) may be 
considered as elements of institutional environment and is usually external to the 
organisation. Zucker (1987) contends rules as explained in Meyer and Rowan (1977) and the 
State as discussed by Dimaggio and Powell (1983) are among the elements of institutional 
environments. Dimaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) in particular, refer to the institutional 
environment as the organisational field as it ‘constitute[s] a recognized area of institutional 
life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products.’ 
Government management practice change may be viewed as the result of institutionalisation 
process since its inception is triggered by environmental pressures from the State and 
enforced through a series of legitimated elements (e.g. regulations). One of the most 
prevalent pressures for change in the government or public sector comes from legislation, 
where particular units in organisations are obliged to comply with the rules in order to be 
perceived as legitimate. However, the compliance with certain rules is not necessarily 
translated in to better performance and it is not impossible that the intention for change is just 
for formality (see for example the findings of Carpenter & Feroz 1992, 2001). Meyer and 
Rowan (1977, p. 340) further emphasise that,  
Institutionalized products, services, techniques, policies, and programs 
function as powerful myths, and many organizations adopt them ceremonially. 
But conformity to institutionalized rules often conflicts sharply with efficiency 
criteria and, conversely, to coordinate and control activity in order to promote 
efficiency undermines an organization's ceremonial conformity and sacrifices 
its support and legitimacy.  
 
Apart from the State, the role of professional bodies as another institutional actor can been 
seen in terms of, for example, the influence of Certified Practicing Accountant (act as a 
professional accounting body) in shaping accounting environment through their graduates.  
Despite it being widely employed as a research lens, NIS has been subject to criticism for its 
failure to acknowledge economic and efficiency issues (Hopper & Major 2007). For instance, 
Dimaggio and Powell (1983) acknowledgment of competitive isomorphism –   that assumes 
rationality for restructuring comes from market competition – however, they were in favor of 
institutional isomorphism and neglected the interplay between both. The separation of the 
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economic fitness from the discussion can also be found in Meyer and Rowan (1977) who 
contend that institutionalisation serves as a window dressing and is not aimed at improving 
efficiency. However, it is difficult to separate between institutional and economic pressures 
and they may co-exist at the same time (Scapens 2006). Consequently, such dichotomies are 
not necessary to make (Major & Hopper 2004).  
Another critics for NIS resulted from its inability to address the role of intra-organisational 
factors (Major & Hopper 2004). For instance, another research shows that pro-active 
mimicking and managerial discretion have meant that system change may the result of 
serving both internal need for improvement and social fitness (Chang 2006; Modell 2001). 
This has to some extent weakened the traditional belief of NIS. 
Despite the differing views on NIS, this study employs this perspective as it is believed 
suitable to the context of the research, in that the reform was initiated by the central 
government to be adopted by its regional administrations. Institutional isomorphism better 
suits in this context since the central government introduces its imposition. Furthermore, NIS 
is useful perspective to discover the rationality for organisational conformance towards 
institutional pressures as well as suitable lens to reveal influential actors of change. Whether 
competitive isomorphism plays its role in the process of change is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
3.2.1 Isomorphic processes under NIS perspective 
Effort to respond and adjust with the environmental pressure to be rational, organisations 
tends to ‘be guided by legitimate elements, from standard operating procedures to 
professional certifications and state requirements, which often have the effect of directing 
attention away from task performance. Adoption of this legitimated elements, leading to 
isomorphism with institutional environment, increases the probability of survival’ (Zucker 
1987, p. 443). Isomorphism in this context is towards structural similarity. The similarity in 
organisational structure among organisations is possible since they resemble the practices of 
more legitimate counterparts within the same industry (Dimaggio & Powell 1983). 
Resembling response to institutionalised rules is believe as a method to gain legitimacy, 
resource, stability and hence survive in the institutionalised environment (Meyer & Rowan 
1977). In the public sector and particularly for the Indonesian context where the government 
seems to exhibit similar structures (e.g., hierarchy of the government and agency level, 
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agency names and responsibilities) from one regional government to another, isomorphic 
processes is very likely to occur.  
Dimaggio and Powell (1983) identifies three types of isomorphism, i.e., coercive, mimetic 
and normative. They argue coercive isomorphism may be the result of formal or informal 
pressures exerted on organisation using methods span from extreme persuasion to soft 
invitation and it has an association with political influence and legitimacy problem. Coercive 
process may involve imposing mandated practices into an organisation by another 
organisation at an upper level. In categorisation provided by Scott (1987, p. 501), this 
legitimate coercion falls under ‘the imposition of organizational structure’ account of 
structural influence. A compliance as a form of response is likely to occur otherwise it may 
be seen as illegitimate. Nonetheless, similar with Meyer and Rowan (1977) contention on the 
myth and ceremony of formal structure, Scott (1987) believes responses to coercion are 
mostly superficial.  
A further type of isomorphism, results in mimetic processes, usually coming from 
environment uncertainty which may result in one organization mimicking the practices of  
others in similar environments (Dimaggio & Powell 1983). They gave example of this 
mimicry process by directing attention to the modernisation of the Japanese Government by 
learning and copying of western practices. ‘The imperial government sent its officers to study 
the courts, Army, and the Police in France, the Navy and postal system in Great Britain, and 
the banking and art education in the Unites States’ (Dimaggio & Powell 1983, p. 151). An 
organisation will of course select what it believe a more legitimate organisation and model 
itself to be similar in structure and practices in order to gain legitimacy. 
Normative as the third type of isomorphism identified by Dimaggio and Powell (1983) is 
associated with professionalization, e.g., professional people in organization tend to infuse 
best practice based on their knowledge or experience. They interpretation of 
profesionalisation brought them to the belief of two sources of isomorphism (i.e., formal 
education and professional networks).  These sources are believed as the centre of norms for 
the development of organizational management where irreplaceable individuals with specific 
skills shape the understanding of particular structure and practices (Dimaggio & Powell 
1983).  
In addition to isomorphic processes discussed above, it is also worth to note the inducement 
concept offered by Scott (1987) as a rationale for homogenisation in organisation’s structure. 
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Scott (1987) argues that inducement strategy is used by the actors of change to have their 
subordinate units conform with requirements once they have the ability to provide incentives 
to subordinate organisations. This isomorphism is enforced by continuing or discontinuing 
incentives based on the continuity of conformation/compliance which is evaluated regularly 
to look for detailed evidence of conformation.  
Table 3.1 summarises the main body of literature on NIS, used in the development of the 
theoretical framework useful for developing research questions. 
Table 3.1: Main literature on NIS used in the study 
No 
Author(s) 
and year of 
publication 
Journals Contribution to current research topic development 
1 
Meyer and 
Rowan 
(1977) 
 
American Journal 
of Sociology 
 
Providing a rationale for the formation of formal 
organisational structures in gaining legitimacy. 
2 
 
Dimaggio 
and Powell 
(1983) 
 
American 
Sociological 
Review 
Providing a framework for isomorphic processes, 
namely coercive, mimetic and normative processes. 
3 
 
Scott 
(1987) 
 
Administrative 
Science Quarterly 
Supplementing isomorphic processes, explanations 
from a different angle and categorisation 
4 
 
Zucker 
(1987) 
 
Annual Review of 
Sociology 
Defining institutionalisation and institutional 
environment, and supplementing the explanation of 
institutional actors from a different angle. 
 
Examining isomorphic processes on a structural change is not necessarily straightforward. 
The process for change may be the result of all isomorphic pressures over time or in a point 
of time and they may acts as a single form or acts simultaneously which sometimes is 
difficult to distinguish which poses the highest pressure (Carpenter & Feroz 2001). In 
addition, some pressures can be subtle which is difficult to realise their existence in 
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influencing the organisation practices. This particular research explores the existence of 
isomorphic processes in governmental organisation’ PMS as a part of a variety of structural 
reforms under NPM and New Governance initiatives.  
In the past, there was a strong public perception that traditional government structures are 
unable to provide acceptable services. For example, the structure of public bureaucracy when 
centralised in terms of control and resource allocation, have little flexibility in hiring and 
rewarding personnels and meeting implicit organisation’ goals (Hood 1991). Government 
organisations were also considered too large and need institutional reform (Guthrie et al. 
2005). Similarly, people witness the public sector as a monopolistic body in terms of 
providing certain practices, out of touch, out of control, badly managed with the potential for 
financial mismanagement inside (Peters & Savoie 1994). These negative views have resulted 
in social belief that better practice comes from the private sector (Hood 1995). This belief 
also prompted public sector management adopting NPM and subsequent mechanisms of such 
corporate governance and good governance in the management practice. 
3.3 NIS approach on performance measurement research 
Drawing from the broad literature review and examining the institutional theory as a lens, 
motivation for performance measurement implementation within the public sector is likely 
due mainly to survival reasons. Gupta, Dirsmith and Fogarty (1994) claims that the survival 
of government units depends primarily on the support of external constituents and only 
secondarily on their actual performance. For instance, despite the fact that reform has taken 
place, results of the implementation of new performance management innovations are rather 
unclear for many countries and the evidence of sophisticated, convincing improved 
performance is rare (Atkinson, Waterhouse & Wells 1997; Olson, Humphrey & Guthrie 
2001). Much of the research exhibits the appearance of isomorphism in the process of 
management change practices (see for example Abernethy & Chua 1996; Akbar, Pilcher and 
Perrin 2012; Radin 1998).  
In terms of isomorphic processes during the introduction of PMS, coercive power from the 
central government in terms of imposing regulations may explain the motivation for change 
and it is assumed as one of the strongest factors to the implementation (Akbar 2011). 
Mimicry may also be possible to explain the change in government PMS since the level of 
adoption may not be similar from one governments to the others due to institutional capacity 
of each government organisations (Mimba, Helden & Tillema 2007, 2013; Tillema, Mimba & 
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Helden 2010), and technical and organizational constraints (Berman & Wang 2000; 
Cavalluzzo & Ittner 2004). In addition, more professional people might be assigned to 
positions in government organisations to improve performance and better deliver services and 
this may be an alternative channel to transfer professional knowledge on performance 
measurement into management within government sector. This normative isomorphism may 
also possible arise in government organisation in its attempt to gain legitimacy. 
The application of NIS in public sector performance measurement has appeared in the work 
of, for instance Modell (2001) in his study examining the managerial responses to public 
sector reform and Chang (2006) who assesses the National Health Service (NHS) managers 
in the UK to government imposed performance measures. This perspective also use in 
Abernethy and Chua (1996) in their research assessing the impact of institutional processes 
on management strategic choice in hospitals. In relation to financial performance, NIS have 
been used as lens for the work of Carpenter & Feroz (1992) on US state governments 
decision to adopt generally accepted accounting principles, and the work of (Geiger & Ittner 
1996) on determinants of government cost accounting practices.  
Table 3.2 exhibits sample of public sector performance studies apply NIS as the theoretical 
lens of research. 
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Table 3.2: Some applications of NIS for public sector performance studies 
No 
Author(s) and 
year of 
publication 
Journals 
Focus of 
Study 
Research Questions/Objectives of 
the Study 
Methods and empirical data 
collections 
Findings/conclusion 
1 
Brignall and 
Modell (2000) 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
General 
 
To advance a framework based on 
institutional theory addressing the 
impact of interplay among funders, 
professional groups and purchasers of 
public services on the performance 
measurement design and 
implementation 
 
Conceptual paper  
2 Modell (2001) 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
Hospital 
The study aims at providing detailed 
analysis of the managerial tactics in 
developing  performance measures 
(drawing from Oliver's typology) 
Case study using semi-
structured interviews and 
archival data collection 
 
- There is a strong resistance in initial 
implementation of diagnosis related 
groups (DRG)-based performance 
measures due to complexity and other 
problems. 
- Pro-active mimicking then made DRG-
based performance measures seen as 
superior mechanism for improvement 
 
3 
Abernethy and 
Chua (1996) 
Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research 
Hospital 
 
- Relationship between control mix 
and its environment 
- Strategic responses to institutional 
pressures 
- Factors influence responses 
- How do accounting control 
systems fit into the 'package' of 
controls? 
 
 
Longitudinal study in a 
hospital using archival data 
collection, observational and 
Interview 
- External pressures determine 
organisational control mix 
- Evidence of a range of responses to 
pressure 
- The organisation depends heavily on 
major stakeholder 
- 'Crude' budgetary control is enough 
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4 
Carpenter & 
Feroz (2001) 
Accounting 
Organization and 
Society 
US State 
Governments 
 
How Institutional pressures influence 
the decisions to adopt Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) for external financial 
reporting 
 
Cross-case analysis 
 
The GAAP adoption was slow and 
evolutionary, involve many actors and 
through isomorphism processes. It is also 
understood that the adoption smoothness 
influenced by several factors. 
 
5 
Geiger and 
Ittner (1996) 
Accounting, 
Organization and 
Society 
Units in U.S. 
Federal 
Government 
Examines the influence of legal 
requirement to be self-funding and 
mandated requirement for cost 
accounting data. 
Survey through mailed- 
questionnaire and interview 
 
- Mandated government cost accounting 
systems are positively associated with 
cost system elaborateness, but are not 
associated with greater internal use of 
cost accounting data. 
- The extent of competition and funding 
uncertainty is positively associated with 
both the use of cost accounting data for 
internal decision making and control 
purposes and cost system elaborateness 
 
6 Chang (2006) 
Financial 
Accountability & 
Management 
Local Health 
Authorities 
Investigates the response of local 
health's managers to performance 
measurements imposed by central 
government 
  
Semi-structured 
Interview 
 
- Performance measures imposed were 
rather high level and not suit local 
authorities 
- As there is strong coercive power, 
managers infuse the requirement to 
secure resources.  
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3.4 Research questions 
A research question provides guidance on how to address the phenomena to be studied. 
This research specifically focuses its attention on PMS change in the Indonesian regional 
governments. The selection of this site of research and interest in the area of PMS has been 
mounting since a large number of regional governments adopted national framework on 
PMS. Hence, the study has an interest in exploring the rationale for this adoption and 
assessing the consequences. Drawing from PMS literature and NIS as a supportive 
theoretical framework, this research posts four research questions as follows;  
3.4.1 PMS motivation 
From the NIS perspective, which is adopted as a lens in the present research, rational 
explanation for the change in organisation practices is quite unique where the motivation is 
believed to be driven by legitimacy intentions instead of real managerial improvement 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977). This distinct motivation has been evidenced in the public sector 
PMS literature (Cavalluzzo & Ittner 2004) but there is also evidence that management has 
discretion to serve various external stakeholders’ conflicting interests by, for example, 
performing a decoupling strategy (Chang 2006; Modell 2001).  There has been some 
evidence of management attempts to serve both a legitimacy purpose and internal 
management interests (Chang 2006). In the present research setting, the change in regional 
governments’ PMS started with the introduction of the central government legislation on 
the PMS and accountability. Hence, this research seeks an explanation for the extent of the 
Indonesian central government control and power over its regional governments over PMS 
implementation and the extent of other factors contributing to PMS adoption, development 
and implementation. For this purpose, the underlying motivation in adopting a national 
agenda in PMS is investigated and formulated as the first research question as follows: 
RQ1: To what extent are regional governments motivated to adapt their PMS to the central 
government initiative? 
3.4.2 PMS introduction and development overtime 
The diffusion in public sector PMS’s as in other managerial innovation diffusion is likely 
to be better explained using isomorphic processes. For this purpose, the likelihood of 
evidence of coercive, mimetic and normative influencing factors, described by Dimaggio 
and Powell (1983) and supplemented by Scott (1987), is investigated in the present 
research. The influence of each of these isomorphic elements is investigated and explored 
over time during the performance measurement evolution, starting from the initial 
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introduction of the Indonesian public sector reform. The revelation of how PMS initiatives 
introduced into Indonesia’s regional level of government and the stages in its development 
overtime is useful to understand the strength of different types of isomorphic elements. 
Hence, the second research question was developed as follows: 
RQ2: How has PMS been introduced, developed and implemented at regional level of 
government over the last 15 years? 
3.4.3 Major impediments to PMS development and implementation 
The literature indicates that the adoption, development and/or implementation of a 
particular PMS have not been straight forward. Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) found that 
organisational factors (e.g., the extent of top management commitment to PMS and the 
extent of training provided) and technical factors (e.g., performance information system 
capability) influence PMS development and implementation. Berman and Wang (2000) 
also present similar results in which the capability of collecting data on time and having 
adequate information technology is different between the high level user and the low level 
user of PMS. Other impediments may come from institutional capabilities, level of 
stakeholders’ involvement, and level of informality where these factors contribute to the 
PMS design and implementation (Mimba, Helden & Tillema 2007). As mentioned earlier, 
informality is the practice of adopting informal structure from outside of management but 
it has a potent influence for government decisions. For example, political and financial 
supports from business leaders to political leaders, and in return they receive facility or 
simplicity in running business (Sarker 2006). To investigate the impediments to PMS 
design and implementation in practice, the following third research question is posed: 
RQ3: To what extent has the development and implementation of the national framework 
on performance measurement been impeded at a regional level?  
3.4.4 The extent of accountability 
In the government sector, performance measurement is useful to promote accountability 
since it is discharged through performance information (Kloot 1999). The nature and 
notion of accountability has now been emphasised in the government sector through 
legislations (Kloot 1999). However, the notion of accountability is often difficult to 
determine in a multiple stakeholder’ organisation, such as government since the ability to 
serve the different purposes and often conflicting interests of various stakeholders requires 
multiple understanding of accountability dimensions (Parker, L & Gould 1999). Some of 
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the most defined terms of accountability in the public sector include among others: 
Political accountability, internal versus external accountability (Mulgan 2000a), legal 
accountability (Romzek 2000), financial accountability, performance accountability 
(Funnel, Cooper & Lee 2012), vertical accountability (Hodges 2012), horizontal 
accountability (Schillemans 2011) and also corporate versus hierarchical accountability 
(Bovens 2007). The present research investigates the notion of accountability and how it is 
discharged through the adoption and implementation of a national agenda on performance 
measurement. Hence, the fourth research question is as the following: 
RQ4: Have there been any significant impacts on accountability following the performance 
measurement change initiative? 
3.5 Research Process  
Figure 3.1 has been developed to provide a summary of the research process. As 
highlighted earlier, the objective of this research is to better understand the impact of 
central government change on the Indonesian regional governments’ PMS and 
accountability following the last 15 years of public sector reforms. Addressing this 
objective, four research questions have been developed with the PMS and accountability 
literature as reference points, and these questions are operationalised around four main 
themes developed from the NIS perspective and supporting literature.  
Figure 3.1: Research process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research questions discussed in section 3.4 are operationalized through a set of 
interview questions under each theme. Public sector performance measurement and 
management, and the accountability literature are used to develop themes and semi-
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structured interview questions around the themes. Table 3.2 below lists the associated 
literature that has contributed to the research questions.  
Table 3.3: Literature for research question development 
Research Questions Associated literature 
 
PMS change and accountability 
 
 
 
a. PMS Motivation 
 
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977), Cavalluzzo and Ittner 
(2004), Dimaggio and Powell (1983), Scott (1987), 
 
b. PMS introduction and development 
over time 
 
Dimaggio and Powell (1983), Scott (1987) 
c. Major impediments to PMS adoption 
 
Berman and Wang (2000), Cavalluzzo and Ittner 
(2004), Mimba, Helden and Tillema (2007) 
 
d. The extent of accountability 
 
Funnel, Cooper and Lee (2012), Bovens (2007), 
Romzek (2000), Hodges (2012), Mulgan (2000a), 
Schillemans (2011). 
 
 
For the purpose of the interviews, a number of directive open-ended questions were 
developed to assist both interviewer and interviewee on actual themes. Other questions 
then follow the theme and evolve during the interview process as a snowball effect. Prompt 
questions relating to each research question were developed based on the literature and 
some replication of questions is believed useful and thus employed for the study.  
Table 3.4: Research themes and sample of associated interview questions 
Interview Questions Link to literature 
 
1. General introduction to the topic: 
a) Briefly describe position, duties and 
responsibilities. 
b) The level of involvement in PMS 
development. 
c) Explain your understanding on PMS applied at 
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regional governments since the introduction of 
Presidential Instruction number 7/1999. 
 
 
 
 
2. PMS Motivation: 
a) What was the purpose of developing PMS? 
Any rationale behind development? 
b) Are regional governments’ resources 
dependent on the central government 
provisions? To what extent? 
c) Could you rate from the most influential 
factors to PMS adoption among: 
d) central government legislation,  
e) assist manager to be more accountable, 
f) improve performance,  
g) to have more rational approach through better 
means of disclosure. 
 
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
Dimaggio and Powell (1983), 
Scott (1987) 
 
3. PMS introduction and development overtime: 
a) Explain how PMS has infused into regional 
governments.  
b) In attempt to adopt national framework on 
PMS could you explain the process of 
development and implementation at regional 
level overtime? 
c) Could you explain the contribution made by 
internally professional staff and external 
parties to PMS development? 
d) Could you explain any evidence of 
benchmarking in PMS development by 
learning the so-called good practice of other 
government institutions? 
 
 
Dimaggio and Powell (1983) 
 
4. Major impediments to PMS adoption 
a) To what extent have top management, elected 
officials and legislative members played roles 
in PMS adoption? 
b) To what extent has adequate training been 
provided to adopt and develop PMS? 
c) To what extent has a performance information 
system been able for capturing and delivering 
performance information? 
d) To what extent has level of informality 
influenced PMS implementation? 
 
 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004), 
Berman and Wang (2000), 
Mimba, Helden and Tillema 
(2007) 
 
5. The extent of accountability, use of performance 
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information and outcomes of PMS: 
a) To what extent has performance information 
been used to report the achievement to higher 
level of authorities? 
b) To what extent has performance information 
been used to report the achievement to 
legislative members? 
c) To what extent has performance information 
been used to report the achievement to the 
community? 
d) To what extent has accountability increased 
due to PMS implementation over time? And to 
what level has it increased to different 
stakeholders?  
e) To what extent has PMS been used to: 
- Set service delivery priorities? 
- Change activities and allocate resources? 
- Adopt new approaches or change work 
processes? 
- Coordinate efforts? 
- Refine measures? 
- Reward or otherwise recognise employee 
performance? 
- Develop budget/funding decisions? 
f) To what extent has PMS: 
- Increased awareness for legitimacy? 
- Improved decision making abilities? 
- Improved timeliness of management 
decisions? 
- Been able to clarify programs, goals and 
objectives? 
- Been able to eliminate services that are no 
longer appropriate (in terms of budget 
allocation efficiency, priority, etc.)? 
- Increased ability to determine effectiveness 
of service delivery performance? 
- Increase ability to determine the efficiency 
of service delivery performance? 
 
Funnel, Cooper and Lee (2012), 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004), 
Berman and Wang (2000) 
 
 
To obtain an understanding of PMS evolution and the discharge of accountability, 
information obtained from semi-structured interviews of key participants in the field was 
corroborated with documentary evidence collected in the forms of government regulations, 
guidelines, and reports and was analysed around the themes. A detailed explanation on the 
method of data collection is discussed in the next chapter. 
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3.6 Summary  
NIS was used as a theoretical lens to guide the study. NIS is believed to be able to uncover 
the rational explanation behind PMS implementation, to describe the process for change 
over time, and to show the consequences for government accountability. From the 
perspective of this lens, supporting research questions were designed in accordance with 
the main research question to address the objective of the study. To operationalise research 
questions, a template consisting of several semi-structured interview questions based on 
different themes was developed. The next chapter details the methodology and procedures 
of the research, including the discussion of philosophical perspective and other 
methodological issues to address.    
47 
 
Chapter 4: Research Method 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter elaborates on the methodology underpinning this research. The chapter 
commences with the definition of qualitative research and the philosophical perspective 
taken, particularly explaining the epistemological and ontological positioning. This is 
followed by discussion of the research design, focusing on the field study approach and use 
of documentary evidence as well as semi-structured interviews as methods of data collection. 
This section also provides an explanation of participant selection and justification thereof. 
The attempt to achieve rigor and trustworthiness of the research is also discussed through the 
establishment validity and reliability test. Lastly, the chapter briefly declares the practice of 
this research in relation to ethical considerations and confidentiality.   
4.2 The nature of qualitative research and its philosophical assumptions 
The study has been conducted drawing on qualitative research methods. This approach has 
been carefully considered and is based on an assumption that in order to possess a full 
understanding of the real occurrence of a particular phenomenon a close and direct 
interaction between researcher and object of the study is necessary. For the present research 
this means the interaction between researcher and participants in the field. 
4.2.1 The nature of qualitative research 
The present research is interested in understanding the implication of PMS change and the 
discharge of accountability in the specific context of Indonesian regional governments; and 
this interest is addressed by seeking answers for questions posed such as how was 
performance measurement change motivated and managed. A qualitative research design is 
suitable for addressing this kind of research question, and applies for this study since 
‘qualitative researchers are interested in understanding how people interpret their 
experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their 
experiences’ (Merriam 2009, p. 5). Unlike quantitative research, where researchers try to 
simulate the context and find possibilities using statistical analysis, in a qualitative study a 
researcher is involved in the setting with the participants, in order to gain the understanding 
of the real phenomena in meanings and values (Denzin & Lincoln 2005). Thus, the primary 
instrument is the researcher as a human, and direct interaction with participants gives benefits 
in terms of easy clarification for interpretation or for the understanding of the real 
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occurrences (Merriam 2009). One characteristic of qualitative research is that the product is 
richly descriptive in words and figures ‘to convey what the researcher has learned about a 
phenomenon’ (Merriam 2009, p. 16).  
4.2.2 Qualitative research philosophical assumptions 
Philosophical assumptions about where qualitative research sits can be seen from two 
perspectives. Firstly, epistemologically (or how to perceive the nature of knowledge) 
qualitative research is usually located as interpretive research (Merriam 2009). This means 
that the emphasis is on the understanding of the social world through careful examination of 
the phenomena in the real context, and subsequently through accurate interpretation of the 
occurrence (Bryman & Bell 2007). Precise interpretation can only be gained after researchers 
have a full understanding of the context during interactions with key participants. Secondly, 
ontologically (or how someone perceives the nature of reality) qualitative research assumes 
the reality does not exist on its own but rather is socially constructed, and consequently there 
are many interpretations of a single event (Merriam 2009). This ontological position is 
generally described as constructionist, and it implies that the reality is the outcome of 
individual interactions in perceiving social properties (Bryman & Bell 2007).  
4.3 Research design  
Using a qualitative perspective, a field study method was conducted within the Indonesian 
Government setting. The field study is a common method employed in management 
accounting research. By comparison to the quantitative experimental research and survey 
methods, qualitative field studies have a benefit in terms of the ability to develop intimate 
relationships with participants (Abernethy et al. 1999). Since the present study was aimed at 
gaining insights into regional government performance measurement change and its 
associated accountability based on the central government framework, insights were collected 
through two primary resources of evidence, namely interviews with key participants and 
documentary evidence. The findings collected from these sources were matched against the 
literature in order to seek answers for developed research questions, and to find support for 
the theory provided in the previous chapter. Even though the reality of the occurrence can 
never be able to be captured in full, the combination of multiple methods in qualitative 
research aims to secure an in-depth understanding about the phenomena (Denzin & Lincoln 
2005). This alternative strategy may increase the rigor, breadth, richness and depth of the 
inquiry (Flick 2009). The design of the present research can be depicted as in Figure 4.1. 
49 
 
Figure 4.1: Research design 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Method of data collection and data analysis 
In this research approach, the accuracy in data collection and analysis will contribute to the 
level of confidence in the research findings. Appropriate selection of methods also 
determines the trustworthiness of the research. This section elaborates on sources of evidence 
and how the researcher came to this selection of sources, and presents a discussion of how the 
data are analysed for further interpretation.  
4.4.1 Sources of evidence 
The first source of evidence for this research is in terms of publicly available documents, 
which are readily accessible. Documents include the Indonesian Central Government 
regulations and any government reports available to the public. In addition, internal records 
have been provided to the researcher to improve understanding of the phenomenon at hand.  
These include reports on performance evaluation conducted internally by the central 
government agencies. This evidence was then supplemented by further internal documents 
sought during interview sessions. The time frame in collecting this documentary evidence is 
limited, traced back to 1999 when the first regulation of the new regime of the performance 
accountability system was released. See Appendix I for types of document collected as 
sources of evidence.  
Literature review NIS as the theory 
Research questions 
Findings 
Research method 
Documentary data 
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Semi-structured 
interviews 
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Documents are static data, and hence need people’s interpretation or others’ descriptive views 
in order to enhance their usefulness for analysis (Merriam 2009). Thus, in this research, to 
corroborate the documentary findings, interview sessions with key participants were 
administered as further data sources. An interview is the process whereby a researcher 
engages with participants to discuss the topic of research, and might be face to face, over the 
telephone, or through other state of the art devices (Fontana & Frey 2005). In terms of 
formality or rigidity, interviews may range from structured, semi-structured to un-structured 
interviews. In qualitative research, the second tends to be most common, since both types 
offer flexibility to a certain extent, which is useful to gain depth of response to a research 
topic. In qualitative interviewing, interviewers can depart from guidelines if they find 
relevant information regarding the topic of research, and follow up questions are usually 
based on the respondents’ replies (Bryman & Bell 2007). This strategy is useful for 
facilitating researchers’ attention on rich and detailed data.  
For this research, semi-structured interviews were administered due to the researcher’s 
preference for relying on a pre-determined list of questions to be raised. By using a template 
to guide questioning, important points were less likely to be lost or the researcher distracted 
during the process. Semi-structured interviews also offer great flexibility and intimacy 
between interviewer and interviewee. Once the interviewee feels comfortable, the depth and 
breadth of information can be further developed. Abernethy et al. (1999) assert that this type 
of interview is an appropriate choice when a researcher wants to gain useful information from 
the actors’ point of view. The list of questions prepared as a guide (and provided in Chapter 
3, Table 3.4) was based on literature and documents previously examined. Probe questions 
and any departures from the guide were based on interviewee responses at the time of 
interview.  
Participants were invited from both central and regional governments. The central 
government representative views were important as they provide a balanced view from the 
central government perspective. Similarly, those from regional government were purposely 
selected from a large population of regional governments because they were considered to be 
further advanced in PMS application. Invitation letters were sent to their top managers to 
ensure suitable interviewees were recruited.  Following the agreement to participate, all 
participants were then clustered based on their roles in performance measurement change. 
The first group or cluster of participants was selected from the Central Government 
institutions, those having the responsibility to externally conduct evaluation upon regional 
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governments’ performance at the end of every budget year. These evaluators or assessors are 
believed to be able to provide benefits to the research as they understand the real phenomena 
in the field. This group is thus classified as “external evaluator”. Two Central Government-
appointed agencies were contacted to participate; but only one agency indicated an interest to 
participate and could meet the timelines required by this research.  
The second cluster consists of participants who have performed internal evaluation tasks for 
their regional governments’ PMS. According to Indonesian Central Government regulations, 
these people are internal auditors to the regional governments, and are mostly located within 
an internal audit agency of each regional government. Hence, these “internal evaluators” 
were approached to have their views on the topic of this research represented. Participants 
within the final cluster, classified as “implementers”, are those within regional governments 
who use the Central Government guidelines in developing and implementing PMS. For this 
purpose, participants were selected and sampled from regional government agencies 
responsible for producing annual government performance reports.  
These three clusters represent different interests, and thus provide useful insights to 
understand the phenomena. For instance, “implementers” may reveal weaknesses in the 
mandated PMS and reporting framework, while “internal evaluators” in the regional 
governments may expose their views upon implementation issues and their relation to the 
Central Government guidelines. “External evaluators” may disclose the overall practice in the 
regional governments. 
Twenty potential participants were invited to participate from central and regional 
governments. Of the twenty, four did not response.  Further communication was made with 
each of the responding participants to arrange interview dates and times. Sixteen participants 
participated in the research through nine sessions of interviews and two email conversations, 
as are indicated in Table 4.1. On three occasions/sessions, interviews were held with two 
participants involved at the same time. They provided responses to different questions as well 
as adding to points raised by each other’s comments. Participants selected for the interview 
were those who had depth of knowledge about the evolution of PMS and accountability 
within Indonesian Regional Governments. One interviewee from the “external evaluator” 
cluster and one interviewee from the “internal evaluator” cluster held senior managerial 
positions in their institutions (i.e. P2 and P10 in Table 4.1). All other interviewees were 
middle managers in their institutions, except for three participants who were designated as 
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staff in their institutions (i.e. P4, P6 and P13 in Table 4.1). Four participants have been 
involved in PMS in their governments.  
Face to face interview sessions were held with thirteen of the sixteen participants between 
March and April 2015 during the scheduled fieldwork time. These were conducted on 
location, in the participant offices. The three remaining participants were unavailable during 
this scheduled fieldwork time, but willing to be interviewed at a mutually agreeable time. 
Two participants agreed to email conversations and the remaining participant was contacted 
through Skype video upon his request. The interview process with this participant was 
conducted at an earlier time frame at his request.  He notified the interviewer that he was 
taking long-service leave in 2015 and wouldn’t be available at the proposed time. He agreed 
for an earlier interview to be scheduled while he was still in his administrative position in 
October 2014. The interview sessions lasted between 27 to 44 minutes, with the exception of 
the Skype video interview, which lasts for 1 hour and 50 minutes. The following table 
presents interview details for this research. 
Table 4.1: Interview details 
Occasion 
Code 
Name 
Role in PMS 
Involvement 
in PMS 
development 
Interview length 
Interview 
Type 
I P1 
External 
evaluator 
No 
1 hour and 50 
minutes 
Skype 
II P2 
External 
evaluator 
No 38 minutes Face to face 
III P3 & P4 
Internal 
evaluator 
No 44 minutes Face to face 
IV P5 & P6 
Internal 
evaluator 
No 33 Minutes Face to face 
V P7 
Internal 
evaluator 
No 27 Minutes Face to face 
VI P8 Implementer Yes 29 Minutes Face to face 
VII P9 & P10 
Internal 
evaluator 
Yes 27 Minutes Face to face 
VIII P11 & P12 Implementer Yes 43 Minutes Face to face 
IX P13 & P14 
Internal 
evaluator 
No 35 Minutes Face to face 
- P15 Implementer Yes - Email 
- P16 Implementer No - Email 
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Due to the fact that interviewees are Indonesian, the interview process was conducted in the 
Bahasa Indonesian language and the interviews were recorded upon the giving of 
interviewees’ permission. Following the finalisation of data collection, information was 
manually transcribed and translated from Bahasa Indonesia to English. The translation 
process involved using a translation service located in Victoria, Australia. 
4.4.2 Method of data analysis 
(Joffe 2012) contends that interviews, in particular semi-structured interviews, and textual 
data are best managed using thematic research approaches. A theme is defined as ‘a pattern 
found in the information that at minimum describes and organizes the possible observations 
and at maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon’ (Boyatzis 1998, p. 4). Themes are 
designed to ensure that useful information around issues raised in the research questions is 
gathered. In this way, the present research was conducted according to key themes, which 
was followed with thematic analysis of both interview transcripts and document materials. 
The key themes were associated with the research questions, which consist of PMS 
motivation, PMS introduction and development, impediments to implementation, and 
accountability (refer to Chapter 3, Table 3.4). Thematic analysis ‘refers to the process of 
analysing data according to commonalities, relationships and differences across a data set’ 
(Gibson & Brown 2009, p. 127). Thus, the thematic method is useful to identify and analyse 
the patterns of meaning emerging from a set of data (Braun & Clarke 2006).  
Thematic analysis is considered a method on its own for analysing qualitative information 
(Joffe 2012), and has a benefit in terms of flexibility (Braun & Clarke 2006). That is, 
flexibility in data analysis is possible whereby the creation of themes are not necessarily tied 
to or stem from a particular theory but are also potentially generated directly from raw data 
(Braun & Clarke 2006). (Boyatzis 1998) further divide thematic analysis into three stages: 
theory-driven; prior data or prior research-driven; and raw data-driven. The present research 
utilises all of these approaches, as some of the themes are pre-developed based on NIS (i.e. 
themes that are related to the motivation and isomorphic processes), while other themes stem 
from previous literature and research on PMS (e.g. themes that are related to impediments in 
PMS implementation). The rest of the themes are data driven, which are observed during the 
fieldwork (e.g. based on participants’ responses to interview questions), and following the 
codifying process. Most of the theory-driven and prior research-driven themes were used to 
develop research questions and to design interview questions.  
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Data analysis starts from coding data. The coding process of this research follows the method 
suggested by Saldana (2009). Schwandt (1997, p. 16) defines coding as ‘a procedure that 
disaggregates the data, breaks it down into manageable segments and identifies or names 
those segments.’ Saldana (2009) contends that qualitative coding is a heuristic method to 
capture the essence and essential elements of data, which are then clustered according to 
pattern and used to facilitate category development. To form a code, a word and a phrase are 
used to symbolise and represent the meaning of a datum. Saldana (2009) developed a number 
of coding methods for qualitative research, one of which is descriptive coding. The present 
study uses descriptive coding to capture the essence of transcript data and document content, 
due to the researcher’ belief that participants may express their understanding on a context in 
a range of different wordings. Descriptive coding is concerned with the identification of a 
topic from a passage, and hence a code is a description of primary content (Saldana 2009).  
All codes are then organised and grouped into different categories based on their similar 
characteristics, as suggested by Saldana (2009). This method helps to build themes in the 
study for further analysis or to find the most associated pre-developed themes. The themes 
are used as subheadings in chapter 7 to discuss the findings and in addressing associated 
research questions. Saldana (2009) suggests that the coding process may be repeated for 
another cycle if the researcher believes it necessary to reorganise codes, categories or even 
themes. For the present research, due to the amount of data, the first cycle of the coding 
process was believed adequate to generate reasonably accurate and comprehensive categories 
and themes. Thus, successive cycles of coding were not considered necessary. The process of 
codifying, categorising and associating the data with themes can be depicted in Figure 4.2. 
Another coding method employed in this study is attribute coding, to capture any 
demographic description of the participants useful for further evaluation in the data analysis. 
NVivo, as a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), has been 
utilised in the present research to help with the identification of valuable data to be coded and 
the identification of emerging themes useful for analysis. Subsequent to the analysis, excerpts 
from the participant responses were used in this thesis to provide samples of real evidence of 
the occurrence. 
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Figure 4.2: Data coding process and its association with category and theme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed for this particular study with the reference of a streamlined codes-to-theory model 
for qualitative inquiry by Saldana (2009). 
4.5 Methodological rigor 
Validity and reliability are the two most common sets of criteria in determining research 
trustworthiness. Trustworthiness of research is ‘defined as that quality of an investigation 
(and its findings) that made it noteworthy to audiences’ (Schwandt 1997, p. 164). Validity 
and reliability are concerned with the accuracy and replicability of scientific findings, 
respectively, and the value of the research is partially dependent upon the ability to 
demonstrate these two aspects (LeCompte & Goetz 1982). Research findings have to be 
rigorous and trustworthy so they may have a positive impact in terms of research significance 
and research contributions. Careful attention to both aspects is very important since 
rigorously conducted research results in the confidence of both researchers and readers that 
the outcome is of an acceptable value. The concern in accuracy and replicability between 
qualitative and quantitative studies is not necessarily comparable, since the nature and 
philosophical assumptions between the two are different. Validity and reliability are 
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commonly mentioned in quantitative research, even though the terms are quite popular in 
qualitative types of study as well. However, the present study draws on particular terms for 
qualitative research as conceptualised by Guba (1981), to assess four aspects of concern: truth 
value, applicability, consistency, and neutrality. Guba (1981) suggests terms such as 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability to better reflect internal validity, 
external validity, reliability and objectivity, respectively, to assess these four aspects of 
concern.  
4.5.1 Credibility of research 
In terms of the trustworthiness of the research, one of the concerns is with truth value. Truth 
value concerns how to establish confidence in the research findings; and the term credibility 
is used here instead of internal validity (Guba 1981). In the present work, the concern is 
whether both participants and researchers share the same meanings of the phenomena when 
the reality is conceptualised, in order that confidence with results can be established 
(LeCompte & Goetz 1982). Establishing confidence is not possible by simply matching the 
findings with reality, because ‘reality is holistic, multidimensional, and ever-changing; it is 
not a single, fixed, objective phenomenon…’ (Merriam 2009, p. 213). Interpretation of reality 
can be achieved through closer interaction between researcher and participants to understand 
individual perspectives, when uncovering details of the phenomena in the context of research 
(Merriam 2009).  
To increase the credibility of qualitative research, Merriam (2009) suggests five strategies 
that might be employed, which are: 
- Triangulation 
- Member checks or respondent validations 
- Prolong engagement 
- Reflexivity or researcher’s position 
- Peer examination or peer review 
Triangulation is a process of searching for convergence of information from multiple sources 
of evidence or methodologies (Creswell & Miller 2000; Denzin 1978). It can reduce the 
threat to internal validity or credibility of findings, since the strengths in one methodology 
can minimise the weaknesses of others (Abernethy et al. 1999; Guba 1981). There are 
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multiple types of triangulation, namely across data sources (e.g. interviews data collected 
from different people from different perspectives or through follow-up interviews with the 
same participants), multiple investigators, and multiple methods (e.g. interview, observation, 
archives) and theories (Creswell & Miller 2000; Denzin 1978; Lincoln & Guba 1985; 
Merriam 2009). In an attempt to maintain the level of confidence, the present study draws on 
interview data collected from multiple clusters, as elaborated on earlier in this chapter. This 
cross-data method of validation was also verified by comparing it with the analysis of 
documentary evidence and prior related literature. In addition, to increase the confidence 
level for unclear responses, one participant was re-contacted for further discussion, 
elaboration and clarification of the earlier interview response. 
The second alternative to increase the credibility of qualitative research is through the process 
of conducting member checks or respondent validations. Merriam (2009, p. 217) contends 
that the process of member checking involves requesting feedback from some participants on 
preliminary analysis to look for “ring true” interpretation of the phenomena. Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) insist this circular, reinforcing strategy is the most important method in 
establishing credibility. Its importance lies in the assumption that, while the lens focuses in 
on participants’ views, the credibility of information and narrative account depends on their 
reactions (Creswell & Miller 2000). Following participant review and comments, action to 
improve the interpretation can be taken, for example by correcting the meaning of specific 
terms arising in the interviews. Creswell and Miller (2000) mention that a focus group is the 
most useful strategy in reviewing information, but that a single participant view approach can 
be used as alternative. The present research employed this latter strategy, in which a few 
participants were approached by phone to comment on preliminary findings.  
The third strategy is prolonged engagement in the field, where researchers spend a substantial 
amount of time engaging with people, doing repeated observation and building trust with 
participants in an attempt to receive disclosed useful information (Creswell 2003; Creswell & 
Miller 2000; Guba 1981; Lincoln & Guba 1985). Merriam (2009) uses the wording adequate 
engagement in data collection for this strategy. This kind of intimate relationship is possible 
for long-term research, and is often used in ethnographic studies. Since the present study is 
restricted in time allocation, this strategy is employed only to a small extent and thus is not 
deeply elaborated here. At the most, the present study was able to collect as much data as 
possible until no new documentary evidence showed relevance information, and justifies the 
number of interview participants within the allowable time to conduct field study. This 
58 
 
strategy finds support from Merriam (2009, p. 219), in which she claims there is no specific 
consensus on how deep to engage, but ‘the best rule of thumb is that the data and emerging 
findings must feel saturated; that is, you begin to see or hear the same things over and over 
again, and no new information surfaces as you collect more data.’ 
The fourth alternative is reflexivity or researcher’s position. As an investigator, in an attempt 
to establish confidence in findings, a researcher needs to justify and maintain their position in 
research. This may be done by explaining and clarifying biases, dispositions and assumptions 
(Merriam 2009). This explanation and clarification is part of the process labeled as 
reflexivity, in which researchers critically conduct self-reflection (Guba & Lincoln 2005; 
Merriam 2009). Reflexivity in this research is conducted in the last section of the final 
chapter, which reinforces the view that the articulation of assumptions and limitations show 
readers that this research is not presented as having perfectly discovered the nature of reality. 
Instead, such reflexivity allows readers to better understand how the researcher has come to 
such conclusions. 
The final strategy employed in this study in regard to increase reliability is through a method 
labeled peer examination or peer review, as suggested in Merriam (2009). Prior to 
submission of the present thesis, it was submitted for peer review. Along with candidature 
reviews and presentation at an academic conference, further feedback was provided by an 
academic and a government employee, who were familiar with the research topic. 
4.5.2 Transferability of research 
Another concern is the applicability aspect of the research. Guba (1981) defines applicability 
as the extent to which the findings of particular inquiry are applicable to other contexts or 
with other subjects. Traditionally, it is perceived as how generalisable are the results 
produced from a study. In quantitative research, generalisability of findings, where certain 
research should be generally applicable to other similar research, is vital. The proponents of 
quantitative research reach their generalisations through sample randomisation and control of 
the sample to achieve a certain degree of confidence (Merriam 2009). However, this concept 
of generalisation is not always applicable to qualitative studies, since its philosophical 
perspective is dissimilar to that of qualitative research. Therefore, sample randomisation is 
not necessarily relevant to qualitative research to a certain extent; instead, for some research 
(such as the present study), participants are purposely selected in attempt to understand the 
phenomena examined in depth.  
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Some qualitative advocates suggest a few perspectives on how to view and respect 
generalisability (Ericson 1986; Merriam 2009). One example is to view the findings as 
concrete universal, which mean we study to a great detail and are able to compare with other 
similar studies in certain contexts to achieve generalisability a concrete level (Ericson 1986). 
Merriam (2009, p. 224) provides a good illustration of how we should interpret applicability 
in terms of concrete universal in qualitative research: ‘I get a speeding ticket from a trooper 
pulling out from behind a concrete buttress, subsequently, I slow down whenever I come 
upon concrete buttresses on any road. [Suggesting] I have taken a particular incident and 
formed a concrete universal.’ Or it can also be interpreted as working hypotheses, which in 
this context means hypotheses that reflect the situation in a context and can be useful for 
future decision making (Merriam 2009). Transferability may also be viewed from an 
audience perspective rather than from our perspective, and this approach appears the most 
suitable for this study. Readers may have the ability to decide whether the findings of a study 
are applicable to their situation. This perspective is usually labeled user or reader 
generalisability. 
There are two most popular strategies to enhance transferability discussed in qualitative 
research, namely rich, thick description and sampling strategy. The term rich, thick 
description is used to described the detailed presentation of the setting, participants and 
findings of the study with adequate supported evidence (Merriam 2009). Thick description 
starts with thick descriptive data collection during the research process (Guba 1981). In 
writing the results, detailed evidence is clearly presented (e.g. in terms of quotation from 
interviews and documents). In terms of sampling strategy, there are two strategies that might 
be employed. Firstly, this can be done through varying the sample to the maximum number 
possible, either in site selections or participant clusters. This maximum variation strategy may 
increase the chance of having significant contributions and also increase transferability 
(Merriam 2009). For the present study, interviewees were selected from four different 
clusters, and this is believed to have provided adequate representation of key participants to 
understand the phenomena. Another sampling strategy discussed by Merriam (2009) is 
typical or modal sample, where the sample is purposely selected from certain types so the 
readers then are able to compare with their own types. 
4.5.3 Dependability 
Another aspect that requires attention is consistency. Guba (1981, p. 80) defines consistency 
as ‘how can one determine whether the findings of an inquiry would be consistently repeated 
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if the inquiry were replicated with the same (or similar) subjects (respondents) in the same (or 
similar) context?’ Replication here is meant to determine whether results are making any 
sense from a given data set, or whether results are consistent and dependable (Merriam 2009). 
Therefore, the concern is about the stability of data as useful evidence of a robust study 
(Guba 1981). Consistency or dependability can be achieved through triangulation and the use 
of an audit trail (Merriam 2009). While triangulation has been well elaborated in the 
credibility section above, an audit trail details any records in data collection up to writing the 
conclusion. It consists of recording any important aspects have been passed through the 
duration of research into your journal or diaries (e.g. how the study was conducted, how data 
were collected, and any problems encountered). These records as reference are useful for 
interpretation and analysis. 
4.5.4 Confirmability 
The last term discussing the worthiness of research is whether a researcher can establish 
neutrality, whereby findings are free from biases, including the researcher’s personal interests 
and perspectives. The confirmability concept has been developed to assess neutrality, and is 
believed more appropriate than the objectivity concept in qualitative research. Objectivity is 
not possible to achieve under a naturalistic perspective. To give a clearer understanding, the 
statement of Guba and Lincoln (1982), who clarify that ‘it is not the inquirer’s certifiability 
we are interested in but the confirmability of the data’, may better explain the meaning of 
confirmability. Triangulation and practicing reflexivity are the two most common approaches 
to enhance confirmability (Guba 1981). Thus, while useful for increasing other aspects of 
trustworthiness (e.g. dependability and confirmability), triangulation and reflexivity also, at 
the same time, serve to enhance confirmability. 
In review, the present study employed the strategies presented in Table 4.2 to enhance rigor 
and trustworthiness. Credibility, or internal validity, of the qualitative method used in this 
research has been enhanced in four ways. First, data was sourced in a multiple of ways to 
enable triangulation.  Data sources include semi-structured interviews, internal documents 
and publicly available materials. Second, transcribed data was sent back to participants for 
review and validation to ensure investigator and participant share the same meanings. Third, 
the interviewer maintained a position as outsider and reflected on this position throughout the 
research process to ensure any bias was minimised. Four, the final research report was 
reviewed by academics.   
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Table 4.2: Attempt to increase trustworthiness 
 
Criteria 
 
Strategy 
 
Credibility 
 
- Multiple source triangulation 
- Member checks/respondent validations 
- Reflexivity 
- Peer examination/review 
 
 
Transferability 
 
- Rich, thick description 
- Maximum variation in data sample 
 
 
Dependability 
 
- Multiple source triangulation 
- Audit trail 
 
 
Confirmability 
 
- Multiple source triangulation 
- Reflexivity 
 
 
Source: Developed particularly for this research and adopted from (Guba 1981; Guba & Lincoln 
1982; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Merriam 2009). 
An independent government official, who has a good understanding of the research topic, 
was also used to validate findings.  
For the purpose of improving transferability or external validity of the research, interview 
candidates were carefully selected from the population with recommendations from senior 
managers or colleagues who were originally contacted for interview. Accordingly, the 
researcher understands that the interview candidates best represent the different government 
positions and expert roles and are most suitable to respond to the research questions posed. 
Furthermore, the goal of the research analysis and subsequent report is to present the valuable 
data in a clear and meaningful manner. To improve comprehension, the interview and 
archival data has been clustered into different categories based on the interviewee roles in 
developing or implementing the PMS. This technique helps to demonstrate the different 
points of view of each of the participant clusters. 
Dependability, or reliability, of the research is enhanced through the triangulation of data and 
subsequent audit trail provided by the research. For example, the researcher is reflective in 
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his approach to ensure the evidence recorded in transcripts concurs with evidence extracted 
from other reports and documents provided.  Checking continued throughout the interview 
and documentary analysis to minimise the potential for missing or neglecting important 
evidence. Thus, both multiple source triangulation and reflexivity is used to increase the 
confirmability of the research.  
4.6 Ethical issues and data storage 
As this research involves human beings, particularly in interview sessions, ethical issues were 
addressed to avoid any unintended consequences. Ethical consideration and conformation to 
ethics is taken into account in this research by requesting ethical approval from the Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) Business College Human Ethics Advisory 
Networks (BCHEANs), prior to collecting field data. Following Human Ethics Committee 
approval, invitations were sent and to urge potential sources of information to participate. 
Upon agreement to participate in this research, consent form listing participants’ rights were 
distributed prior the interview session being conducted.  
In regard to data storage and confidentiality issues, written data is kept secure and stored by 
the researcher in a locked filing cabinet, while electronic data is stored on a safe computer up 
to the completion of the study. Access to stored data is only available for the purpose of 
research and none is released for other purposes. Further than that, no individual identity is 
disclosed, and any sample of a participant’s view depicted in the thesis is coded.  
4.7 Summary 
This chapter presents the qualitative methodology applicable for the research in this study. 
The study was conducted with full consideration of any aspect that may result in rigor and 
robust outcomes. Since research should make some contribution, either theoretically or 
practically or both, it should generate high levels of confidence. This chapter elaborated on 
how methods and sources of evidence were selected for this present research. This included 
how to analyse information, how to ensure data is used meaningfully, and how to increase the 
trustworthiness of the research. The chapter closed with a discussion of how to deal with 
ethical issues and data storage. 
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Chapter 5: The Research Setting 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research setting on which this thesis is based. The research takes 
place within the Indonesian Government setting, with the focus on regional government 
performance measurement and accountability. The chapter starts with general information on 
Indonesia as a country, followed by the structure of the government, to assist with a better 
understanding of the research topic. In the next section, a performance accountability system 
in operation is introduced to give a brief picture of where PMS sits and how it interacts with 
other systems under the Indonesian Government policy.  
5.2 Indonesia in brief 
Indonesia is located in South East Asia. It is an archipelagic country with a population of 
more than 250 million. With 13,000 islands in total, the majority of the Indonesian population 
is spread across five main islands. Indonesia gained independence in 1945 following a-350-
year rule by Portuguese, Dutch and Japanese occupations. Since then, it has been transformed 
into a nation with different types of governance from time to time before becoming a republic 
up to the present day. The atmosphere of real democracy has been in evidence since the late 
1990s following the collapse of the 32 year ‘new order’ regime of President Soeharto. Since 
then, government reforms have translated into a change in the bureaucracy to simpler and 
more transparent practices. The changes were believed to start from 1999, in which the 
government received pressure both externally, from international donors, to conform with 
their requirements in order to receive their financial support to improve the severe fiscal 
condition (Harun, H, Van-Peursem & Engleton 2015), and internally from constituents 
demanding accountability and transparency. As a consequence, the new government 
administration released a number of regulations addressing these issues.   
Indonesia used to be a key player in oil and gas exportation and had a strong voice at the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but scarcity of new resources 
has made it unable to export, and it opted out of OPEC in 2008. The main exporting 
commodities today include textiles, rubber, crude palm oil, cacao, and coffee, which are 
mostly exported to Japan, China and the USA. Indonesia is also a haven for mining industries 
other than oil and gas. However, due to technical capacity, many mining productions are 
managed by foreign companies and consortiums. For instance, Freeport-McMoran Inc from 
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the US is managing and producing enormous reserves of copper and gold in this country, 
which result in limited returns to Indonesia. 
In terms of economy, Indonesia has been classified as an emerging economy or a developing 
country (IMF 2010). Despite being positioned as a developing country, Indonesia is one of 
the fastest  growing economy and is now the world’s 10th largest in Purchasing Power Parity 
estimation (World Bank 2014). It also has been playing a substantial and consistent role in 
Asia-Pacific politics and economy, with more involvement in a variety of regional 
cooperation bodies including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  
Nonetheless, the conflict of interest between the competitor and the winner of the most recent 
(2014) presidential election has resulted in a very strong opposition from the two sides of the 
followers. Economic observers are concerned with the future national economic condition if 
this tension continues. 
5.3 The structure of the Indonesian Government 
Under the current system, the Indonesian government is divided into three tiers, namely the 
central government, provincial governments, and local governments. Following 
decentralization reforms, the Indonesian Central Government delegated its subordinate 
governments with a number of authorities. It has allowed lower levels of governments to 
have higher authority on decision making for the following sectors: education; health; public 
works; public facilities; and infrastructure. The central government maintains authority for 
foreign policy, defense/security, the judiciary, fiscal policy, as well as religion. Each 
government level has two branches, namely the executive side that consists of elected 
officials and ranks, and the legislative side to oversee the conduct of the executive. Both 
elected officials and legislative members are democratically elected in the general elections.  
The following Indonesian Central Government agencies - the Ministry of Home Affairs’ 
(MoHA)
5
, the Ministry for State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucracy Reform 
(MSAEBR)
6
 and the Ministry of Finance (MoF)
7
 - provide directive assistance for regional 
governments (at both local and provincial levels of governments) through their regulations. 
                                                 
5
 Translated from Kementerian Dalam Negeri 
6
 Translated from Kementerian Pemberdayaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi 
7
 Translated from Kementerian Keuangan 
65 
 
Consequently, lower levels of government are held accountable and report on their 
performance to the Central Government through these particular agencies. Figure 5.1 below 
exhibits the structure of government under Indonesian jurisdiction. 
Figure 5.1: The structure of the Indonesian government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Authority delegation 
Report on performance 
At regional level, currently there are 511 local and 34 provincial governments
8
. Local 
governments encompass municipalities and regencies with no substantial differences in duties 
and responsibilities between the two. Officially, both local and provincial governments work 
under MoHA’s supervisions, but technically National Development Planning Agency 
(NDPA)
9
, MSAEBR and MoF also play a powerful role through regulations regarding 
planning, performance and budgeting that have to be adhered to. Agencies under local and 
provincial governments are also under the control of other associated ministries for different 
purposes. For example, the central government Ministry of Education (MoE) has the right to 
regulate Education Departments under regional government control. 
Since the introduction of Government Regulation number 22/1999 on regional government, 
local and provincial governments have now received a large amount of responsibility. This 
change of responsibility comes with the obligation to provide better services to the 
community with the resources allocated. The budget allocation is now the responsibility of 
                                                 
8
 Figures for number of local and provincial governments taken from MoHA website, and can be retrieved at 
http://otda.kemendagri.go.id/images/file/data2014/file_konten/jumlah_daerah_otonom_ri.pdf   
9
 A national government agency responsible for planning development, National Development Planning Agency 
is a literal translation for Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional. 
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regional governments. As autonomous entities, this requires skilled management to 
administer the financial resources. The quality and quantity of services, and the benefit and 
impact of services delivered, are also required to be assessed by constituents through means 
of performance accountability. For this purpose, a PMS framework has been developed by 
the central government to be implemented by regional government, and guidelines in this 
regard keep updating over time. 
5.4 The concept of PMS and accountability in the Indonesian Government 
In the Indonesian public sector, performance measurement is not new, but more recently its 
value is being considered. A concept called Sistem Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah 
(SAKIP), or Government Institution Performance Accountability System, has been designed 
to better monitor performance and the discharge of accountability. SAKIP is defined in 
Government Regulation number 29/2014 as a systematic sequence from various activities, 
tools and procedures designed to measure, collect, classify, summarise and report data of 
performance, for the purpose of accountability and performance improvement. This system is 
designed to integrate the planning system, performance measurement, performance-based 
budgeting, treasury system, accounting system, and performance reporting. As part of 
SAKIP, PMS is used to evaluate the success and failure of programs/governments’ strategic 
objectives. According to LAN decree number 239/IX/6/2003, performance measurement is a 
systematic and continuing process to evaluate the success or failure of activities based on a 
set of programs, policies and goals in order to achieve government missions, vision and 
strategies. The method of measurement is through matching the results (achievements) 
against pre-set targets. For this purpose, performance indicators (PIs) are set earlier, when the 
performance agreement
10
 is agreed upon during the planning stage. PIs are set for both 
activity level and strategic objective level.  
In the Indonesian government context, accountability is always related to performance. Thus, 
performance accountability is the term used for government accountability, which is defined 
in Government Regulation number 29/2014 as a manifestation of government institutions’ 
obligation to be responsible for the success/failure of programs/activities delegated by 
stakeholders. This definition is similar to the definition provided in the accountability 
literature. In order to be meaningful, information on achievement in performance 
                                                 
10
 This is an agreement on set-performance planning between elected officials and their agencies, and between 
agency top-level managers and their subordinates. This agreement is set following budget approval. 
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accountability should be disclosed and reported to stakeholders. A brief picture of the current 
practice of PMS is depicted in Figure 5.2. This figure shows how to link planning and 
budgeting and to measure the achievement government objectives, until a performance 
reporting is produced. 
5.5 Summary 
Performance measurement and accountability have been recognised in Indonesian 
Government under a system called SAKIP. This system incorporates planning, budgeting, 
treasury, performance measurement, accounting and performance reporting, and it aims to 
provide a good integration among all these elements. Government accountability is 
discharged through information released in performance reporting, based on the measures of 
performance. For the purpose of accountability reporting, lower levels of government are 
required to submit reports to higher levels of government for scrutiny.  
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Figure 5.2: A brief picture of PMS in the Indonesian regional governments 
 
Source: Adapted from MoF regulation No. 13/2006, MoHA regulation No. 54/2010, and MSAEBR regulation No. 53/2014. 
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Chapter 6: Findings  
6.1 Introduction 
This findings chapter provides the results of a comprehensive review of the documentary 
evidence and analysis of the interview data. This chapter first describes the evolution of the 
Indonesian regional government PMS since the introduction of public sector reform and the 
impact of PMS implementation upon accountability. PMS evolution is separated into three 
stages/phases, each of which represents different milestones in central government initiatives. 
These relate to the release of various regulations that occurred from 1999-2002, 2004-2009 
and 2009-2015; and implementation of those initiatives at regional level. Emphasis is given 
to the evolution of performance-related regulations on planning, performance and budgeting. 
Secondly, a current picture of PMS is presented, followed by an elaboration of a number of 
impediments in implementation. After that, the discharge of accountability following PMS 
implementation is presented. Subsequently, regional governments’ motivation in adopting the 
central government framework on PMS is disclosed, in the last section. Information revealed 
in this chapter comes from documentary evidence and from interview sessions with key 
participants.  
6.2 The evolution of the Indonesian regional government PMS since 1999 
Since late 1990s the issue of good governance became increasingly important in the public 
administration field, and this has been acknowledged by policy setters in the Indonesian 
Government. With the spirit of good governance in mind, bureaucrats at the central 
government searched for alternative strategies to reform the government administration and 
improve accountability and transparency. Under the earlier regime (prior to 1999), the 
government administrative was centrally controlled, whereby all decisions came from the 
central government. The allocation of the budget and the ways in which it was administered 
were in the hands of central government. Regional governments were acting as the 
representative in the regions for the administration of the central government agendas. 
Elected officials and members of the House of Representatives were appointed by the central 
government and had no substantial voice in relation to government policies and agendas.  
One of the reforms which lead to an enormous change in the governmental system was the 
release of decentralisation law. Unlike the previous very central administration, the new era 
of a more decentralized administration that began in 1999 has delegated more power and 
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authority to regional governments to manage their territories. Local officials (governors, 
mayors and regents) and members of the House of Representatives have been democratically 
elected by the people as a result of the administrative change. The possession of this power 
and authorisation at regional level of government, together with the ability of community 
members in selecting their local representatives, have resulted in a change in political 
accountability. In consequence, the people are now normatively (through their representatives 
in the House of Representatives) able to hold regional governments accountable for their 
conduct. 
Meanwhile the central government administrators were trying to find a mechanism to assure 
that government institutions work in the best interest of the public and to secure the 
legitimacy and trust from their communities. To do so, they had to find a mechanism that 
would disclose the achievement of government performance in relation to the services and 
products that have been trusted by the public to be delivered. Prior to 1999, there was no 
comprehensive PMS able to determine and inform the extent of government achievement, in 
areas such as health, education, public planning and infrastructure. What can be described as 
PMS was in terms of the regular collection of performance information regarding the 
completion of tasks and responsibilities, and reported either quarterly, half yearly or annually. 
The focus was on input measures, even though some output indicators were also 
implemented. In addition, there was a perception that the success of a program was 
determined by the capability of a unit of government organisation in meeting budget targets 
as input indicators. As such, this resulted in a strong emphasis on financial performance 
rather than on the government’s desired outcomes. Hence, an explicit PMS was deemed 
urgent; and following public sector reform, a new system of performance measurement for 
accountability purpose was introduced in 1999.  
The introduction of a current performance and accountability mechanism was prompted by a 
high level bureaucratic initiative to find a relevant tool to measure the achievement of 
government goals. In a preliminary interview for the present research it was mentioned that 
mention that The United States GPRA was then studied and translated into an accountability 
and performance mechanism developed by the central government for the use of all levels of 
government. Some of the translations of GPRA can be found in currently applied strategic 
planning and its elements, annual performance plans and reports. Through time, the practice 
of the UK’s public service agreements has also been adopted to complement the existing 
performance and accountability mechanism.  
71 
 
6.2.1 The introduction of a PMS for accountability (1999-2003) 
The emergence of a newly established PMS in Indonesian Government started with the 
introduction of Laporan Kinerja Akuntabilitas Instansi Pemerintah (LAKIP)
11
, as required in 
Presidential Instruction No 7/1999. Although, the title appears to emphasise accountability 
reporting;, LAKIP actually focuses on the need to establish a performance accountability 
system. The aim of LAKIP (as advised in the Instruction) is to gain an understanding of the 
government institutions’ ability to achieve their visions, missions, and goals. To achieve this 
aim, it was believed that a performance accountability report that encompasses PIs, methods, 
mechanism and reporting procedures is essential. To start with, by 30 September 1999 all 
government institutions (at both the central and regional levels) were required to develop 
strategic planning for their main programs that could be achieved in a range of one to five 
years. This planning should incorporate the description of: 
1. Visions, missions, strategies and organization key success factors. 
2. Organization goals, objectives and activities. 
3. How to achieve goals and objectives. 
Following the accomplishment of strategic planning development, starting from the end of 
budget year 2000/2001
12
, each institution had to produce LAKIP as a report on performance 
accountability, and it had to be submitted to the President through the Ministry for State 
Apparatus Empowerment (MSAE)
13
. To assist institutions with the LAKIP production, the 
Public Administration Agency (PAA)
14
 was appointed to provide a guideline. Subsequent to 
this appointment, in a very short period of time, PAA released a decree number 
589/IX/6/1999 on a guideline for developing performance accountability reporting. This 
guideline attempted to give a picture of a strategic planning and how to assess planning 
achievement. A government must certainly have a vision that is run through its missions. In 
attempt to meet the missions as stated, the PAA guideline underlined the need to develop a 
                                                 
11
 May be literally translated as Report on Government Performance Accountability.  
12
 Prior to 2001, the budget year was similar to the fiscal year, ended 31 March. 1 April 2001-31 December 2001 
was recognised as a transition year, and subsequent to that year, the budget year has been the same as the 
calendar year. 
13
 MSAE is the previous title of the MSAEBR. 
14
 PAA is a literal translation of Lembaga Administrasi Negara (LAN). It is a central government institution 
which has a main responsibility to provide assessment on government administration, and to develop a national 
policy on state administration. During 1999 to 2003 this institution was a given a task to develop a guideline on 
government performance measurement and accountability. This task was then ceased and transferred to 
MSAEBR. 
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number of government goals that can be achieved within a five year period. From these goals, 
a set of short-term objectives (to be achieve within a single year) were required to be 
designed. In order to meet these objectives, the governments were to set policies as a 
guideline for the programs and activities development. This hierarchical structure of planning 
was designed to form a strategic planning scheme. Figure 6.1 provides a picture of 
Indonesian government strategic planning.  
Figure 6.1: Strategic Planning 
Source: Summarised from LAN and BPKP (2000) 
According to the documents reviewed, policies at a strategic planning level are basically 
rules, norms or guidelines in developing programs and activities, whereas a program is a 
collection of activities. A central or a regional government program could be run through 
several activities, and these activities are selected on a yearly basis, ranked based on priority. 
The linkage among the elements under strategic planning could be traced through template 
forms provided that explain the association among elements, from an institution vision at the 
Government Vision 
Missions 
Goals 
Objectives 
Policies 
Programs 
Activities 
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top to activities at the bottom in the hierarchy (see Appendix III for comprehensive examples 
of strategic planning). In terms of measuring performance, this guideline provided 
performance measurement template forms to explain activities and elaborate program and 
policy. At activity level, a series of PIs were to be developed and grouped into inputs, 
outputs, outcomes, benefits and impacts.  
For managers of government organisations to have a full understanding of performance 
measurement and accountability, as well as the capability to produce reliable strategic plans, 
PAA, in collaboration with the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (FDSA)
15
, 
released a module on LAKIP in 2000. This was a comprehensive module covering issues of 
accountability and good governance, strategic planning, performance planning, measurement 
and evaluation on performance, as well as performance reporting. It was used as a 
complementary document to PAA decree Number 589/IX/6/1999.  
Specific to performance measurement, in conjunction with presidential instruction number 
7/1999, the module explained that performance to be measured was for all levels in 
management of a central/regional government, from top to the lowest level. The performance 
emphasis of each management level would differ from one to another. High level 
management focuses on the aggregate results and looks at the whole agency/government 
outcomes, benefits and impacts; while the people in the operational level would look into 
inputs and outputs of programs/activities individually. In developing the PMS, the module 
classified five stages needing to be adhered to by a government management. The stages 
classified are: a strategic planning design stage, PIs setting stage, a data measurement system 
stage, performance measures improvement stage, and the integration into management 
process stage. The process of strategic planning in general has been discussed earlier in this 
chapter. In the second stage, management sets qualitative and quantitative PIs that are able to 
describe the success/failure of objectives/goals and activities/programs.  
The third stage was developing a data measurement system. The first step was to set an 
achievable standard to each indicator and to make sure data is available before measuring; 
then, to set how to display the information on performance in the most effective way so the 
readers/stakeholders were able to use the information for policy decisions. The next stage was 
                                                 
15
 FDSA is a central government organisation with the main function to provide supervision to other 
government institutions. FDSA is a literal translation of Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan 
(BPKP). 
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improving performance measures to indicators that need modification or adjustment. Thus, 
indicators need to be flexible to change. The last stage in performance measurement was to 
integrate it into the management process, where it was used as a mechanism to assess or 
evaluate the achievement of goals and strategic objectives. This process of performance 
measurement through the stages above form a cycle as they are continuously developed. This 
performance measurement cycle is pictured in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2: Performance measurement cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
  
       
 
  
 
   
       
     
 
 
 
 
     
 
  
 
   
       
   
 
   
       
              
 
Source: Adapted from (LAN & BPKP 2000) 
In 2003, PAA revised the guideline with a decree number 239/IX/6/2003. In order to be 
accountable, this new guideline underlined the important value of a PMS that incorporates 
four elements: strategic planning, performance planning, performance measurement, and the 
report on performance. According to PAA (2003), each of these elements can be defined as 
follows:  
1. Strategic planning is a process to develop result-oriented services that can be achieved in 
the range of 1 to 5 years, systematically and sustainably, by taking into account any 
potential elements, opportunities and threats that might be posed. It consists of 
government vision, missions, goals, objectives, strategies, policies and programs, as well 
as measures of success and failure in the action. 
2. Performance planning is a process to determine annual activities through strategies, and is 
translated into policies, programs, and activities. The document is then known as an 
annual performance plan. 
Strategic planning 
Integration with 
management process 
Set PIs 
Performance measurement 
improvement 
Data measurement 
system development 
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3. Performance measurement is a systematic and sustainable process to assess the likely 
success or failure of activity executions. This process aims at evaluating each of the PIs to 
give a clear picture of goals and objectives achievement. 
4. Report on performance is an explicit accountability report on performance or LAKIP. 
These four elements are core to the PMS. Under strategic planning, performance is measured 
according to performance planning, and the result is disclosed in a report on performance. For 
evaluation purposes, PAA (2003) expected managers in each unit of government 
organization, at both the central and regional government levels, to use the forms to: 
1. Examine the achievement of each activity PIs in order for any improvements to be made 
in programs/activities execution. 
2. Analyse efficiency by comparing inputs with outputs of the programs. 
3. Measure or determine effectiveness by evaluating the association between governments’ 
goals and outcomes or benefits. 
4. Evaluate the performance gap and find strategies to solve the problems. 
Figure 6.3 shows an attempt by the guideline to assist management with the ability to produce 
programs/activities that are in line with the objectives. Since the success of 
programs/activities is the responsibility of government agencies, the whole government 
performance is reflected in the collection of all agencies’ achievement of objectives. In 
practice, however, to some extent it is difficult to say that the level of objectives achievement 
was truly the result of activity performance, since the correlation between the two was not 
always clear in the development process. This has been partly due to a low capability in 
human resource. For instance, a participant from the central government believes that many 
regional governments still have difficulty in defining outcomes and producing appropriate 
outcome indicators.  
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Figure 6.3: Performance measurement based on PAA Decree number 239/IX/6/2003 
Strategic Planning 
Goals Objectives How to achieve goals and objectives 
 Description Indicators Policies Programs 
1 2 3 4 5 
 A B   
 
Performance Plan 
Objectives 
Programs 
Activities 
Description Indicators Target Description PIs 
Unit of 
measurement 
Target 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A B   C D   
 
Activities Performance Measurement 
Program Activities  
 Description PIs Unit of measurement Target Actual % 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7* 
 C D     
 
Measures of Objective Achievement 
Objectives PIs Target Actual % 
1 2 3 4 5* 
A B    
Source: Adapted from PAA decree Number 239/IX/6/2003. *Percentage of the actual achievement by comparing with the target. 
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An internal reviewer describes this: 
‘Sometimes the agencies have put their best effort, but when it comes to 
performance reporting they were unable [to clearly describe performance]. 
Probably there is a constraint in human resource at agency level.’ (P6) 
Low capability, as a result of limited training provided to staff in implementing the PMS, is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Despite direction having been provided in the PAA guidelines and the module, apparently 
implementers at regional governments were not fully capable of directing regional 
governments to produce reliable strategic planning. This problem was partly due to time 
constraints available to learn new directions in PMS, and limited assistance in producing 
strategic planning directly. As a result, the implementers in regional governments did not 
have substantial knowledge to develop strategic and performance planning, and could not 
relate the planning with the achievement of government outcomes, particularly in these very 
early years of adoption. As a consequence, a number of consultancy efforts in strategic 
planning development arose from both central government representatives and other 
consultancy providers. In relation to this, one participant states: 
‘At that time, a guideline on planning was not available. So, the main business 
is not on how to develop a performance report but on developing a strategic 
plan.’ (P1)  
In the meantime, financial based-performance regulations also started to be introduced as part 
of public bureaucracy reform, by the release of The State Finance Law No. 17/2003 on April 
5, 2003. This is the first milestone of performance-based budgeting introduction in 
government organisations. The implementation was not straightforward, as there were more 
guidelines to be released and a lot of people to educate in order for the new system to be 
applicable. The full implementation did not occur until five years following the introduction. 
The State Finance Law also stated the requirement to integrate the performance 
accountability system with the budgeting system, by introducing a “working plan and 
budget” and changing budgeting classification in accordance with international standards. 
The application of “working plan and budget” means that budget allocation is based on a 
performance plan that is set earlier. This method was believed to be able to avoid duplication 
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in performance planning.
16
 The guideline to assist regional governments on how to develop a 
budget based on performance was then available in 2006 through the introduction of MoHA 
regulation number 13/2006.  
6.2.2 Revision in performance planning and budgeting and the introduction of key 
performance indicators (KPIs) (2004-2009) 
The PMS framework was introduced in 1999, and was followed with implementation at 
regional governments throughout Indonesia, driven by Presidential Instruction No. 7/1999 
and Presidential Decree No 8/2004,
17
 MSAE designed and released a guideline on evaluating 
performance accountability reports through decree No.135/2004. This was the first regulation 
on how to assess the quality of performance measurement reports. The evaluation was run by 
MSAEBR and FDSA. For the purpose of performance evaluation, each year MSAEBR also 
equipped evaluators with guidelines on how to conduct assessment. All top managers were 
also required to appoint supervisory teams to conduct supervision of their subordinates’ 
performance and to take action upon the results of performance review. Drawing from 
documentary evidence, the link between evaluations conducted in each organisation unit 
internally and government evaluation as a whole was unclear. This was also confirmed in 
discussion with a participant in the present research, as there was no exact guideline or any 
regulation on how to utilise the information from a low-level unit evaluation as a base for the 
whole government evaluation.  
In an attempt to improve the performance measurement framework, the central government 
introduced the “performance agreement” as a part of SAKIP through MSAEBR circular 
number 31/2004. Performance agreement is an agreement between a higher authority (i.e. the 
central government) to a respective lower authority (i.e. regional governments), in which a 
lower authority promises to meet a performance target that has been set in the annual plan 
document. Internally, the agreement set is between an elected official and an agency 
manager. This agreement is supplemented by a form that is similar to the performance 
planning form. Performance was to be measured based on the actual performance of 
objectives listed in the performance agreement document. The idea of introducing 
                                                 
16
 Duplication in developing performance planning was possible at the time, since the performance 
accountability system that incorporated performance planning and measurement was under the responsibility of 
PAA, and on the other hand the budgeting system was under the responsibility of the MoF.  
17
 Both regulations required both explicitly and implicitly that the MSAE formulate policy in government 
performance accountability. 
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performance agreements was believed to come from the practice in the UK, as indicated by 
one participant from the external evaluator cluster, who stated: 
‘A performance agreement is a performance contract. The theory came from 
the UK. In 1999, there was a [regulation on performance] report and then 
suddenly performance contract emerged.’ (P1)  
At almost the same time, the State Finance Law No. 17/2003 set an important milestone on 
the future of Indonesian Government, as it has had a reasonably strong influence on the 
release of a variety of planning and financial regulations. For instance, in accordance with the 
State Finance Law, the central government issued Government Regulation No. 20/2004 on 
Government Working Plan, to assist the direction in developing annual performance planning 
for the whole government.
18
 This regulation seemed to be focussed more on central 
government agencies, even though to some extent it was used for regional governments as 
well.
19
 For regional governments, this regulation introduced an annual government working 
plan and annual working plan for agencies that should be developed accordingly. This 
regulation has created a new step forward in PMS, since this annual plan is intended to be 
used as a basis for budget appropriations.  
6.2.2.1 Improvement in performance planning  
It is worth noting that a national agenda on development planning was introduced in October 
2004 (by the release of Law No 25/2004), which came five years after the introduction of the 
performance accountability reporting regulation (through Presidential Instruction No 7/1999). 
Interestingly, and prior to the release of this law, the central government introduced a 
government working planning regulation through Government Regulation No 20/2004 in 
August 2004, in which to elaborate the annual planning development process. This meant that 
the guideline on annual planning was released earlier than the law that regulates the general 
rules in government planning.
20
 This indicates a lack of coordination among government 
sectors in releasing performance-related regulations.  
                                                 
18
 Under the Indonesian Government system, central government laws are translated by government regulations 
and followed by associated ministries’ regulations. 
19
 Specific regulations on regional government performance planning were then only starting to be released, 
from 2008, to address the requirements in the Regional Governance Law No 32/2004. 
20
 Note that law is the second highest regulation in the hierarchy after the Constitution. Government regulation 
is one level below law. 
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Law No 25/2004 set a new system in national planning, where a twenty-year or long-term 
development plan, medium-term term (5 year plan), and annual working plan, were 
introduced for all levels of government. This law requires government agencies to set five 
yearly plans/strategic plans and annual plans/working plans, by referring to the whole 
government medium-term plan and annual plan, respectively (see Figure 6.4 for regional 
government planning structure). Prior to endorsement, medium-term planning and annual 
planning should go through a series of ongoing consultations and inputs from indicative 
agencies’ strategic plans and agencies’ annual plans, respectively. Once endorsed, agencies 
revised their planning in accordance with the whole government-approved plan. 
Figure 6.4: The Indonesian regional government planning structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  Cascading down of development planning 
  Reference for planning development 
Source: Developed from the Government of Indonesia Law No 25/2004 
From Figure 6.4 above, we can see the interaction between whole government planning and 
agencies’ planning, which is not clear in performance regulation prior to 2004. In terms of 
performance measurement, there has been a more challenging task for implementers, since 
agencies now have a clearer planning template to refer to in attempts to align their objectives 
with the whole government objectives. They have to be able to design programs and activities 
under aligned objectives that serve both agencies and the whole government objectives. 
Government long 
term plan 
Government 
medium term 
plan 
Government 
working plan 
Agency strategic 
plan 
Agency working 
plan 
National long 
term plan 
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Almost at the same time, the Regional Governance Law No. 32/2004 was released to replace 
Law No 22/1999 on Regional Governance. The content of planning rules from both 
regulations is the same, but the latest regulations were specifically designed for regional 
governments. 
In response to the change in regulation on decentralization, and as a derivative of Law No. 
32/2004, the central government released Regulation No 8/2008 on stages and procedures in 
developing, controlling and evaluating the implementation of local development planning. 
The content of Regulation No 8/2008 is similar to Law No 25/2004, but it specifically 
addresses the planning system for local and provincial governments. A complete guideline, 
on how to address the requirements in this Regulation No 8/2008 to be practical, was then 
introduced 2 years later through MoHA regulation No 54/2010. From this time, MoHA 
released annual regulations regarding annual planning as an annual guideline for regional 
governments.  
6.2.2.2 Performance-based budgeting  
In terms of performance-related budgeting, in order to be effective, the State Finance Law 
No. 17/2003 had to be backed up by more practical regulations. In response to this need, the 
State Treasury Law No 1/2004 and the new Fiscal Balance Law No 33/2004 (to replace Law 
No 25/1999) were released. The State Treasury Law No 1/2004 introduced financial 
administration procedures and responsibility authority, while the Fiscal Balance Law No 
33/2004 outlines a new structure of budget and components, and describes the percentage of 
funds shared by the central and regional governments. Following all the above new Laws, a 
government regulation on Local Financial Management No. 58/2005 was established, which 
was then translated into MoHA Regulation No 13/2006 on a Guideline for Local Financial 
Management. This guideline has been in effect since 2007, which was 5 years after the 
introduction of Law No 17/2003. In other words, Performance-Based Budgeting (PBB) 
started to be in practice in 2007, with some regional governments starting to adopt this new 
method in their budget process in that year. This MoHA guideline was reasonably 
comprehensive, outlining a new method of budget preparation, and the change was radical in 
comparison to the previous line and incremental system. It also provided a template to align 
the allocation of the budget based on pre-planned performance in the planning system; even 
though the link has not been very clear in practice, due to a lack of collaboration between 
those authorities who release performance planning regulation and performance budgeting 
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guidelines. For the purpose of linking planning and budgeting, MoHA Regulation No 
13/2006 introduced a “working plan and budget” template form to be used by regional 
government agencies (see Appendix IV for the template example). However, there have been 
some inconsistencies between this regulation and LAN decree No 239/2003, which have 
resulted in confusion. For instance, MoHA Regulation No 13/2006 does not recognise the 
benefit and impact groups of PIs, as LAN decree No 239/2003 does. Besides, objectives 
achievement indication is not clearly described in the working plan and budget.  
Despite reform in the budgeting (through PBB introduction) coming a few years after the 
introduction of a performance accountability system, this financial aspect of performance 
change has been diffused quite well into regional government practices. Moreover, the 
regional governments’ high resource dependence on the central government made regional 
governments put considerable effort into complying with financial regulation requirements, 
otherwise penalties may apply for those not following the rules. One prominent penalty has 
been the delay in transferring shared funds for regional governments until they have met all 
MoF requirements. Regional governments have then focused more on the financial aspect of 
budget preparation and execution, and on the accuracy and timelines of financial reporting. 
As a consequence, they have put less emphasis on non-financial aspects in terms of 
effectiveness of services for outcome achievement. Concern about this phenomenon has been 
raised by some participants, for example: 
‘Agency top managers do not view [overall] PMS as important as their minds 
are still focused on the budget allocation for their agencies' (P15). 
Efforts to align performance and budgeting have continuously progressed in order to have a 
comprehensive performance accountability mechanism that is able to indicate actual 
performance. In April 2006, the central government released a government regulation on 
Government Institution Finance and Performance Reporting No 8/2006. This regulation has 
set another milestone in performance measurement and accountability evolution under the 
Indonesian public sector reform, since it has been used as reference for numerous consecutive 
PMS regulations. However, this regulation seems to have little connection with previous 
efforts in designing reliable performance measurement; instead, it seems to suggest the 
starting of a new performance reporting agenda. The regulation itself resulted in another 
problem, since it set a different template for performance reporting compared to the previous 
template (based on PAA decree Number 239/IX/6/2003). Hence, since the introduction of 
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Regulation Number 8/2006, there have been two types of performance reporting. Table 6.1 
depicts specific aspects of the two performance reporting regimes: 
Table 6.1: The comparison between the two performance reporting regimes 
No 
Aspect of performance 
reporting 
PAA: 
239/IX/6/2003 
Government regulation: 
8/2006 
1 Reporting authorities 
Regional 
Governments 
- Regional government 
agencies 
- Regional government 
2 Reported authorities 
- The President, 
- MoHA,  
- MSAEBR,  
- FDSA 
MSAEBR 
3 PI groups 
- Input,  
- Output, 
- Outcome, 
- Impact, 
- Benefit 
- Output,  
- Outcome 
4 PI used 
- Objectives 
- Activities 
- Programs 
- Activities 
 
Source: Summarised from PAA Decree 239/IX/6/2003 and Government Regulation 8/2006. 
This regulation states that performance reporting is a product of a performance accountability 
system, and as an integral part of the planning, budgeting, treasury and accounting system. 
Despite this acknowledgement, there has been no further clear guideline on how to manage 
this integration in practice.   
It is worth noting that Regulation 8/2006 put heavier emphasis on financial reporting than on 
performance reporting. Financial reporting is particularly reviewed internally by internal 
auditors, and subject to external audit, and is presented as accountability reporting to different 
stakeholders (i.e. the House of Representatives, the MoF, and the MoHA). Meanwhile, 
performance reporting is required to be annually presented to the central government through 
MSAEBR. This central government agency then provides evaluation and feedback for 
regional governments. In regard to financial reporting, the MoF is dominant and has powerful 
coercive influence, as it is able to impose its rules to regional governments due to funding 
dependency.  
84 
 
6.2.2.3 The introduction and implementation of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
Another milestone in PMS development is the introduction of KPIs through MSAEBR 
Regulation No 9/2007. According to this regulation, KPIs are used as a tool to indicate the 
achievement of an institution’s goals and strategic objectives. In fact, measures of objectives 
achievement had been in place since 1999, but were not identified as key indicators. KPIs are 
applicable for both the whole government and government agencies; where for government 
level they should indicate the outcome of government objectives and goals, whereas at the 
agency level it was expected that they should consider output indicators. Since the Indonesian 
Government has been diffused by the idea of corporate governance, policies have been 
directed into a result-oriented government. These two types of indicator are perceived to be 
able to indicate the performance under a result-oriented government approach, and the focus 
from input has been removed. Output here may be in terms of goods or services produced 
from government activities to support the achievement of strategic objective and goals. 
Meanwhile, the outcome is a reflection of the usefulness of a product or output: it is about 
how far the products/services meet expectations.  
A further step in making KPIs applicable is by developing a guideline, and for this purpose 
MSAEBR introduced Regulation No 20/2008. This guideline explains and elaborates a 
mechanism in developing good performance indicators, and supplements the readers with a 
set of performance indicator samples that might be used by regional governments in 
developing their planning and performance systems. Quantitative indicators are suggested, 
not because they are more objective, but because the accuracy of quantitative measurement is 
easy to digest and thus is preferred. Some kinds of quantitative indicators are in terms of 
percentages, ratios, averages, indexes, and absolutes (such as 30 units, 20 persons). However, 
qualitative measures are also used, for example, indicators that indicate the achievement in 
terms of scales (e.g. poor, adequate, good).  
It is indicated that KPIs are to be used in various management policies, and that any 
document prepared for these policies should state KPIs in it. The documents are as follows: 
1. Medium term planning and annual planning, 
2. Budgetary documents, 
3. Performance agreements,  
4. performance accountability reporting, and 
5. Performance measurement. 
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KPIs are also used as controlling tools in program and activity execution, meaning that 
management is expected to utilise KPIs in examining the progress of program and activity 
achievements and in making any decision, once the results do not meet the expectations. For 
the purpose of performance evaluation, evaluators also used KPIs in assessing government 
performance. All of the use of KPIs can be depicted, as Figure 6.5: 
Figure 6.5: The use of KPIs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from MSAEBR Regulation Number 20/2008 
From Figure 6.5, we can see that KPIs are used in medium-term and annual planning, 
performance and budgetary documents. For annual purpose, a set of KPIs are designed in the 
annual planning documents, and they are then used for all other performance-related 
documents. Theoretically, at the end of a cycle year, if the government priorities have not 
changed and no revision is required subsequent to performance reporting evaluation, the KPIs 
remain unchanged for the following year. 
At the government level, a regional development planning board is the responsible agency to 
develop planning systems, including developing KPIs for medium-term planning, with input 
from other agencies and stakeholders; while agency-level KPIs are set by each agency and 
reviewed by regional development planning boards.  
MSAEBR Regulation Number 20/2008 underlined that KPIs are open for review, since a 
government’s programs and priorities might change from time to time. Regular review is 
important to maintain validity, and is useful for measurement and controlling purposes. In 
reality, most of regional government agencies’ KPIs have not been appropriately aligned with 
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KPIs set in the medium-term plans of their respective governments. In other words, the 
agency-level objectives and programs are not adequately set to align with higher-level 
objectives. Therefore, fundamental reformulation of the planning system is urgent for most 
regional governments; but to revise medium-term planning is not an easy task. According to 
Law Number 32/2004 and MoHA Regulation Number 54/2010, government medium-term 
planning is set in a regional government regulation to be used for a five-year term. A revised 
plan requires House of Representatives approval, and this is time-consuming.  
6.2.3 Improvement in PMS regulations (2010- 2014) 
Efforts to improve performance guidelines were continuously being undertaken by 
MSAEBR. In 2010, a new guideline in developing Performance Agreements and 
Performance Accountability Reporting was released through Regulation No 29/2010. This 
regulation superseded MSAEBR circular number 31/2004 on performance agreements. If we 
make comparison between this regulation and LAN circular number 239/2003, the latest 
regulation does not have a template to be used to indicate activity performance. The focus has 
been on the strategic objectives, where the performance planning form and performance 
measurement form are developed based on a strategic objectives level, which are then at the 
end translated into LAKIP or a performance reporting document.  
After years of discussions through a series of meetings since 2006, regulation on SAKIP was 
finally released in April 2014 through Presidential Regulation on SAKIP No 29/2014. This 
regulation replaces Presidential Instruction Number 7/1999 and sets a new era in Indonesian 
Government performance measurement and accountability. This latest milestone in PMS has 
been set based on Government Regulation Number 8/2006, which provides an implication 
that PAA Decree Number 239/2003 is ineffective. Some different aspects introduced were as 
follows: 
1. At agency level, in addition to the annual report, a performance report has to be produced 
every quarter (which is called an interim report), submitted to the respective mayors or 
governors together with an interim financial report.  
2. The performance planning term is diminished, while programs and activities that used to 
be set in the annual planning template are now integrated in the working plan and budget. 
3. Low-level indicators that previously applied for activities now apply for both activities 
and programs. 
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4. A mechanism to compare year to year performance achievement under a five-year 
strategic planning scheme is introduced. 
5. Prior to submission to MSAEBR, an internal auditor team is to conduct a review on its 
regional government’s annual performance reporting, in order to ensure that reliable 
information is disclosed. 
6. Where needed, an internal auditor team conducts an evaluation upon SAKIP 
implementation. 
In response to requirements to develop performance agreements, to produce a performance 
reporting document, and to have a review on performance reporting as described in 
Presidential Regulation on SAKIP No 29/2014, MSAEBR introduced regulation number 
53/2014 to assist regional governments with these requirements. In terms of performance 
agreements, in fact, there is no substantial change made in the content by comparison with 
the previous guideline (which is an outdated MSAEBR regulation Number 29/2010); so with 
performance reporting, in which only minor additions are made to the content, to allow a 
matrix of year to year performance comparison, and the achievement to date column under 
the medium-term planning scheme. The relatively new idea is the guideline on how to 
conduct an annual performance review. However, this guideline has not discussed the process 
of performance evaluation as requested by Presidential Regulation on SAKIP No 29/2014. 
MSAEBR Regulation number 53/2014, released in November 2014, was introduced to 
regional governments in December. This regulation has started to be in effect since being 
introduced. This has resulted in difficulties for implementers, since they have been working 
in compliance with the previous guideline, which was immediately withdrawn. There has 
been a very limited time for them to comply with the latest requirements, as the report had to 
be lodged to MSAEBR two months after the end of budget year. Internal thorough review is 
also time-consuming, and as a result, in order to comply with the timing of submission, it did 
not appear that much could be done in compliance with this latest regulation.  
The new guideline does not equip implementers in the regional governments with a specific 
template on performance measurement, as they were provided in MSAEBR regulation 
number 29/2010. However, since it has been made ineffective due to the introduction of 
MSAEBR regulation number 53/2014, regional governments are set to self-design the 
template using two paragraphs of information on performance measurement, in an appendix 
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of this new guideline. There is no evidence of further communication or direction from 
MASEBR regarding this issue.  
In terms of performance review, the central government did not equip reviewers with 
adequate information or review assistance. This has resulted in many difficulties for 
reviewers that performed their job in the beginning of 2014. All participants in the internal 
evaluator cluster have been involved in reviewing performance reporting documents, and 
they expressed similar concern in relation to the absence of communication from MSAEBR 
regarding further assistance on the review process. For instance, a participant claimed: 
‘The last MSAEBR regulation [was] released at the end of 2014 without 
further information disseminated [in regards to meeting its requirements].’ 
(P9). 
6.3 A picture of the current government PMS  
Since its inception in late 1999, the Indonesian regional government performance 
measurement framework has evolved and improved, under a system named performance 
accountability (or SAKIP). Over fifteen years in place, it has changed quite a few times, and 
the latest change by the central government has been noticeable in 2014, ,through the 
introduction of regulation number 29/2014 to replace presidential instruction number 7/1999. 
In response to this regulation, MSAEBR introduced regulation number 53/2014 before the 
closing date of 2014, and the new framework was put immediately into effect subsequent to 
its introduction. Despite some elements having changed (such as the introduction of 
performance agreements in 2004 and the implementation of KPIs since 2007), the main PMS 
framework has remained unchanged since the first introduction in 1999.  
Since the introduction of Government Regulation number 8/2006, the intention to integrate 
PMS with other elements, particularly planning and budgeting, has been in evidence. In fact, 
the performance measurement system does not work without the availability of reliable 
strategic planning, and financial support in terms of budget allocation for programs based on 
the set plan. A broad outline of PMS and its integration with the planning and budgeting 
system, based on the latest guidelines, is depicted in Figure 6.6. 
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Figure 6.6: PMS and its integration with planning system and budgeting system 
 
 Step in development            Coordination line 
Source: Developed based on regulations on government performance and accountability.
21
 
 
                                                 
21
 References to develop the figure consist of Presidential Regulation Number 29/2014, MoHA Regulations 
Number 54/2010, Number 13/2006, and MSAEBR Regulation Number 53/2014. 
 
 
  
Planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budgeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency level Government level 
Strategic plan Medium term plan 
Performance 
measurement 
Government 
working plan 
Agency level 
working plan 
Long term plan 
Performance 
reporting 
Approved budget 
document 
Working plan and 
budget 
Performance 
agreement 
Performance 
agreement 
Performance 
reporting 
90 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.6, the government planning system has to be translated into and 
run by the respective agencies. For the purpose of integration among the systems, effort has 
been made to provide a strong linkage among the systems. For instance, budget allocations 
are based on agency working plans, where the “working plan and budget” documents are 
created. Once the “working plan and budget” document is approved as a complete budget 
document, agency top managers are set to design performance agreements based on approved 
programs, activities and budget for their agencies in a particular year.  
At the whole government level, there are two documents, in relation to performance at 
government level, that should be produced. The first document is the performance agreement, 
which, according to Presidential Regulation number 29/2014, is simply a summary of the all 
agency performance agreements. The agreement at this level is between the regional 
governments and the central government (see Appendix V for performance agreement and 
annex). Another document is performance reporting, or LAKIP. The development of this 
performance report is based on the performance agreement, and with reference to information 
disclosed in agency performance reports.  
6.4 Impediments to PMS development and implementation  
With the improved regulations, a majority of respondents believe that the central 
government-designed PMS framework has the ability to address performance issues if 
impediments can be minimised to a large extent. There are some problems that have surfaced 
in relation to the development and implementation of the national PMS framework, during 
the field work. These problems are listed as follows: 
1. Low level of top management commitment. 
During the interview sessions conducted in the field, the study revealed that elected officials 
and high level bureaucrats at regional governments do not possess a strong passion for 
building up a powerful PMS. This problem has been described as an enormous obstacle in 
PMS application, as the likely success much depends on the figure of leaders. A participant at 
the external evaluator cluster elaborates:  
‘That is the problem. It depends on personality. If a regional  government] 
has an elected official who understands  the use of] performance 
measurement, who is concerned with the community problems, it will be nice. 
But if, for example, it has not a very good elected official, the accountability 
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will definitely not good. Hence, it much depends on the figure, yes, on the 
leader.’ (P2; Emphasis added). 
This does not mean that they do not support the establishment of PMS, but they receive a 
limited driver for them to be interested in. Most top management do not see PMS as of equal 
importance as the financial performance system. A rational explanation for such little interest 
can be traced back to the little drive provided to regional governments since its diffusion in 
1999. Unlike financial performance, which received extensive attention from stakeholders, 
punishment (in terms of postponing shared funding for late budget approval), and a 
substantial amount of funding as a reward (for those who received unqualified positive 
opinion in financial reports), PMS does not have such leverage. The only drive that might 
result in a small improvement is a requirement to have a “CC”22 grade for LAKIP, as one of a 
number of prerequisites in order to receive an unqualified positive opinion in financial 
reporting. Since there is no powerful drive in implementing the provided PMS framework, 
top managers’ responses are passive in the way that they fulfill the central government 
requirements as a form of compliance, but with limited effort to enforce the system to be 
working and useful for decision making. This phenomenon has been described by two 
participants, who comment: 
‘Honestly, top management does not know what the SAKIP is. But since it is 
the mandate of the law, public disclosure regulation, and the use of budget 
that must be accounted for, inevitably local government must develop its own 
SAKIP.’ (P4). 
Another participant mentions: 
 ‘A statement from a top manager will definitely be followed up. But the 
problem here in our city is that we receive low response when we report to 
superior. Even no response at all, so that means we work by our own. We 
cannot work by our own, we need the support from planning board; we need 
the inspectorate to conduct reviews as well.  Since there is no response from 
top management] the result  of PMS implementation] is minimal.’ (P8). 
 
                                                 
22
 CC is one of the grades provided by MASEBR in evaluating LAKIP. A complete measurement and grading 
system can be traced in MSAEBR regulation number 13/2010. 
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This top management attitude can trigger a passive attitude among the implementers at the 
lower level in management.  
2. Passive attitude/apathetic behavior among staff at accountability units towards PMS. 
Low-level commitment shown by top management to PMS implementation has resulted in a 
passive attitude towards PMS among staff at accountability units in performing their duties. 
In the regional governments, there are two categories of accountability units that are 
responsible for collecting performance data and producing performance reporting documents. 
The first category is a unit attached to each government agency, but which is often not 
specifically and formally designed. The second category consists of an official division under 
the bureau of organisation at each of the regional governments’ secretariat. Staff at agency 
level accountability units often have a low understanding of PMS use and usefulness, and 
limited interest in performance data collection. This has related to low capability staff as a 
result of lacking knowledge, and low level of managers’ interest in the use of performance 
reporting. Reporting produced by the accountability units often serves a ceremonial purpose, 
as agency managers receive and sign the reports to be submitted to the respective mayor or 
governor with limited interest in using performance information as evaluation tools for their 
own organisations. This attitude underestimates the LAKIP production efforts by the unit 
staff, and eventually results in a passive attitude among staff. A participant who is involved in 
the PMS design commented: 
‘PMS in our government has not been very good due to lots of agency 
managers who still perceive it as not so important.’ (P15)   
At the whole government level, staff at the government accountability unit have to deal with 
many difficulties in summarising agency level performance reporting, in producing a 
government level LAKIP, due to lack of performance information capability in delivering 
information useful to address the whole government strategic objective achievements. In turn, 
this has resulted in apathetic behavior (among performance reporting preparers at the regional 
government level) towards PMS in the regional governments. The implementation and 
reporting of a performance system under such environmental conditions is then more likely to 
simply meet regulation requirements and compliance rather than manifest an intention for 
real improvement. As a result, PMS is unable to deliver better performance and to enhance 
accountability to the stakeholders.  
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3. Low institutional capacity. 
Another area of concern in association with PMS implementation is that regional 
governments have limited capacity to design and implement a meaningful PMS to be useful 
in the decision-making process. The most common cause in relation to this impediment is 
limited number of training provided to staff at accountability units, for both agency and the 
whole government levels. As a consequence, staffs at these units have low capability in 
designing a reliable PMS, since they have no adequate knowledge in this area. A participant 
at the internal evaluator cluster stated: 
‘Actually, this is a very good system. However, human resource is not ready to 
develop a reliable system and to translate regulations appropriately. So, I 
think in the future there is a need to increase the capability of staff, so that 
they will be able to fully understand the [central] government rules.’ (P14) 
Another internal evaluator found a similar problem associated with lack of knowledge among 
the people involved in the system development: 
‘Sometimes data from government agencies…agencies have done it totally. 
However, they could not be able to describe it [in the report]. Probably, there 
are constrains in human resources. Moreover, regulations keep changing over 
the years and probably agencies lack new information because they do not 
follow up with the latest development [in regulations].’ (P6) 
Institutional capacity due to lacking staff knowledge results not only in difficulties in aligning 
programs/activities with strategic objectives, but could also have impact on the ability to 
design proper PIs to indicate achievements. For instance, there have been many difficulties in 
designing outcome indicators due to the fact that they are mostly qualitative in nature. Since 
it is difficult to design meaningful qualitative measures, most of the result indicators are 
literally quantitative outputs, despite the fact that they are claimed as outcomes. This problem 
was described by an external evaluator, as he believes:  
‘Defining outcomes is not a simple thing to do, isn’t it? In my opinion, output 
indicators have been well defined, but outcome indicators have not been 
optimally [defined]. Eventually, the approach taken is, okay, there is 
gradation in outcome level. There is immediate outcome; there is also a 
perfect outcome. Hence, they select the [outcomes] that are the closest to the 
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output. Once an output is produced then it is considered as an outcome, that’s 
it. Well, it is still at immediate outcome level, has not yet moved towards 
ultimate outcome.’ (P2) 
An internal evaluator stated: 
‘In presenting, output indicators are adequate enough for agencies, but for the 
whole government it is supposed to present objective indicators in terms of 
outcome, what benefit can be expected of, or impact in the future, isn’t it? And 
this is still far [from expectation]. A bit far.’ (P3) 
It has been discussed in an earlier chapter that the result of all agency activities is an 
indication of the whole government achievement, since the execution of the government 
planning is the responsibility of associated agencies. Hence, the ability to design a PMS that 
is able to align agencies’ objectives with the whole government objectives is essential. 
However, since there was a problem in the resource capacity internally, the ability to produce 
such a PMS was also diminished, because PMS developers were not able to provide an 
alignment for lower-level objectives (at agencies) with higher-level objectives (at the whole 
government). 
To some extent, efforts to disseminate knowledge to increase the PMS developers’ capability 
were made through short training sessions. However, the results and impact of such training 
were not convincing, as the assistance provided was not constant. One participant claimed: 
‘Indeed like I said before, on the one hand human resource in developing the 
system is not adequate. On the other hand, the [system development] process 
is without a constant assistance. There is training either from the central 
government or from regional government, but it finishes at that point. 
Subsequently, in the application we as evaluators can see lots of mistakes. 
When asking, they do not really understand it.’ (P14). 
To mitigate lacking knowledge and increase capability, most regional governments invite 
FDSA branches in their territory to supervise their accountability units. However, the impact 
of supervisions has not been outstanding, as many regional governments do not receive 
satisfactory results in the external evaluation both for the performance measurement section 
and for the other sections of SAKIP. The latest report on LAKIP evaluation that has been 
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available to be collected is for the year 2013, and it has shown only eleven local governments 
received a B grade, out of 462 that have been evaluated. 
23
  
It has been revealed in the interviews that despite eleven governments having received good 
achievement, there is limited effort from other top management governments to learn from 
the practices of these successes by sending staff to carry out comparative studies. One 
participant who is involved in PMS development in her government admitted that she had 
once been sent to learn from another local government, but the report has not been responded 
to by top management. Since most of the staff at accountability units have no basic 
knowledge in PMS (either from educational background or previous experience) they 
eventually became autodidact learners, even though some occasionally receive some help 
from the FDSA following an invitation to briefly assist in LAKIP preparation.  
4. Lack of coordination among policy setters. 
In reality, a less performed PMS is not the result of problems that come from the 
implementers’ side at regional governments, but is also compounded with the problems that 
are associated with central government capacity, such as lacking coordination among policy 
setters in the central government in developing the guidelines. There have been at least four 
central government agencies responsible for designing performance-related regulations (i.e. 
MSAEBR, NDPA, MoF, and MoHA). MSAEBR is responsible for developing the PMS 
framework, while NDPA as a national development planning agency has the responsibility to 
produce planning regulation. MoF is required to produce financial regulation, and in this 
matter regulation on performance-based budgeting. The last agency, MoHA, has the 
responsibility to translate central government guidelines, through its subsequent regulations, 
to be adaptable in the regional governments. However, there is an indication of limited 
reference and consultation among these policy setters in producing performance-related 
guidelines.  
Lack of coordination among policy setters has resulted in a number of problems of 
contradictions and inconsistencies among regulations. For example, Law number 25/2004 
and Law number 32/2004, as two major laws on performance planning, contradict in their 
articles on local regulation settings. Law number 25/2004 requires a head of regional 
                                                 
23
 http://www.menpan.go.id/berita-terkini/2893-rapor-akuntabilitas-kinerja-membaik-11-kabupaten-kota-dapat-
nilai-b.  No further information is able to be collected for the results at provincial level of governments.  
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government regulation for regional government planning, while Law number 32/2004 
indicates the use of a regional government regulation. Moreover, inconsistencies are found in 
some associated regulations. For instance, MSAEBR regulation number 53/2014, as a 
translation of Presidential regulation number 29/2014, is assumed to completely address the 
requirements. However, it has not addressed the requirement to produce a guideline on 
performance evaluation, and has not elaborated on how to utilise program and activity PIs. It 
also does not provide any template for performance planning.  
Lack of coordination has also led to limited linkage among performance-related regulations. 
The linkage between “working plan and budget” and performance measurement templates is 
not clear. It is quite often the case that a different set of PIs is used on these two documents. 
To date, budgeting regulations have been made in accordance with planning regulations, but 
the association of these regulations with performance measurement regulations from 
MSAEBR has not been well aligned. The integration of the performance-related systems, as 
was urged in Law 17/2003, has yet to be made a reality.  
5. Communication problems. 
The communication between policy setters in the central government and the implementers of 
the policies in the regional governments has not been very smooth. Top-down information, in 
regard to the utilisation of the latest regulations on PMS, has not been administered to a 
sufficient extent. Most participants claimed and complained that they did not receive any 
further information or training on how to utilise the current changes in the PMS. Internal 
evaluators were dealing with difficulties in conducting reviews on their government PMS, as 
they receive no assistance in the first place. Most of them have called FDSA for help, while 
the members of FDSA have limited knowledge on MSAEBR regulation number 53/2014, 
since it was only released in late 2014. However, since it has immediately been made 
effective, regional government accountability units and internal evaluators have to comply 
with this new guideline without further top-down communication from MSAEBR.  
On the other hand, there is no evidence of bottom-up communication from regional 
governments receiving a meaningful response from the central government agencies. For 
instance, a participant claimed his government has lodged a request to the central government 
to incorporate a local program priority on planning system, which has impacted upon 
performance. However, they received no response on this matter.    
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A study conducted by NDPA on the national planning system shows that, at both the national 
and local levels, communication for developing government planning has been limited, 
particularly adequacy of information coverage during technical assistance. It was mentioned 
in the report that even though a number of training activities have been provided, the 
coverage of detailed technical assistance has been limited.  
6. Conflict of interest at regional level 
Strong political influence in the regional governments has spanned through various aspects of 
administration in the government system. Planning, budgeting and performance systems are 
no exception. The power of the House of Representatives members is significantly strong, 
that the executive side of government is often difficult to balance. Evidence can be easily 
found in budget finalization of activities being changed to accommodate the legislative 
members’ aspirations that are in conflict with the executive branch of government’s interest. 
An external evaluator describes this: 
‘Actually [a system] has a normative [regulation] and it has been designed 
properly. The planning has its own step, you must have known this…we know 
that regional medium term plan has to be aligned with national medium term 
plan, a five year plan than is derived into agency strategic plans. So there is 
continuity [in the process]. At musrenbang
24
 members of the House of 
Representatives should attend the meetings if they were to carry out their 
constituents’ aspirations. Activities they offer should go in through the 
meetings. In June, there is [another] meeting on ‘general policy on budget’ 
and ‘priority and budget ceiling.’ All have to be locked at this time, but [in 
reality] it is not. The offers come during the budget process, at the end in 
November. Probably the political aspect has to be managed properly.’ (P2) 
The deviation during the budget process is caused more for political purpose and self-interest 
rather than an intention to better suit the programs and accelerate government performance. 
The executive branch of the government is often reluctant to fully oppose the legislative 
members, as this action if taken may result in postponing budget approval. Late approval 
                                                 
24
 Musrenbang is a series of meetings at a certain time in the beginning of the year, to discuss development 
planning, which includes the discussion of objectives, priorities, programs and activities to be executed for the 
following budget year. 
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means the regional government is ready for a penalty that is imposed by the central 
government in terms of delay in transferring the central government funding. Since a high 
portion of regional government budget comes from the central government funding, the 
penalty means postponing most budget execution. Therefore, most regional governments are 
balancing the power of the members of the House of Representatives by compromising and 
accommodating their wishes, and as much as possible maintaining bargaining power without 
jeopardising the timeline of budget approval. This phenomenon has been clarified by most of 
the participants. A participant explained: 
‘Regional planning board might have insisted that [activities] are not 
available in annual working plan, so they are not to be tolerated. But for 
politically motivated activities, whether you like them or not, they have to be 
accommodated.’ (P8) 
A report released by NDPA in late 2013 indicates that decisions made for budget allocation 
were often not well linked to priorities in strategic planning, but instead were based on the 
agreement among executives and legislatives to fulfill each party’s interest. As a consequence 
of activity deviation, the approved performance plan and budget/budgetary document is no 
longer aligned with the working plan. Performance agreements are set based on the approved 
budgetary document. Hence, performance that is to be measure is not based on the original 
strategic planning document.  
7. High level of informality 
The meaning of informality, in particular to the present research, is the action of individuals 
or parties to utilise their power to infiltrate the system for their own interest at the cost of 
common or legal practice. The informality action when exercised always involves the 
breaching of formal rules. The most common informality in the regional governments 
involves the activity of individuals or a certain group of people to influence the elected 
officials’ policy decisions. These people are most commonly those providing assistance prior 
and during general elections, and thus having a reasonably powerful influence on mayors’ or 
governors’ policies. They may even have positions in the government administration. A 
participant raised his concern about this problem by saying: 
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‘Regional leaders have their succession team. Once they win, members of this 
team have their own positions and it has worried me. Frankly speaking, this 
can destroy the system.’ (P2) 
Other influence may also come from individuals from the same political background. For 
instance, they may have the same ideology since coming from the same political party. The 
policies are informally consulted with those influencing parties, and quite often the results of 
this consultation conflict with the best practice. Some sample of rule breaching can be found 
in terms of assigning less qualified people for strategic positions such as agency top 
managers. Less qualified managers are likely to have limited knowledge in performing tasks 
and responsibilities and bringing their organisations to better performance.  
Informality is not always related to top management conduct, but can also be exercised by 
other level managers. There is a common belief that the consultants and contractors hired to 
execute governments’ activities are often less qualified. Their submission documents are 
illicitly passed by the governments’ administrators for their own sake.  
Since there are a number of impediments to the process of PMS implementation, the quality 
of PMS is limited. This can be seen from a very limited number of regional governments 
receiving a ‘B (good)’ mark for their SAKIP to date. However, the trend shows that there is 
improvement from year to year in the number of regional governments’ SAKIP (see 
Appendix VI for the SAKIP evaluation results trend). The evaluation on overall aspects in 
SAKIP (including planning, measurement, reporting, evaluation and performance 
achievement) has been done since 2004 by MSAEBR and FDSA, and today it is also 
conducted with the help of regional government agencies responsible for internal supervision.  
6.5 The discharge of accountability through PMS implementation  
Since Regional Government Law number 22/1999 was introduced, regional governments 
have autonomy in terms of power and authority in managing their regions. There has been a 
massive shift in political accountability, in which formerly, due to the centralisation system, 
regional governments acted only as the central government representatives in the regions, 
with a vast majority of decisions being made centrally. Nonetheless, currently the control of 
central government over its subordinates in regional levels remains strong. The government 
administration system has made this possible, and it has been exerted through central 
government-imposed regulations over its regional administrations. As a result, performance 
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information delivered through PMS is mostly used to satisfy the central government 
requirements, by for example meeting on-time compliance in performance-reporting 
submission. The rest of the stakeholders do not have such strong power and hence are left 
limited in terms of being informed about performance achievement. For instance, 
performance disclosure to the public remains limited. 
The shift in PMS was quite recent, which impacted upon the readiness and the capability of 
regional governments to adapt to the change. A few more advance regions were able to 
manage their administrations faster than the others. For example, they were able to make 
good policy decisions in relation to boosting their performance. The rest, accounting for most 
of the regional governments, have since struggled to perform better regardless of more power 
and authorisation being delegated. In addition, as discussed previously, there is a difficulty in 
translating outcome-based performance, and this phenomenon is in particular occurring at 
agency level. In general, management is more interested in meeting the output targets, since 
they are more visible and put less emphasis on outcome measures. For example, management 
does its best to meet the number of hours of a training session and pays less interest to the 
quality of training and trainees. This attitude comes from a corrupted system where top 
managers pay much attention to output achievements, since failure to comply with output 
measures often ends up in dealing with law enforcement teams. This behaviour, of not putting 
a considerable attention to outcome measures, has costs in the lowered effectiveness of 
government products or services. 
The implementation of PMS and the production of performance reporting have been done in 
accordance with the central government requirements. The performance reporting itself 
should be submitted to the higher level of authority as a form of accountability reporting.  
The regulations have also been requested to be published in any means to the public, either as 
a whole or in the form of a LAKIP summary. However, based on the findings from the 
interview process, only a limited number of regional governments have provided such public 
reporting. Nonetheless, most participants mentioned that there is an intention by their 
governments to publish the government’s achievements on their websites in the near future.  
For accountability purpose, performance reporting is reported vertically from the lower level 
of the institutions to the higher level of governments. All agency performance reports are 
then summarized, and a government accountability unit has developed a government 
performance report based on agency reporting. Subsequently, a whole government document 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
This chapter outlines general overview of organisation with the emphasis on 
strategic aspect and issues. 
 
Chapter II. Performance agreement 
This chapter summarises some important point in planning and performance 
agreement.  
 
Chapter III. Performance accountability 
This chapter consists of two main components; 
1. Organisational performance achievement. It elaborates the achievements of 
organizational objectives through a disclosure of results from performance 
measurement.  
2. Actual budget spending. It describes the actual spending in order to achieve 
organisation performance based on performance agreement. 
 
Chapter IV. Conclusion 
 
Appendices  
 
on LAKIP is sent to higher authorities that are mostly the central government agencies as 
high-level policy setters. All regulations on performance reporting, except MSAEBR 
regulation number 29/2010, also require local government reporting to be submitted to 
respective provincial governments, but without clear justification for the purpose of this 
reporting. The current performance reporting (as from MSAEBR regulation 53/2014) 
template is as follows: 
 
Figure 6.7: The content of performance reporting 
 
 
 
 
Source: MSAEBR Regulation Number 53/2014. 
The other stakeholder that might benefit from performance reporting/LAKIP is the House of 
Representatives, but not in terms of a full of LAKIP; instead from an extract of it that is 
amalgamated into another report. According to Government regulation number 8/2006, the 
amalgamation of performance reporting and financial reporting is to be used to produce 
regional government accountability on budget implementation reporting (see Figure 6.8 for 
the linkage between government performance reporting and financial reporting).  
102 
 
Figure 6.8: A diagram of performance reporting and financial reporting linkage 
Government agencies Governor/Mayor/Regent MSAEBR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: This figure is an amalgamation of appendix IV-B and IV-C of government regulation number 
8/2006. Originally, the figure consists of two diagrams but they are here simplified without altering 
the components. 
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reporting to be extracted in this accountability document remains limited. Besides, members 
of the House of the Representatives do not have a sufficient interest in reading and evaluating 
the report. 
Internally, PMS implementation and reporting on performance achievements are expected to 
be used for a variety of policy decisions. This is anticipated to be of benefit in terms of 
delivering significant impacts upon the outcomes anticipated of the system implementation. 
However, since it faces a number of obstacles in its implementation, the uses and benefits of 
PMS are not convincing. Based on interviews administered in the field, policy setters in the 
regional governments have not used PMS and its reporting for setting service delivery 
priorities, allocating resources and adopting new approaches or changing work process. A 
participant commented; 
‘At this time, our government is still not using the performance report to allocate resources 
and budget.’ (P15) 
In developing programs and activities, government agencies propose to regional planning 
boards that are responsible to lead the government planning agenda. The content of proposals 
is usually a cut and paste from that of last year. There is no proper evaluation above each of 
programs and activities based on previous performance and priorities. Following planning 
approval, a regional government’s budgeting team will then allocate the temporary budget to 
each program/activity, most likely similarly to the previous allocations with some adjustment 
made based on the income predictions. Hence, no room is provided for the utilisation of PMS 
and its reporting on setting future planning and budget allocations. Even though PBB has 
been recognised for more than a decade, its  implementation has not yet been effective in the 
regional governments.  
Performance reporting is believed to be a mere formality and is produced for compliance 
purpose without proper use by stakeholders: 
‘I think the report is only a mere document, it is not used as a guide.’ (P8) 
The following apathetic statements show a participant’s views on the real value attached to 
PMS and its subsequent performance reporting at her regional government: 
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‘Honestly, it is done to [only] fulfill obligations in producing the performance 
report since the document we have created has not been used by the 
government, for example for program/activity evaluation.’ (P8) 
‘Since there are high level regulations that make it compulsory, regional 
governments have to [comply with it]. If there are no such regulations, people 
at regional government level do not care about the SAKIP.’ (P8) 
6.6 Motivation in adopting the central government PMS framework 
Indonesia is known for its unitary state, where powerful bonds between regional governments 
and the central government are maintained, mostly through imposed regulations of the central 
government. Despite the fact that decentralisation has been introduced since the release of the 
Regional Governance Law no. 22/1999,
25
 the control of central government over its 
subordinates in regional levels remains strong. For instance, the central government 
maintains its power over most resources such as taxes, income from mining industries and 
other income, and leaves a small number of resources to be collected by regional 
governments. This administration system has resulted in high resource dependency for 
regional governments upon the central government, where a large amount of resources in 
terms of funding is held centrally and the allocation is based on the central government’s 
distribution. As a consequence, the central government has the ultimate power over regional 
governments, and this power is exerted through regulations to be adhered to by its regional 
authorities.  
On the regional governments’ side, compliance to the central government-imposed rules is 
the only option in all aspects of administration. This is also true for the adoption of the central 
government framework on regional government PMS. The main motivation in PMS adoption 
and implementation is therefore predominantly in meeting the central government 
requirements for having a specific measurement system as mentioned in the guidelines, and 
having on-time performance reporting submission to the central government. This practice is 
viewed as sufficient to maintain the accountability purpose towards the central government. 
                                                 
25
 This law has been replaced by Law no. 32/2004 and its subsequent revisions. 
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6.7 Summary 
The evolution of the Indonesian regional government PMS started with the introduction of 
government-imposed regulation on performance accountability reporting in 1999. Since then, 
its evolution has seen efforts to make the system properly functional by improving guidelines 
and integrating it with planning and budgeting systems. PMS has passed through three phases 
during this time, and each phase sets a milestone in development. Nonetheless, a number of 
impediments to the implementation have made PMS less functional. The usefulness of PMS 
is then limited, and the management does not utilise it properly for policy decisions. The 
application of PMS is more symbolic, and regional government management tend to develop 
the system merely for a compliance with performance reporting requirements and to be seen 
to be accountable by the central government.  
Chapter 7 provides an elaboration of the result of analyses and provides some discussion of 
the findings that are presented in this chapter. A detailed discussion on the impact of 
accountability upon PMS implementation, and evidence of isomorphism as indicated in the 
NIS, are also covered in the next chapter to provide a fuller understanding of PMS practice in 
the Indonesian regional governments. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion on the findings elaborated in the previous chapter. The 
discussion is arranged according to each respective research question. The discussion on 
accountability is intensified in order to provide the link between the findings and different 
dimensions of accountability reviewed in chapter 2. In the final section, this chapter provides 
an elaboration of evidence of isomorphism during the process of PMS evolution.  
7.2 Discussion 
A PMS is vital and beneficial for both internal uses for a better performance and for the 
purpose of discharging accountability. Nevertheless, the usefulness of a PMS depends on a 
variety of contributing factors, driven by an understanding of the main motivation for 
adopting these systems. Further examination of whether there are issues that may impede or 
enhance the implementation process contributes to a greater understanding of the 
phenomenon at hand. In the following sections the issues found during the fieldwork are 
discussed, along with their theoretical and practical implications.  
Theoretically, the findings of this study confirm the application of NIS in developing 
countries, at least through providing evidence of isomorphism (i.e. coercive power from the 
central government) as the major driver for PMS at the regional level of government. In 
practical terms, efforts from regional governments in meeting legitimacy by conforming to 
the requirements indicate that the coercive power of the central government is significantly 
strong. There is evidence of excessive dominance by the central government, despite 
decentralisation being in place for more than a decade.  
7.2.1 PMS Motivation 
The control of the central government over regional authorities remains strong and is exerted 
through regulations pertaining to regional administration systems. This control is also 
evidenced in the practice of PMS in that the framework has been provided to be 
implemented. Apart from this, there has been a desire to synchronise the development 
planning between regional and the central government following the central government 
agenda. In more precise terms, the central government holds the control over the whole 
unitary state development direction. For this purpose, the National Development Planning 
System Law No. 25/2004 was released and its associated lower level regulations and 
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guidelines were published from year to year by respective agencies (i.e., NDPA and MoHA). 
This law regulates the need to synchronise regional development planning with the national 
planning agenda. In addition, Law number 32/2004 on regional governments reaffirms 
regional planning integration with the following guidelines in the form of Government 
regulation number 8/2008 and MoHA regulation number 54/2010. 
The Indonesian regional government performance framework has changed over time since its 
inception through Presidential Instruction number 7/1999, as the first central government 
imposed regulation on performance and accountability following the Indonesian public sector 
reform era. The achievement of government’s goals and objectives is assessed through 
performance information disclosed in performance reporting. The intended target of this 
reporting is the higher level of authorities and respective central government agencies. For 
instance, local governments produce performance reporting and send these to their associated 
provincial governments and the central government. This kind of reporting system is a formal 
central government requirement through regulation on the performance accountability system 
(for which MSAEBR Regulation number 53/2014 is the latest). Nonetheless, complying with 
such regulation does not guarantee the performance information is internally utilised by 
management to decide on future policies.  
Over time, PMS has not translated well into day-to-day activities in the regional 
governments, as a result of many impediments to the implementation process. Despite a 
number of obstacles to deal with, there is also evidence that the central government 
framework on PMS has been adhered to by regional governments. However, the major 
intention to develop PMS and disclose performance information through performance 
reporting is to serve the central government regulations. Such a practice provides a strong 
implication of legitimacy-seeking to be the most powerful motivation. Legitimation is 
particularly important to regional government since they need to be viewed as working on 
track, hence securing their positions in terms of possible unintended consequences (such as 
receiving unfavorable notice from the central government). Even though the leverage for 
improvement in the system is not as strong as the drive provided by the central government 
for financial administration regulation, the pressures in terms of annual evaluation from 
MSAEBR and FDSA provide sufficient drive for compliance with government-imposed 
procedures. This motivation shows support for the NIS belief that changes in the system and 
procedures are the result of external pressure, and in this context this pressure is from central 
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government through its legal formal rules and surveillance. This shows the excessive 
dominance of the central government over its subordinates at regional levels.  
7.2.2 PMS introduction and development 
An existing PMS in the regional government was initially a central government initiative, by 
providing a framework to be adopted and implemented by its regional governments. The 
objective of introducing such an initiative was based on the intention to improve government 
administration to be more efficient, effective, and accountable. Unfortunately, the 
implementation of PMS at regional level has not been as smooth due to limitations in the 
guidelines provided. Following an extensive literature review of publicly available 
documents it was found that there were delays in offering guidance. For example, a 
comprehensive performance planning regulation was only released in 2004. Meanwhile, the 
first regulation to introduce the applicability of PBB was released in late 2003. It was only in 
2007 that the integration among these three elements of a performance system was made 
possible, after the introduction of a working planning and budget template in which budget 
allocation is based on performance planning. However, the level of integration has not been 
convincing, since different regulations were developed in isolation without adequate 
reference being provided to the overall performance-related system. As a result, a number of 
the templates developed were not fully able to link elements in a PMS. For example, planning 
and budgeting regulations recognised “working planning” and “working planning and 
budget”, respectively, while the performance system used a performance plan template. The 
terms “working” and “performance” are not necessarily the same. Similar concerns relating 
to the lack of integration between planning and budgeting have also been addressed in Jurnali 
and Siti-Nabiha (2015). 
Based on the documentary and interview findings of performance-related regulation 
initiatives, it seems that there are three regimes: 1) a planning regime that sets a national 
development planning agenda, which is led by the NDPA; 2) a performance regime with 
PMS interest, which is led by the MSAEBR; and 3) a finance regime that focuses on 
developing financial performance regulations, and is led by the MoF. Efforts to integrate 
these regimes into a collaboration on PMS framework development has been urged in 
government regulation number 8/2006 and Presidential regulation number 29/2014. A strong 
effort can be found in Presidential regulation number 29/2014, which does not provide a 
separate performance planning template, but instead utilises “performance planning and 
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budget.” This initiative has made a complete linkage between planning and budget allocation, 
attempting to diminish planning duplication as quite often occurred in the past.  
Unfortunately, when examining the guidelines introduced to regional governments, there still 
appear to be inconsistencies between each of the documentary guidelines provided for 
implementation guidance. For example, the “working plan and budget”, based on MoHA 
regulation number 13/2006, recognises input, output and outcome measures at activity level; 
while Presidential regulation number 29/2014 only requires output and outcome indicators. 
While “working plan and budget” needs an update to adjust to the latest performance 
measurement initiative, input measures might be valuable to be able to indicate the efficiency 
level of a program/activity. Other than inconsistency, sometimes regulations can conflict with 
each other, which causes confusion as to which should be adhered to. For example, 
Government regulation number 8/2006 set a different guideline on performance 
measurement. Interestingly, this is the foundation for the released of Presidential regulation 
number 29/2014, which is translated into MSAEBR regulation number 53/2014. All of these 
inconsistencies provide evidence that reflect the low level of coordination among the central 
government agencies. 
It is not clear whether the performance reporting template under Government regulation 
number 8/2006 is still effective. If there is no further formal clarification, regional 
governments are required to produce two sets of performance reporting in different styles. In 
the field, however, the obligation of preparing and submitting performance information based 
on government regulation number 8/2006 has been abandoned in favor of complying with the 
latest requirements by MSAEBR. Since the enactment of MSAEBR regulation number 
53/2014, the position of PAA decree number 239/IX/6/2003 has also been unclear, whether it 
has been rendered ineffective or is still in use. Since the basis for PAA decree number 
239/IX/6/2003 to be released has been in effect as presidential instruction number 7/1999, 
logically it has been unused. However, if omitted, regional governments do not have a 
foundation for strategic planning and performance planning since they have not addressed in 
the latest regulation. 
In the regional governments, PMS development is the responsibility of an assigned unit that 
consists of policy makers. This unit works under the coordination of the bureau of 
administration at a government secretariat. For internal purpose, each government agency has 
its own unit with a focus on developing agency-level PMS, collecting performance data, and 
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producing agency performance reporting. PMS development involves individuals across 
sectors and agencies with different responsibilities.  
Government-imposed regulations relating to the system and accountability have resulted in 
high compliance. The willingness to comply with rules indicates that the central government 
enforcement has been powerful enough. Every year, an evaluation is conducted by the central 
agencies of each local and provincial government PMS. It is not possible that regional 
governments can abandon this obligation. Examining this phenomenon, it is clear that 
external force, in the form of government-imposed regulations and the central government 
evaluation process upon regional government PMS, provides evidence of a coercive process 
of isomorphism. 
7.2.3 Impediments to the development and implementation process 
There are seven main impediments found in the field, as described in the previous chapter, 
that might hinder the smoothness of development and implementation process of a PMS in 
the Indonesian regional governments. These impediments consist of: 
- Low level of top management commitment, 
- Passive attitude/apathetic behavior among staff at accountability units towards PMS, 
- Low institutional capacity, 
- Lack of coordination among policy setters in the central government, 
- Communication problems between policy setters in the central government and 
implementers at regional governments, 
- Conflicts of interest among stakeholders at regional level, and 
- High level of informality. 
These impediments have undermined the usefulness of a PMS of a regional government. The 
seven impediments can actually be distinguished into two categories in terms of sources. The 
first category is those emerging at the regional level. This consists of low level of 
management commitment, passive attitude/apathetic behavior among staff, low institutional 
capacity, conflict of interest among stakeholders, and high level of informality. When 
examined carefully, with interview and documentary evidence, it appears that low top 
management commitment is one of the main obstacles. Once this obstacle is mitigated, the 
rest of the problems might be easier to handle. For example, top management may use its 
power to switch staff attitude toward PMS from passive to actively involved in managing 
better results. Since a top manager has the ability to decide on policy, he/she can exercise this 
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power to increase capacity of his/her government, through for example providing adequate 
training to staff and enforcement of a rewards/punishment model to encourage staff effort and 
change their attitude. The level of informality can also be minimised once strong commitment 
towards running the system properly has been built by top management. Hence, it appears 
that solving the top management problem might ease some other obstacles at regional level. 
The low level of top management commitment found in this study supports previous 
literature on public sector PMS studies such as Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004).  
However, solving the top management commitment problem is not an easy task. At most, 
what can be done is initially mitigating the second category impediments, which are those 
that come from the central government. These impediments are lack of coordination among 
policy setters, and communication problems between the central government and regional 
governments. As gleaned from interviews, to some extent the root of the problems originate 
from the central level of government, which result in low level of regional top management 
commitment and apathetic behavior among PMS implementers. For instance, lack of inter-
agency coordination in producing regulations causes a number of inconsistencies and 
conflicting guidelines. This results in confusion and difficulties for regional implementers, 
since their ability to align among regulations is limited. As a consequence, this appears to 
have discouraged management commitment to utilise the system in the way it was intended. 
Other than that, the smoothness of a two-way communication between the central authorities 
and regional implementers is vital. If the messages from guidelines can be translated well at 
regional level and the regional government concerns in general are accommodated, an 
improved attitude towards PMS is likely to follow.  
Examining the better management of the financial aspect of performance at regional 
governments as a result of tough regulations and powerful rewards/punishment schemes, 
similar strategies can be exercised to enforce the utilisation of PMS. A comprehensive 
guideline or series of guidelines with a strong coercive power and rewards/punishment 
resulting from inter-agency collaboration might be powerful enough to level up regional 
management commitment and mitigate other impediments. This suggestion is also addressed 
in Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha (2015). 
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7.2.4 The extent of accountability 
This section discusses the impact of PMS implementation upon accountability. For this 
purpose, the present study examines the impact on several dimensions of accountability, as 
discussed in the literature review chapter based on the findings in the field. 
1. Political accountability. 
The introduction of decentralisation in the government administration may have been 
perceived to a change in political accountability, in which regional governments may be held 
accountable directly by their constituents (the public and through their representatives in the 
House of Representatives). However, the present study shows that the powerful control of the 
central government over its regional administrations has resulted in the change in regional 
government practices predominantly towards meeting the central government requirements. 
As a consequence, the public in general do not receive substantial information on 
performance achievement of their respective regional governments, and thus the community 
does not have the ability to substantially review the improvement in the government services. 
With few public reports released or information available for the public to view, there is an 
indication that the central government remains the major stakeholder that plays a powerful 
role over regional governments. This phenomenon could be the result of a strong “agents-
principal” relation between regional and central government, as discussed in the legal 
accountability topic by Romzek (2000) and Bovens (2007). This attitude of regional 
governments provides a drawback in political accountability, as the public in general and 
members in the House of Representative do not have the same information on governments’ 
achievement. This means that the public have a relatively low ability to hold their 
governments accountable.   
2. Legal accountability. 
In response to corporate governance, the central government released a number of regulations 
on performance and accountability. For the implementation at regional governments, the 
central government as a principal in an agency-principal relation exercises its power through 
MSAEBR. Since today more and more regional governments comply with MSAEBR 
regulations in PMS and its reporting, regardless of the use and usefulness of this system, 
accountability for legal purpose seems to be met. 
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3. Corporate and hierarchical accountability. 
If we consider a government organisation as a pseudo-corporation (as it is an independent 
body), we then may consider it to be legally held accountable collectively, as suggested by 
(Bovens 2007). This may be true for both the whole government organisations and their 
agencies. Thus, a government organisation may be held accountable for the whole conduct of 
its respective agencies regardless whether some of the agencies are under performing; so too 
do the agencies where they are responsible as a collection of individuals’ actions regardless 
of individual performance. In the Indonesian regional governments’ case, external 
stakeholders (for example the central government) require regional governments’ 
performance reporting instead of individual agencies’ reporting.  
 
On the other hand, if we look at the hierarchical dimension in the practice of accountability in 
the Indonesian jurisdiction, a head of regional government is the person who takes the blame 
in the name of his/her government for the inappropriate conducts of his/her agencies. 
Internally, individuals in the government agencies are held responsible for their conduct from 
top management to the lowest level employee in the hierarchy, each as actors of 
accountability.  
4. Financial accountability. 
The reform in the financial sector was actually started in 2003 with the introduction of 
performance-based budgeting. However, the term “performance” here might be still 
considered to be rhetoric, as budget allocations have not actually been based on performance 
evaluation of the previous year’s achievements and future prospects. The transformation of 
financial administration and management into better practices has been widely accepted at 
regional governments. The improvement in budgeting and accounting systems has resulted in 
most regional governments receiving unqualified positive opinions for their financial 
reporting.  
5. Performance Accountability. 
Performance accountability is a broad concept of accountability, where it reflects not only the 
quantitative and numerical financial performance but also discloses broader qualitative 
outcomes of government goals and objectives. Theoretically, performance reporting puts 
emphasis on the outcomes rather than on outputs. This is in parallel with result-based 
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government initiatives in the Indonesian government since they have conducted 
administration reform. Thus, regional governments have been urged to adopt this approach, 
and a performance-reporting template has been designed to disclose the elaboration of 
governments’ efforts in achieving their outcomes. However, in the field, the term “outcome” 
is difficult to define and measure. As a consequence, most measures developed have been to 
the extent of output measures. If we look at the public sector accountability and performance 
continuum developed by Funnel, Cooper and Lee (2012), performance accountability of the 
Indonesian regional governments may be classified as accountability with efficiency 
concerns, where the focus is on the ability for managing a series of inputs to having 
anticipated outputs. With this focus, the Indonesian regional governments in general sit in the 
middle of the performance accountability continuum. 
6. Vertical and horizontal accountability. 
Vertically, as is the case elsewhere, elected officials have the capacity to hold agency 
managers accountable. Similarly, agency managers have the power to delegate power to their 
respective lower managers and to ask questions on their conduct. This is also known as an 
internal control system, and it has been practiced with a varying degree of effectiveness from 
one government to the other. Accountability of performance in the Indonesian government 
context is very much related to vertical accountability (from regional to the central 
government), and the main purpose of establishing the performance accountability system is 
to serve government-imposed regulations.  
On the other hand, the practice of horizontal accountability can be found in terms of the 
House of Representatives’ power over government practices. Under a decentralised system, 
members of the House of Representative have the right to question governments in relation to 
performance. The government disclosure to this external control may be viewed as an effort 
to meet horizontal accountability.  
7. External and internal accountability. 
Regional governments have multiple external parties with demands for external 
accountability. The main external stakeholders with powerful control and power might be 
said to be the central government, the House of Representatives and the public in general. In 
terms of PMS, the central government seems to be more powerful in exerting their power, 
since regional governments’ compliance level for submitting performance reporting is 
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significant. Thus, accountability is more to do with the ability to address the central 
government regulation requirements. This also indicates that the central government’s 
coercive power has played a strong role in regional governments’ compliance. While efforts 
to disclose performance achievement in relation to meeting external accountability for the 
House of Representatives has been practiced, there has been no evidence of what exactly 
needs to be disclosed that are taken from the PMS implementation. In regard to performing 
external accountability to the public in general, as discussed earlier, only a small number of 
regional governments have met this obligation, even though it has been required by the 
MSAEBR through its guidelines.   
The application of PMS is also meant to be serving internal accountability. The present study, 
however, shows no significant internal use of PMS despite it having been advised to be 
administered, in Government regulation number 29/2014. Nonetheless, this regulation is 
considered quite recent, having just been put into effect. Future study may exhibit different 
results on the impact of PMS implementation and use for internal accountability purpose. 
Overall, PMS implementation has been much deployed for the purpose of serving legitimacy 
by meeting the central government requirements. Performance agreement between head of 
regional governments and the central government has made the central government the 
primary stakeholder where accountability needs to be addressed. Hence, there is a high 
compliance towards the central government in the willingness to adopt and implement PMS 
and by timely lodging performance reporting to the central government as the most powerful 
stakeholder to date. On the other hand, accountability to the rest of the stakeholders remains 
less functional. Meeting this vertical and external purpose of accountability tends to be more 
symbolic rather than functioning. With the absence of proper internal use, PMS does not 
necessarily translate into improved management performance. This finding provides some 
support for the NIS notion of organisational change rationale. 
7.2.5 Evidence of Isomorphism  
Since the Indonesian central government still has the ability to hold its regional, lower level 
authorities accountable for their conduct, MSAEBR as a central government agency 
responsible for producing guidelines can exert its power, which makes regional governments 
reluctant to disobey. The central government has this ability because the form of unitary 
government makes it difficult for regional governments to act without the central 
government’s approval. The central government has also retained control over a large amount 
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of funding to be shared to its regions, and the collection of this funding is tied to its 
regulation, as previously discussed. Hence, regional governments have a high dependency on 
the central government to survive. In terms of the performance reporting obligation, regional 
governments lodge their report as required annually. However, their obedience at most is for 
the purpose of compliance. To avoid any unnecessary consequences, they need to be seen to 
be legitimate and able to operate as normal governments. This finding, nevertheless, confirms 
the coercive element of isomorphism.  
This kind of motive has resulted in a high level of compliance among the regional 
governments in developing PMS and implementing the system, but a limited impact on 
performance improvement. Moreover, according to MSAEBR, despite a high number of 
performance reports lodged, few only have received favourable evaluations on their PMS 
elements. Without a translation into a better performance, the system development and 
reporting is thus mainly used as a means to perform accountability towards the central 
government instruction. This finding is similar to the assertion of Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
that institutionalised techniques in an organisation are adopted ceremonially and do not 
necessarily align with efficiency criteria.   
The present study does not find significant evidence of mimetic isomorphism. Information 
revealed from participants indicates no proof of adequate activity that can be categorised as a 
mimicry process in developing PMS. This phenomenon might be related to the small amount 
training that has been provided to staff at accountability units who are involved in developing 
PMS by their top management. One participant mentioned that she has once been personally 
sent to another regional government to learn about their practices, but the top management 
did not respond to her report. Lack of mimetic evidence may also be triggered by limited 
number of governments receiving a good mark in MSAEBR evaluation. Good marks may be 
perceived as these governments having outstanding or above average PMSs. Since the major 
motivation is to receive favourable evaluation, this provides little leverage for regional 
governments to mimic other practices. 
In terms of normative as the last isomorphism, this study also does not find any association 
between internal management initiatives and PMS adoption and implementation in regional 
governments. For a few years after the introduction of presidential instruction number 
7/1999, regional governments had difficulties with the system as they did not have the 
capability to manage it in early years of implementation. It is reasonably new knowledge for 
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regional government management, and this area of concern has not been taught in educational 
institutions. The only evidence that can be categorised as a form of normative isomorphism is 
the influence of FDSA management knowledge on PMS, as they are often invited to provide 
assistance to regional government. FDSA has branches in most of the Indonesian regions and 
are easily accessible. Interestingly, since there is little collaboration among policy makers at 
the central level, each institution may interpret the framework differently, either among the 
central government agencies themselves or between a regional government and a central 
agency. For instance, a regional government may receive distinct advice from different 
central agencies responsible for PMS, as evidenced in one regional government in this study. 
However, since FDSA has been appointed to conduct evaluation on regional government 
PMS, their regional branches are often invited to assist with the adoption at regional level.  
Overall, this provides some support for Dimaggio and Powell (1983) assertion on 
isomorphism, where the present study found evidence of strong coercive form in the process 
of PMS adoption and some limited evidence of normative isomorphism in terms of gaining 
knowledge from FDSA as a professional body. 
7.3 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the key findings from this research and offer 
some discussion on the issues around PMS application in the Indonesian regional 
governments. Similarly to most of the PMS applications in the government, the practice in 
the Indonesian regional governments also receives imposition from the central government, 
and as a result legitimacy tends to be the main motive. The usefulness of the system tends to 
be limited and yet find resolution by diminishing any obstacles in the implementation. It is 
recommended that the central government take action to address the issues raised by regional 
governments about the obstacles that are related to the central government authority.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis explored the development and implementation of a performance measurement 
system in Indonesian regional governments. Following the overthrow of the centralised-
government administration in 1999, public sector reforms were introduced. This was not 
unlike the rest of the Western world, whereby centralised bureaucratic control was being 
replaced with decentralised autonomous government units. Similarly, where central 
government budgets were once allocated and distributed on an incremental basis to regional 
governments, these lower level agencies now have decision-making power in relation to 
health, education, planning and infrastructure. However, as part of the decentralisation 
process, the central government needed to ensure their overarching vision and strategies were 
put into place, effecting transparency in performance and resource allocation. Central 
government agencies were set up to develop suitable performance measurement systems to 
measure and monitor performance. Through extensive document analysis and a series of 
interviews, this thesis observed the process of implementation, and picked up on a few key 
issues that have inhibited the process on the way.  
8.2 Summary of research approach and key findings  
This study draws on the last 15 years (1999-2014) of public sector reform in Indonesia. 
Drawing on the performance measurement literature and taking a NIS approach, this research 
examined the process of public sector accounting change. The purpose of the NIS theoretical 
lens was to guide the research in terms of finding answers for the Indonesian Regional 
Governments’ underlying motivation for adapting to change. NIS provided an overarching 
framework to guide the investigation into performance measurement system (PMS) 
introduction, development and implementation over time. It also provided a framework to 
evaluate whether there were any major impediments to the implementation of the national 
framework on performance measurement at a regional level, and the extent to which 
accountability has been impacted.  
A field study approach was utilised in which publicly available and internal documents, 
together with semi-structured interviews, provided key sources of evidence. Importantly, 
interviews were held with PMS developers, adopters, and evaluators, proving the ability to 
explore individual perspectives, further enhancing the reliability of findings.  
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This study details the process of development subsequent to the introduction of the central 
government-imposed PMS in 1999, and explores three stages of change, as follows: a) the 
introduction of PMS for accountability (1998-2003); b) revision in performance planning and 
budgeting, and the introduction of Key Performance Indicators (2004-2009); and c) 
improvement in PMS regulations (2010-2015). During these evolutionary stages, a number of 
impediments were noted. These include: low levels of top management commitment; passive 
attitude/apathetic behavior towards PMS among staff in accountability units; low institutional 
capacity; lack of coordination among policy setters in the central government; 
communication problems between policy setters in the central government and implementers 
at regional governments; conflicts of interest among stakeholders at regional level; and high 
levels of informality. As a result, the findings of this study support the NIS approach, that the 
Regional Government PMS adoption, development and implementation is largely 
legitimising and performed to ensure on-time compliance to the submission of performance 
reports. The process tends to be more symbolic in nature, and the desire to link performance 
measurement with budgets and resource allocation has not yet been achieved. The 
impediments mentioned above, together with strong Central Government influence, have 
provided obstacles to the development and implementation of PMS.  
In the discharge of accountability, PMS has been largely implemented and used for 
accountability towards the central government and dominant regional governments’ 
stakeholders and associated agencies, controlled by central government. However, the 
regional governments’ accountability requirements to other external stakeholders, such as 
local communities, remain limited. 
8.3 Summary of key contributions  
The present research contributes not only to management accounting literature by providing 
evidence from a developing country perspective, but also provides valuable insights into 
practical applications for policy makers and public sector accountants, for future policies, 
further accounting system designs, and their application. This research also offers an 
opportunity for other countries with similar socio-economic conditions to those of Indonesia 
to learn from the practices identified. Theoretically, the findings of this present research 
provide a strong foundation to support the NIS perspective in terms of legitimacy and 
isomorphism. The legitimacy motive in adopting and applying the latest development 
framework supplied for PMS by the central government indicates support to the NIS concept. 
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Similarly, the powerful coercive mechanism exerted through central government legislations 
and its agency regulations, as well as the provision of assistance by FDSA to support the 
application at regional level, are similar to what described in NIS. In addition, the present 
research was conducted through a semi-structured interview to different clusters of 
participants from a distinct responsibility background. Along with other documentary 
analysis, such a methodological approach set a standard of quality in findings. 
8.4 Limitations and areas for further research 
This qualitative research provides an understanding of the evolution of PMS and its impact 
upon accountability in the Indonesian regional governments. In an attempt to produce a 
robust research, this study has been conducted with the utmost care of methodological rigor 
and any means to maintain confidentiality has been employed. Nonetheless, it should be 
borne in mind that the findings are to be read cautiously in relation to their context. It is a 
country-specific study, the findings of which might not necessarily be the same for other 
jurisdictions. In addition, the utilisation of interview as a method of data collection poses 
limitations to some extent in the ability to capture the full story, as it is much dependent on 
the memory of respondents. Also, due to limited number of participants, the research findings 
is expected to be better representing the phenomena if there are follow-up studies to the same 
topic. These limitations provide opportunities for further research, as the present research can 
be replicated and expanded in a numerous ways.  
This topic in the future can be replicated in other jurisdictions, particularly in regions where 
similar managerial characteristics may benefit researchers in potentially finding similar or 
dissimilar phenomena, for example across neighboring nations, in management practices. 
Future research can also be directed toward a study on the central government practices, as 
the findings will be more useful for policy makers in evaluating the overall drawbacks in 
management practices for PMS at all level of governments, and subsequent recommendations 
and actions can be taken. In addition, future research can also focus on a particular sector of 
government, for example a study on the PMS of education sector or health sector may benefit 
the sector individually. This study can also be expanded by employing different theoretical 
lens. For instance, a dependency theorist perspective might be useful since there is evidence 
of high regional government dependence upon the allocation of central government funding 
in terms of budget share. Indeed, there is considerable scope to explore and to contribute both 
to theory and practice. 
121 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The implementation of PMS in the Indonesian regional government has been in place for 
around 15 years. During that time a number of guidelines initiated by the central government 
have been released to assist with PMS development. In the evolution of adopting the national 
framework, developing a system and implementing the system to be useful, regional 
governments have been dealing with a number of impediments that were arising from within 
their own local environment as well as from the central government. These impediments have 
made PMS to be more symbolic than useful for decision making. 
It is revealed that the main motivation of regional governments’ compliance is the result of 
strong central government coercive power that is exerted through regulations; and that there 
was no substantial impact on performance improvement. Since the discharge of 
accountability conducted through PMS implementation, regional governments put their effort 
into meeting vertical, external accountability towards the central government since it is 
perceived as the major stakeholder. Unfortunately, the real accountability in the form of 
responsibility for the community has not been met to a large extent. Thus, this study finds 
some support for the NIS perspective, where PMS has been mostly used as a “window 
dressing” to legitimise management practices, but without necessarily reflecting the actual 
use of the system for decision making and improved performance. 
Based on the findings, coercive regulations alone can result in dysfunctional behaviour, or 
fake compliance, in which the regional government acts as if it is accommodating central 
government requirements. Instead, they might exercise a compromise strategy, particularly 
when two or more external stakeholders favour different criteria, associated performance 
measures and outcomes. Significantly, regional levels of government might avoid the need to 
accommodate central government requirements if they believe the other requirements are in 
conflict, or if the imposition is not accompanied by explicit rewards/punishment as leverage. 
These flaws identified in practice along with a number of other impediments in the 
application of the national PMS framework are issues to consider by policy setters in both, 
regional and central levels. 
In addition, the findings of this research benefit the policy setters within the central 
government, in their attempt to provide reliable policies on regional government PMS. 
Particularly, PMS that might be applicable not only for the purpose of increasing external 
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accountability of regional government but also benefit by being useful in enhancing 
performance. 
To make PMS useful and mitigate the problems associated with implementation, an initiative 
to produce a single or a number of comprehensive guidelines with strong coercive power, 
including rewards/punishment resulting from an inter-agency collaboration, might be 
successful, but would also revert back to central control. If the central government’s desire is 
for regional governments to maintain autonomy, they may exercise inducement strategies or 
tactics as suggested in the NIS literature. By doing so, the central government may provide 
incentives in ways to leverage improved outcomes according to their national strategies, 
engaging regional governments in rewards/incentives for improved financial and non-
financial performance.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Documents used as source of evidence 
Documents as source of evidence used in the study; 
1. Government legislations 
- National Development Planning Law No. 25/2004 
- Regional Governance Law No. 32/2004 
- State Treasury Law No. 1/2004 
- Fiscal Balance Law No. 33/2004 
- State Finance Law No. 17/2003 
- Fiscal Balance Law No. 25/1999 
- Regional Governance Law No. 22/1999 
 
2. Government regulations 
- Government Regulation No. 8/2008 on Stages and Procedures in Developing, 
Controlling and Evaluating the Implementation of Local Development Planning 
- Government Regulation No. 8/2006 on Government Institution Finance and 
Performance Reporting 
- Government Regulation No. 58/2005 on Local Financial Management  
- Government Regulation No. 20/2004 on Government Working Plan 
 
3. Presidential instruction 
- Presidential Instruction No. 7/1999 on Performance Accountability Reporting 
 
4. Presidential Regulations 
- Presidential Regulation No. 29/2014 on Performance Accountability System 
 
5. Ministerial Regulations 
- MASEBR Regulation No. 53/2014 on Technical Assistance for Performance 
Agreements, Performance Reporting, and Procedure of Performance Reporting 
Review 
- MoHA regulation No. 54/2010 on Guideline to assisting Government Regulation No. 
8/2008  
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- MASEBR Regulation No. 29/2010 on Performance Agreements and Performance 
Accountability Reporting 
- MASEBR Regulation No. 20/2008 on Guideline on Developing Key Performance 
Indicators 
- MoHA Regulation No. 59/2007 on a Guideline for Local Financial Management (a 
revision) 
- MSAEBR Regulation No. 9/2007 on General Guideline on Key Performance 
Indicators 
- MoHA Regulation No. 13/2006 on a Guideline for Local Financial Management 
- MSAE Decree No. 135/2004 on Guideline on Evaluating Performance Accountability 
Reports 
 
6. Ministerial Circular 
- MSAEBR circular number 31/2004 on Performance Agreements 
 
7. Non Ministerial Central Agency regulations 
- PAA Decree No. 589/IX/6/1999 on Guideline in Developing Performance 
Accountability Reporting. 
- PAA decree No. 239/IX/6/2003 on Revision on Guideline in Developing 
Performance Accountability Reporting. 
 
8. Reports 
- Kajian Ringkas Sewindu Implementasi Undang-Undang Nomor 25 Tahun 2004 
Dalam Perspektif Stakeholder, Bappenas 2013. 
- Panduan Penyusunan LAKIP Dinas Pendidikan Kab/Kota, Agustus 2011. 
- Evaluation reports on one regional government’ performance. 
- Performance Reporting (LAKIP) of Bandung City Government 
 
9. Modul Akuntabilitas Instansi Pemerintah, BPKP 2011. 
10. Modul Akuntabilitas Instansi Pemerintah, BPKP 2007. 
11. Modul Sosialisasi Sistem Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah (AKIP), LAN & 
BPKP 2000. 
12. Email conversations 
 
(Akbar, Pilcher & Perrin 2012), (Radin A 1998), (Milne, Roy & Angeles 2012; Parker, D 
1990)
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Appendix II: An example of performance disclosure 
1. Health sector (an objective and associated indicator of performance) 
a.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective 1: 
 
KPIs: 
Health Index 
Life Expectancy 
Infant mortality 
rate 
Mothers’ mortality 
 
Source : 
LAKIP 
Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 28 of 174) 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 29 of 174) 
  
Measurement 
for KPI 1: 
Health index 
and 
explanation 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 30 of 174) 
  
Measurement 
for KPIs 2: 
Life 
expectancy 
and 
explanation 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 31 of 174)  
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 32 of 174)  
  
Measurement 
for KPI 3: 
Infant 
mortality rate 
and 
explanation 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 33 of 174) 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 34 of 174)  
  
Measurement 
for KPI 4: 
Mothers 
mortality and 
explanation 
142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 35 of 174) 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 36 of 174) 
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2. Education sector (an objective and associated indicator of performance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 41-42 of 174) 
  
KPIs: 
Number of years in 
school (average) 
Education Index 
The availability of 
books in community 
libraries 
Objective 5 
145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 43 of 174) 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 43-44 of 174) 
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Source: LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 44-45 of 174)  
Objective 6 
KPIs: 
Literacy rate 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 45-46 of 174) 
  
Objective 7 
KPIs: 
Educational 
management service 
Improved in 
national testing 
provider  
Merger and regrouping 
(elementary schools) 
Improved in 
PSB providers 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 52 of 174) 
  
Objective 8 
KPIs: 
 
Educators’ 
certification level 
Improvement in 
educators’ 
certification 
level 
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3. Religious affairs sector (an objective and associated indicator of performance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 53 of 174)  
Objective 9 
KPIs:  
Level of violation 
towards religious 
values 
Level of law 
enforcement 
regarding tourism and 
houses of worship 
building  
Degree of 
improvement houses 
of worship  
 
Degree of 
dissemination of 
religious values and 
the quality of 
worshipping 
environment 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 54 of 174) 
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Source : LAKIP Kota Bandung Tahun 2012 (page 55 of 174)  
Objective 10 
KPIs: 
Level of 
inter-
religious 
tolerance 
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Appendix III: Strategic plan template in performance measurement regulations 
Strategic Plan form based on PAA Decree No. 589/IX/6/Y/1999 
Form PS-1.  This form was used for first year of the strategic planning 
Sectors/ 
Sub 
sectors 
National 
strategic 
policy 
Institution strategic planning (year 1 of 5) 
  
Vision Missions Goals Objectives 
How to achieve goals and objectives 
  Policy Program Activity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         
 
Form PS-2. This form was used for year 2 up to 5 of the strategic planning 
Institution strategic planning (year 2/3/4/5 of 5) 
Objectives 
How to achieve goals and objectives 
Policy Program Activity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
 
Strategic Plan form based on PAA Decree No. 239/IX/6/2003 
 Objectives How to achieve goals and objectives 
Goals 
  
Description Indicators Policies Programs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Appendix IV: Sample of a working plan and budget 
 
Agency Working Plan and Budget 
Form 
RKA - SKPD 2.2.1 
Province/Regency/City ……. 
Budget Year …... 
Government sector : x. xx.  …………………. 
Organisation : x. xx. xx. …………………. 
Program : x. xx. xx. xx. …………………. 
Activity : x. xx. xx. xx. xx. …………………. 
Activity location : …………………. 
Total Year n-1 : $ .................. (.......................................................................) 
Total Year n : $ .................. (.......................................................................) 
Total Year n+1 : $ .................. (.......................................................................) 
Indicators and benchmarks-direct expediture 
Indicators Benchmarks Performance target 
Program Achievement   
Input   
Output   
Outcome   
Activity target group : …………… 
Budget description-direct expenditure 
Account number Description 
Calculation details 
Total 
($) volume  Measurement  
Unit cost 
/measurement 
1 2 3 4 5 6=(3 x 5) 
X x X xx xx      
X x X xx xx      
X x X xx xx      
X x X xx xx      
Total  
 
Source: Appendix A.14.1a of MoHA regulation number 59/2007 
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Appendix V: A performance agreement template 
 
PERFORMANCE AGREEMENT YEAR 20XX 
In order to have an effective, transparent, accountable and results-oriented government management, the 
undersigned below, 
Name : 
Position: 
Promise to realize performance target as listed in the annex, in order to achieve medium-term performance 
targets as set out in planning document. 
The success and the failure to achieve the performance targets becomes our responsibility. 
 
      Date, 
 
      Governor/Regent /Mayor 
 
Source: MSAEBR regulation 53/2014 
 
Sample of a performance agreement annex 
 
PERFORMANCE AGREEMENTS YEAR 20XX 
PROVINCE/REGENCY/ CITY: XX 
No Strategic Objectives Performance Indicators Target 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
    
    
 
Program  Budget 
1……….  Rp…….. 
2………  Rp…….. 
 
Source: MSAEBR regulation 53/2014 
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Appendix VI: The results of local government SAKIP evaluation from 2009 to 2012 
No Category 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1 AA  0 0 0 0 
2 A 0 0 0 0 
3 B 0 2 1 2 
  0% 0.74% 0.56% 1.32% 
4 CC 3 7 21 37 
  1.16% 2.57% 11.67% 24.34% 
5 C 35 143 93 88 
  13.57% 52.57% 51.67% 57.89% 
6 D 220 120 65 25 
  85.27% 44.12% 36.11% 16.45% 
Number of 
institution 
evaluated 
 258 272 180 152 
 
Source: http://menpan.go.id/berita-terkini/2229-rapor-akuntabilitas-kinerja-154-kabupaten-kota-baik 
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Appendix VII: Node summary report 
 
Node Summary 
PMS in the Indonesian Regional Government 
 
Source Type Number of 
Sources 
Number of Coding 
References 
Number of Words 
Coded 
Number of Paragraphs 
Coded 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
d
e
d 
Node 
Nickname: Nodes\\Accountability 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 3 5 118 5  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Development 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 6 22 884 27  
PDF 1 4 231 8  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Development\Aligning process 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 4 9 359 11  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Development\PBB 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 2 2 51 2  
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Source Type Number of 
Sources 
Number of Coding 
References 
Number of Words 
Coded 
Number of Paragraphs 
Coded 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
d
e
d 
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Development\Planning 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 5 9 406 12  
PDF 1 2 139 4  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 11 33 1,290 38  
PDF 1 2 139 4  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\attitude 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 1 1 25 1  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\communication 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 3 4 116 6  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\Conflict of interest 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 7 9 427 10  
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27/07/2015 3:07 PM 
Source Type Number of 
Sources 
Number of Coding 
References 
Number of Words 
Coded 
Number of Paragraphs 
Coded 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
d
e
d 
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\Coordination 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 2 4 152 4  
PDF 1 2 139 4  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\Informality level 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 1 1 32 1  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\Institutional capability level 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 5 7 352 7  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\Institutional capability level\ability 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 1 1 73 1  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\Institutional capability level\Training 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 4 6 279 6  
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27/07/2015 3:07 PM 
Source Type Number of 
Sources 
Number of Coding 
References 
Number of Words 
Coded 
Number of Paragraphs 
Coded 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
d
e
d 
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Impediments\Top Management Commitment 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 5 7 186 9  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Introduction 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 2 2 96 2  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Isomorphic processes 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 7 12 202 17  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Isomorphic processes\Coercive 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 3 6 94 8  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Isomorphic processes\Coercive\Regulations 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 3 5 94 7  
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27/07/2015 3:07 PM 
Source Type Number of 
Sources 
Number of Coding 
References 
Number of Words 
Coded 
Number of Paragraphs 
Coded 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
d
e
d 
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Isomorphic processes\Coercive\Resource dependence 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 1 1  1  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Isomorphic processes\Mimetic 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 1 1 33 1  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Isomorphic processes\Normative 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 5 5 75 8  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Motivation 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 3 5 107 8  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Motivation\Legitimacy 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 3 5 107 8  
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27/07/2015 3:07 PM 
Source Type Number of 
Sources 
Number of Coding 
References 
Number of Words 
Coded 
Number of Paragraphs 
Coded 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
d
e
d 
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Originality 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 2 3 60 3  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Outcome of PMS 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 3 7 139 7  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\System capability 
Classification: 
Aggregated: Yes 
Document 2 2 62 2  
 
Nickname: Nodes\\Uses of Performance Information 
Classification: 
Aggregated: No 
Document 2 4 57 5  
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Appendix VIII: A sample of hierarchical structure of coding   
                 Code          Category               Theme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budgeting is 
believed more 
important than 
the whole PMS 
Performance 
information has not 
been utilised for 
budget allocations 
PIs were not 
reliable 
 
Conflicts in planning 
regulations 
 
Limited alignment 
among planning, 
budgeting and 
performance 
PBB 
Planning 
Introduction and 
development 
Motivation Legitimacy On-time 
compliance on 
reporting 
Aligning 
process 
PIs and KPIs are 
not really aligned 
with medium term 
planning 
Strategic plans are 
not fully a 
reflection of 
medium term plan 
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Agency managers 
do not view PMS 
as significant 
Staffs passively 
response to 
implementation  
 
Attitude 
Impediments to 
implementation 
Communication 
Conflict of interest 
Informality level 
Coordination 
Top down information 
has not been well 
organised 
 
Bottom up 
communication often 
receive low response 
 
Programs and 
activities included in 
the later date 
 
Role of political interest 
is strong in setting and 
approving programs and 
activities  
 
More than one central 
agencies responsible for 
developing planning 
agenda  
 
Lack of coordination 
among central government 
policy setters creates 
difficulties in 
implementation 
 
Political influence on the 
elected officials’ 
decisions due to the 
power of parties behind 
them 
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  Top management 
commitment 
Institutional 
capability 
Difficult to 
define outcomes 
 
Lacking of staff 
knowledge due to 
limited training 
provided 
 
Lack of interest 
for PMS 
 
Limited knowledge 
on the function of 
PMS 
 
Isomorphic 
processes 
 
Coercive 
Mimetic 
Normative 
Compliance as a 
result of the central 
government imposed 
regulations 
 
Comparative study 
to another local 
government 
 
FDSA assistance 
in developing PMS  
 
Not used for 
resource allocation 
 
The use of 
Performance 
Information 
 
Internal use 
External use 
Not used for 
changing 
programs/activities 
 
Not used for 
setting priorities 
 
Fulfill obligation to 
producing performance 
reporting 
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Meeting the higher 
level of 
government 
requirements 
 
Vertical 
accountability 
Accountability 
 
Horizontal 
accountability 
Limited use of PI 
by the House of 
Representatives 
 
External 
accountability 
The central government 
has the strongest power 
in which any 
requirement needs to be 
adhered to 
 
Internal 
accountability 
Limited internal 
function of PMS to 
improved internal 
management 
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Appendix IX: Ethics- Participant Information sheet (invitation letter), Consent 
Form 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
Project Title:  Performance measurement evolution and accountability in the Indonesian 
regional governments 
Investigators:  
Dr. Gillian Vesty  
Email : gillian.vesty@rmit.edu.au 
Phone: +61 9925 5727 
 
Dr. Sue Robertson 
Email : sue.robertson@rmit.edu.au 
Phone : +61 9925 5719 
 
Muhammad Thahar 
Email : muhammad.thahar@rmit.edu.au 
Phone : +61 9925 5509 
 
Dear …………., 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. Please 
read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding 
whether to participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the 
investigators.  
On behalf of School of Accounting, RMIT University, we would like to invite you to participate 
in a research project. I, Dr Gillian Vesty act as Chief Investigator in conjunction with Dr Sue 
Robertson and Muhammad Thahar as investigators is conducting a research project on the 
evolution of performance measurement and accountability in the Indonesian regional 
governments. This research project is being conducted as part of the requirements for Master of 
Business (Accountancy) studies conducted by Muhammad Thahar whom research we supervise. 
This project has been approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee. 
You have been invited to participate because of your detailed knowledge and/or involvement in 
performance management system development in the Indonesian Government.    
The research being conducted is to document evidence on performance management initiatives, 
adoption, development, and its subsequent impact on services and accountability within the 
Indonesian local and provincial governments. We aim to determine the extent to which 
performance measurement plays a role in the Indonesian Public Sector to gain both practical and 
theoretical insights. We aim to interview around twenty people and build a valuable oral history 
that can be combined with archival records for deeper understanding of performance measures 
and the management accounting function. 
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If you agree to participate in this project we would request a semi-structured interview session, 
held face-to-face in your office or other agreed locations lasting approximately 45 minutes to 
one hour. For the purposes of transcribing data, interview sessions will be audio recorded with 
your approval. Where appropriate, we would be pleased to review any documentary evidence 
that you think would be a useful supplement to our interview data. While there is no direct 
benefit to participate, we anticipate that the findings of this research project might be useful for 
PMS development, refinement and enhancing existing capabilities. 
Any information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others from 
harm, (2) if specifically required or allowed by law, or (3) you provide the researchers with 
written permission.  
The result of this research will be in thesis format available in RMIT Repository and publicly 
assessable online. Data collected will be transcribed and translated in to English. All 
participants’ information will be de-identified and aggregated with N-Vivo software used to 
analyse the data. All input to the research will be treated to the utmost care and confidentiality, 
and materials/data associated will be kept securely at RMIT for 5 years.   
As participant you have the following rights: 
2 The right to withdraw from participation at any time;  
3 The right to request that any recording cease;  
4 The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be reliably 
identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the participant;  
5 The right to be de-identified in any photographs intended for public publication, before the 
point of publication, and; 
6 The right to have any questions answered at any time.  
If you have any question regarding this research project, please do not hesitate to contact us at: 
muhammad.thahar@rmit.edu.au or Phone: +61 9925 5509, and 
gillian.vesty@rmit.edu.au or Phone: +61 9925 5727 
 
Yours sincerely 
Dr Gillian Vesty 
Senior Lecturer 
 
Dr Sue Robertson 
Senior Lecturer 
 
Muhammad Thahar 
Research student 
 
If you have any concerns about your participation in this project, which you do not wish to 
discuss with the researchers, then you can contact the Ethics Officer, Research Integrity, 
Governance and Systems, RMIT University, GPO Box 2476V  VIC  3001. Tel: (03) 9925 2251 
or email human.ethics@rmit.edu.au   
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CONSENT FORM 
 I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the information sheet  
 
 I agree to participate in the research project as described 
 
 I agree: 
(a) to be interviewed and/or complete a questionnaire, and 
(b) that my voice will be audio recorded. 
 
 I acknowledge that: 
 
4 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the 
project at any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied (unless 
follow-up is needed for safety). 
5 The project is for the purpose of research. It may not be of direct benefit to me. 
(c) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only disclosed 
where I have consented to the disclosure or as required by law.  
(d) The security of the research data will be protected during and after completion of the 
study.  The data collected during the study may be published, and a report of the project 
outcomes will be available in thesis format. Any information which will identify me will not be 
used. 
 
Participant’s Consent 
 
Participant:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
Participants should be given a photocopy of this PICF after it has been signed. 
